DISSENT

TWENTY YEARS AFTER THE WARSAW GHETTO UPRISING

ARMAGEDDON

by ALEXANDER DONAT

ROY FINCH The Peace Movement Today

EDGAR Z. FRIEDENBERG The Image of the Adolescent Minority

BEN B. SELIGMAN Whose Taxes, Whose Economy?

IRVING HOWE A Revival of Radicalism?

GEORGE LICHTHEIM Does Public Ownership Still Matter?

STANLEY DIAMOND Modern Africa: The Pains of Birth

MEYER SCHAPIRO On David Siqueiros

SPRING 1963 95c.

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DISSENT, issued April 1, 1963, is published quarterly by Dissent Publishing Association, 509 Fifth Avenue, New York 17, New York. Subscriptions: $3.50 for one year; $6.00 for two years; $2.50 for students for one year; foreign subscriptions, including Canada, add 50 cents mailing costs per year. All payments from foreign countries must be made by United States money orders or checks payable in United States currency. Single copy: 95 cents. For special rates on bulk orders from organizations, teachers, etc., write directly to DISSENT. For information on newsstand and bookstore distribution write to: Eastern News Co., 255 Seventh Avenue, New York 1, New York.

© 1963 by Dissent Publishing Association. Permission to reprint any article must be obtained from the publishers. • Manuscripts will not be returned unless accompanied by a stamped, self-addressed envelope. • Entered as second-class matter at the post office at New York, New York on April 1, 1954 under the authority of the act of March 3, 1879. • Volume X, Number 2. (Whole Number 39.)

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DISSENT

VOLUME X
NUMBER 2

SPRING 1963

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A QUARTERLY OF SOCIALIST OPINION

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Meyer Schapiro

On David Siqueiros—a Dilemma for Artists

I have been asked several times during the last years to sign a statement requesting the Mexican government to release the painter Siqueiros from prison. He has been sentenced for a long term because he led a violent demonstration against the government and thus exposed himself to the penalties of a law which classifies such acts as crimes of "social dissolution." From what I have heard of this law, it seems to me unjust; at any rate, the penalty of eight years in prison for leading a demonstration and inciting to violence is barbaric. This law was enacted, supposedly, to strike at fascists and others who plotted to overthrow the Mexican government which prided itself upon being a revolutionary regime committed to the welfare of the Mexican people. Like the Smith Act in our own country, this law was once supported by the Communist party, which saw in it no threat to its own members. It is like the laws in the Soviet Union that punish severely any public demonstration against the regime.

In calling for the release of Siqueiros the signers of the petition have made much of the fact that Siqueiros is a great painter and therefore deserves a special treatment. Imagine, says the letter, Van Gogh, Michelangelo, and Goya, languishing in jail. Most painters would resent as impudent the idea that Siqueiros was one of that company of genius and would feel indignant or amused if they were asked to back that judgment with their signatures. But the issue here concerns the life of a brother-painter, and in such extremes one doesn't hedge over a phrase, no matter how repugnant to an artist's integrity of judgment. The important thing is to oppose an unjust law and to defend an artist who is its victim.

For those who composed the letter, the comparison with Van Gogh, Michelangelo and Goya is more important, even indispensable. By elevating Siqueiros to artistic greatness, they divert attention from his sinister political role. From the viewpoint of justice Siqueiros is not invulnerable. If one takes justice seriously, one must describe the painter in a somewhat different and less glamorous way. In 1940, he organized and led an attack on the house of the Russian revolutionist, Leon Trotsky, in the course of which his band kidnapped and killed one of Trotsky's guards, the American Sheldon Harte. He has also been accused of a part in the assassination of Trotsky. Siqueiros never denied his role in the attack on Trotsky's house and boasted of his action as "one of the greatest honors of my life." He was arrested, and indicted on nine criminal counts; but with the connivance of a foreign consul, he left Mexico and returned after the tumult had died down. He has never been tried for those crimes.

It is my knowledge of this history that keeps me from signing the appeal in Siqueiro's behalf. To defend Siqueiros as a victim of injustice, with-

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JOURNAL OF THE QUARTER

WHOSE TAXES, WHOSE ECONOMY?

Make no mistake about it—the great American economy is stumbling over its feet. Between 1958 and 1962, according to the Council of Economic Advisers, the gap between what we produced and what we could have produced amounted to almost $1000 per person, a total of $170 billion. Had the economy been operating at full blast, each family in the United States could have enjoyed at least another $4000 in goods and services.

Virtually all the indices now suggest sluggishness: the ratio of consumer expenditure to potential Gross National Product stands at about 63 per cent as compared to 67 per cent in 1958; the demand for goods and home construction is about half the potential GNP as compared to 55 to 60 per cent in earlier years; and business investment has dropped from 10 or 11 per cent of real GNP to only 9 per cent. These figures are harbingers of unease—most economists would agree on at least this much.

For one thing, the American consumer does not seem disposed to engage in relatively more spending than he has in years past. Ever since 1950 the proportion of disposable income spent by the consumer has hovered around 93 per cent. There has been no visible increase in spending on durable goods, one of the more popular signs of economic vigor. Interest rates are still too high to help home buying and vacancy rates in rental housing—one of the more recent centers of strength—reportedly have been rising. But most important, industry has been limping along at about 80 per cent of capacity for many months now. Even the CEA, which has a penchant for burying distasteful economic signs in verbiage, has had to concede that "in the past five years, total demands have not been adequate to promote rapid growth of incomes." Said the CEA in its last report to the President: "Consumption has not generated the profitable markets needed to stimulate investment; and investment spending has not generated the incomes needed to promote strong gains in consumption."

Why has this been so? One economist, James Knowles of the Joint Economic Committee, has argued that we are suffering from an artificially induced deflation. In effect, said he, a cultural lag has been imposed, for the responses required by the inflation of the 1940s and early 1950s are still being voiced. Tax measures that bore down heavily on expenditures are still on the statute books, although the inflationary threat has long since evaporated. No longer are we in possession of deferred purchasing power such as prevailed after World War II and Korea. Even the international "dollar-gap" exists no more: with the remark-

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able recovery of Western Europe it has been turned over to the historians to write about.

To these must be added the peculiar development of a compartmentalized economy in which a huge defense and space sector is partitioned off from a relatively affluent portion, and a few tidbits trickle down to the poor. The new exotic war goods utilize proportionately less capital and labor, and their highly specialized shape has less of a multiplier effect than most of us realize. The feedback stimulus flowing from rocket construction and similar enterprises is not nearly so sharp as that which used to stem from steel and autos. In the meantime, the traditional industries turn toward luxury markets patronized by an upper middle class, driving another wedge between the affluent and the dispossessed. All the latter can do now is to press the pants of the wealthy or fill their cocktail glasses or merely wait to be called to dig a ditch.

Perhaps this explains why unemployment last February rose to 6.1 per cent of the work force. The total number of unemployed had increased to 4.9 million; as compared to the previous February the unemployed had gone up another 400,000. Moreover, long term unemployment of 15 weeks or more was now in excess of one million, while manufacturers' placements of new orders declined.

Thus the need for a massive attack on our economic ills was clearly indicated. Yet virtually the only measure the Kennedy Administration could dream up was the rather tepid tax proposal. One would think that to really stimulate demand, substantial relief for low-income taxpayers would be offered. The Administration may have thought it was doing just this, but the facts seem otherwise, for those with incomes under $5000 are to be given a 20 per cent slice of the tax benefits, while the $5000–$10,000 taxpayer is to receive a 44 per cent share of the cutbacks. This may seemingly sound munificent, but note—tax reductions in the $5000–$10,000 category comes to $165 per tax return as compared to $286 per taxpayer in the $10,000–$20,000 group. Those earning from $20,000–$50,000 would get back $820 per return. The 44 percent figure tossed about by Administration experts hardly tells the whole story.

Meanwhile, much legerdemain was applied to corporate levies and so-called tax reforms. For corporations a reversal of normal and surtax taxes was proposed so that the initial impost would be 22 per cent instead of 30 per cent, with an eventual reduction of the total corporation rate from 52 to 47 per cent. The reforms themselves were little more than a potpourri of piddling changes that were unlikely to establish greater equity, a broader tax base or simplified tax administration. The new minimum $300 standard deduction, for example, was meaningful only for those with taxable incomes under $3000. Greater allowances for charitable contributions made a little loophole larger: already the total of such deductions could build the churches of America more than twice over. Social service agencies, however, are upset because of the 5 per cent gross income floor to be placed under all deductions. Real estate operators also are perturbed because this will give home owners smaller deductions. But the one great gap—those mineral depletion allowances on which Texas

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oil millionaires subsist—Kennedy did not dare touch. The 27½ per cent gross income deduction from net income was left alone. As a substitute, his tax message offered a series of complicated changes that the Treasury insists would really reduce depletion allowances by a fourth. Maybe so, but with Lyndon Johnson sitting in the Senate, one wonders how far that scheme will get.

The Independent Petroleum Association labeled the rather mild depletion reform as "a drastic setback to national security [and] contrary to the objective of stimulating growth." The United States Chamber of Commerce muttered that the tax cuts for middle-income families were illusory and was promptly advised by Douglas Dillion that it didn't know what it was talking about. The brightest gem in the debate came from the NAM which remarked querulously that JFK's measures were "over-oriented toward a quick pick-up in economic recovery." Congress thus far has been wary: all the elementary lectures delivered by Kennedy's economics professors appear to have had little effect. Walter Heller argued against puritanism in economics; Willard Wirtz warned of an increase in unemployment; and Kermit Gordon feared that a balanced budget would have dire consequences. (Senator Harry Byrd immediately demanded that he be fired.)

But can tax cuts—at least the kind suggested by the Administration—really get us away from the brink of depression? Most of the witnesses testifying before the Joint Economic Committee on Kennedy's economics did not think so. The combination of budget deficits and tax cuts in the first year might reach about $4 billion, so that with a multiplier of 2½, the total impact might be evaluated at around $10 billion. But the labor force will have increased at the end of 1963 by over one million, and another million jobs will have to be provided to make a real dent in unemployment. The final thrust of Kennedy's tax and fiscal policies might just about equal the wage bill for these increased jobs. Moreover, with at least $90 billion in idle capacity, the likelihood of new capital formation seems dim. With a capital-output ratio of 3:1, perhaps two-thirds of our unused capacity will remain unused, for even if the $10 billion were all spent on consumption, it would call into play not more than $30 billion in capital. Thus, there would be no new investment to make the company approach viability. There simply isn't enough starch in the Administration program to keep it standing.

At any rate, the tax program is just another illustration of the Administration's record of evasion and compromise on fundamental issues, all disguised as New Frontier dynamics. To give the economy in its present flagging condition an effective boost requires at least double what Kennedy wants to do. Instead we have before us a phased program of $13.5 billion spread over 3 years, with but a $2 billion tax cut for year one!

Much more important, it would appear, is an effort directly to stimulate activity via urban renewal, area redevelopment, mass transportation, a proper retraining program and public works of various kinds. Yet the myth of the fiscal cure continues to grip Administration experts, with only soft murmurings offered whenever the question of structural change in the econ-

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omy is raised. The specific proposals I have mentioned are necessary for meeting America's needs, but few in Washington, or elsewhere, seem to care.

Thus, as James Reston recently reported in the New York *Times'* International Edition, the malaise of drift is the most easily discernible note in Washington these days. Power balances power, said he, to the point of paralysis. Radical facts confront both moderates and conservatives and both quarrel with each other as to how best to deny their existence. The JFK philosophy of compromise finally has come to dead rest—neither labor nor management, Castro nor Keating, conservative nor liberal have been placated. Compromise has remained what it really is—low-level politics. It has failed utterly to solve any problem, whether foreign or domestic. As Reston remarked, its sole accomplishment has been to heighten frustration for the President, as indeed for the rest of us.

BEN B. SELIGMAN

A REVIVAL OF RADICALISM?

How many readers can recall the intellectual atmosphere in this country at the time DISSENT started publishing, almost a decade ago? It was a moment of retreat, even rout. A good many intellectuals formerly of the left were engaged in a flight to conservatism which proved as ungainly as it was premature. Seriously entertained, conservatism can be a respectable point of view; but the sour hostility toward their own past, the frantic pursuit of political "novelties" that a century earlier had become the merest commonplaces of European reaction, the barely-disguised contempt for freeedom which certain ex-radicals displayed in their devotion to the Cold War—all this was a good deal worse than conservatism.

It bears remembering, especially in a country devoted to historical amnesia. Do I exaggerate in saying that for the ex-radical intellectuals there was a steady need to depreciate the menace of Senator McCarthy's hooliganism, and that what really mattered was a kind of *union sacrée* in behalf of the Cold War? Or that, under the tranquilizing fumes of the "American Celebration," social problems in the United States were regarded as largely solved—or, in more exalted moments (this was a favorite gambit of Arthur Schlessinger Jr., before he moved from Kierkegaard to Kennedy), as symptoms of that impulse toward evil forever lodged in the human soul?

When DISSENT first appeared, it was attacked with a violence which surprised even those of us who knew we had no reason to expect popularity. Among prominent American intellectuals only C. Wright Mills came to our defense; and whatever our later disagreements with him, we have always felt a genuine gratitude for the solidarity he showed us.

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That many people disagreed with DISSENT was not troubling: who could object to anything so natural? What was troubling was the fact that an intellectual socialist journal, such as would simply have been taken for granted in any free European country, occasioned such venom and rage, as if somehow a deviation from the standard Cold War sentiments were a scandal, even a kind of treason.

Today things are very different, and largely for the better. People feel a little freer to think, to talk, to speculate. Is poverty still a major problem in the United States? In the early fifties you could see mention of this fact only in the left-wing press, but now it finds steady confirmation in a variety of places, including a long and excellent piece by Dwight Macdonald in *The New Yorker*. Is there a problem of power in the United States, a concentration of resources and decision-making which undercuts the formal claims of democracy? A decade ago the mere mention of this fact led to charges that we were clinging to "old-fashioned Marxist cliches," but now it is being discussed among people who do not even think of themselves as socialists. Is the export of American corporate ideology a poor way of opposing Communism? This truth has begun to sink into the minds even of people who had spent years learning to evade it. And do we need a strong infusion of radical policies to stimulate a sluggish economy and a complacent population? More and more people say this too.

All of which is pleasing, for we desire neither an intellectual monopoly nor splendid isolation. As a mood, if not a movement, radicalism is beginning to revive. So far one sees this mostly in intellectual circles, but if the mood deepens and the causes for its appearance persist, we can expect it to extend to larger segments of the population.

Young people in small but significant numbers have turned to the peace movement, that complex of political tendencies united around a desire to avoid atomic destruction. The American campus seems a bit more alive than it has been for some time. A recent symposium about the Cold War in *Partisan Review* showed a notable shift away from the Establishment ideology. *Commentary*, once the center of the more embittered, sophisticated anti-radicalism, is these days a new magazine, receptive to a wide range of opinion, including that of writers on the democratic left. David Riesman, who in the early fifties provided ingenious rationalizations for abandoning radical values, has in recent years been a leader of the Council for Correspondence, an informal organization of academic people devoted to discussing peaceful ways out of the nuclear impasse. Paul Goodman, who stood fast by his anarcho-utopian views throughout the forties and fifties and in consequence was restricted in his opportunities to publish, has recently been issuing some valuable books which are widely and seriously considered.

How are we to explain so notable a shift in the intellectual climate? Without pretending to a full explanation, let me list a few of the more important reasons for the change:

• *The Cold War has run its course of futility, at least for those who thought in terms of "total victory" for the West; the inadequacies of Western power, especially in regard to such areas as Latin America, have become clear; and it is hard to hold to the more simple kind of anti-Communism which flourished a decade ago.*

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displays a remarkable capacity for watering all ideas? That a radical article on a particular subject in the larger magazines can have value, it would be silly to deny; but that it does very much toward reorienting people to a fundamental shift in political thought, it would be hazardous to affirm. I don't know, and neither does anyone else. But there is good reason to listen to the voice of an English friend, Stuart Hampshire, who has written in the *New Statesman*:

> Those who would defend the existing social and economic order have an interest, as they well know, in lifting discussion from the crude material realities of contemporary living on to a higher, more vague and spiritual plane; the moral issues become less embarrassingly sharp and clear when the alleged social evils, being spiritual in their nature, cannot be precisely ascertained or measured; for then no inconvenient political measures are unambiguously indicated. Nothing suits the Sunday supplements, or Mr. Luce's magazines, better than a Great Debate on the Spiritual Malaise of Our Time, in which the young literary radicals are invited to lead.
>
> Mr. Paul Goodman humorously remarks that he is treated by the present American authorities as a jester, and is urged in Washington to keep up his cries of dissent, as some useful contribution to the social whole. He is a member of the intelligentsia, and dissent is what the authorities expect from an intelligentsia, as they expect battle plans from an admiral. There is, in America, as it appears to an English academic visitor, a self-conscious radical intelligentsia with a recognized role and license: that of the popular moralist criticizing the American way of life. . . . From the centers of power he can therefore be viewed with complacency, as someone who has a stimulating effect within universities, and as an ornament of culture in a free society. He does not threaten property.
>
> It was exactly this diversionary role of a freely speculative and morally concerned intelligentsia which aroused Karl Marx's destructive rages. He understood very clearly why the ruling classes would always feel safe as long as radical thought was kept in these speculative, philosophical, spiritual channels: his polemic against utopian socialism, and his argument that a movement of the Left must rest on a materialist philosophy if it is to be linked with effective political action, are suddenly worth recalling: surely there is a truth buried in that dead metaphysics. Reading Mr. Goodman, or the *New Left Review* in Britain, and sometimes also DISSENT and *Commentary*, the German utopian radicalism of the 1840s seems to have come to life again, with one significant difference: that with most of the American new radicals, concepts derived from clinical psychology have replaced the concepts of Hegelian metaphysics. "Alienation" now has a pathological, and not a metaphysical, sense, but it remains as abstract a notion as before.

• It is necessary to distinguish between radical journalism and radical politics. The piece Dwight Macdonald did for *The New Yorker* reviewing Michael Harrington's book *The Other America* is an example of superior journalism. It exposes many unpleasant facts which, until recently, were being discussed by radicals almost exclusively; it popularizes material which had been appearing in DISSENT and other left-wing papers, just as Harrington's excellent book does. But by itself Macdonald's piece is simply a journalistic effort, unrelated to any concern for *rebuilding a radical political community*. I don't say this in order, at the moment, to attack Macdonald; perhaps he doesn't see the need or possibility to rebuild such a commu-

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nity. I am merely trying to describe what it is he does in such an article.

Now take as a contrasting example the recent writings of Paul Goodman. He has a number of important disagreements with the editors of DISSENT, yet he shares with us a belief in the need for a political community of the left and for a coherent, larger view of social problems which puts issues into an historical and political context, rather than confining them to journalistic exposes. He writes for a wide range of magazines, but he writes with an eye toward a *political* end. In this respect, he shares with DISSENT a common purpose, and that is one reason he frequently appears in our pages. When Macdonald believed in the possibility or need for such a radical community (by which, incidentally, I mean a loose grouping that is not quite a political movement but may help prepare the grounds for such a movement), he edited *Politics;* since then he has confined himself to miscellaneous journalism. In the sense that I am here using the term, Paul Goodman remains a political man, Dwight Macdonald does not. And because we believe that one of our essential tasks is to nurture the point of view of the democratic left as a coherent intellectual *tendency,* because we wish to exert an influence, no matter how modest at the moment, as a political group or community, we believe that we must do more than write an article here or there: we must express our views, develop our outlook, discuss our differences, in an organized fashion. Hence, DISSENT.

• We remain socialists: that is, we believe in a fundamental restructuring of society, a redistribution of property and power, along democratic lines. Radical criticisms of one or another social evil, or of the society as a whole, have great value, no matter where they may appear; but just as they do not necessarily make for a radical intellectual tendency, so they do not come to the same thing as advocating a socialist renovation of American life. The difficulties in both the socialist position and in trying to advocate it these days, we know rather well; but we believe that an essential function of a journal like DISSENT, even as it engages in radical criticism and analysis of current affairs, is to keep returning to the fundamental need for, and problems of, socialist thought.

The ways in which this can now be done are surely affected by the changes I have described in the intellectual atmosphere. Perhaps we should venture a little into hypothetical "program-making"—what we would say if there were a significant socialist movement in the U.S. Perhaps we need to define more sharply the general perspective of DISSENT, even while preserving our tradition of individual freedom and no hard-and-fast editorial line. Changes and improvements in the magazine will be forthcoming in the next few issues; but in these remarks it may be enough to indicate the basis for our continued existence and vitality. We have a job to do, and with a certain amount of help from our friends and readers, we mean to do it.

IRVING HOWE

COMING IN *DISSENT*

THE UAW REVISITED
by Harvey Swados

BLACK BOYS AND NATIVE SONS
by Irving Howe

DESPAIR IN MISSISSIPPI,
HOPE IN TEXAS
by Willie Morris

SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS
by Stanislaw Ossowski

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THE PRINTERS' STRIKE AND THE LIBERAL RESPONSE

For over one hundred days the New York printers stood up against an attack without parallel in recent union negotiations, and achieved what may fairly be called a victory.

The most remarkable aspect of the strike was not the tenacity of the printers, but the shallowness of the liberal response. It was to be expected that Henry Luce's *Life* would editorialize its regret that the good-old-fashioned days of strike-breaking were past—in New York anyway. (Score one for Mayor Wagner. On the whole he did a commendable job.) But what came as a shock was the cowardice and viciousness of "labor's friends"—in the national Administration., in the academy, and generally in what passes for the liberal community. Ignorance is a poor excuse under any conditions, but what shall we say about those who lack even that dismal excuse?

Take Murray Kempton, a red-hot if ever there was one. Covering the labor scene as he has for years, he has on more than one occasion, and with the caustic skill which marks his best word, rapped the unions, and their leadership, for neglect of militancy—not social or ideological militancy, but plain old wages-hours-and-conditions militancy. If memory serves, he did a couple of such columns in *The New York Post* not long ago about the ILGWU. Kempton has been an implacable critic of Jimmy Hoffa yet he hasn't entirely veiled his respect for what Hoffa and the teamsters can achieve when they are of a mind to.

Came the printers' strike, and Kempton fell apart at the seams. It could be that he objected to the Newspaper Guild strike which preceded the typographers' strike. I don't know. But when the typographers refused to go along with the pattern set in the Guild contract, Kempton could no longer take the hurt. He joined *The New Republic* as an editor, and in its December 22 issue compounded hysteria with journalistic irresponsibility: the typographers are Luddites; Bertram D. Powers, president of Local 6, is a power-hungry tyrant; etc.

We could pity Kempton, and leave it at that. In a more recent column in *The New Republic* he ships oars a little in a kind of reluctant embarrassment, and concedes that "it is impossible for me to talk about the newspaper strike in other than personal terms." But the strike still brings to his mind the image of Cuba. ("I am grateful that I never had property and family in Cuba.") The assassination of opponents by a dictatorship (which permits no strikes!) reminds him of . . . his own situation.

With Kempton's second piece, *The New Republic* printed a column by James Reston that *The New York Times* suppressed in its Western and Paris editions. According to Kempton the Reston column was suppressed because the *Times* management was afraid of Powers. (*The New Republic* and *Life* etc. etc. are not afraid of

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the firing squad?) Maybe the *Times* management sensibly preferred not to pour oil on the fire. Maybe they had a twinge of conscience on what in fact constitutes news fit to print. For when Reston openly pleads for strike-breaking and calls Bert Powers "the boss of the New York Printers" he plainly disqualifies himself as an expert.

Now Reston is no ordinary reporter. He's the *doyen* of reporters, no less. True, he more often covers big national emergencies than printers' strikes (it took the printers 79 years to bust loose in New York City), and Reston can find a strike "an acceptable situation in a meat factory or a steel mill, but newspapers are not pork chops or iron fences." No, they are the products of paper and ink and many skills. And the men discharging these skills have needs and aspirations—almost as serious as Reston's.

The typographers were not the only craft to strike. Eventually mailers, photoengravers struck. Other crafts respected picket lines. But the typographers provoked the wrath. Let us, then, have a look at their union.

• A union which is the oldest in the country, its New York local the longest in continuous operation—over one hundred years; pioneers in all kinds of union advances, *yet* falling behind other trades and crafts in recent years.

• A union which is the most democratic and honest in the country, *yet* denounced as boss-ridden by those who get paid to know better.

When Powers announced that he had to submit the Mayor's proposed settlement to the membership, the idiot newscasters on radio and TV scoffed; it was only a stall. But the Kemptons and Restons should know better, should they not? They should know that the typographers have a "clumsy" democracy whereby everything has to go to the membership. Or would these champions of the people's rights (in Cuba!) really prefer a Hoffa who can ram terms down any membership's throat?

• A craft union of immense, and doubtless excessive, pride that helped organize the industrial unions of the CIO, and retained a close attachment to the industrial unions up to the time of merger—*yet* remained in the AFL.

• A union which has encouraged the development of new techniques, which maintains the best-equipped school in the country on the new printing processes, and which has even developed some new processes, *yet* does indeed find itself up against the serious threat of mass displacement by new machinery.

Easy enough to denounce them if they want to control the machines in New York that can produce newspapers in California and Paris. But not so easy to dispense with the human problem. Why shouldn't the members want to cushion the jolt of displacement? Are Guildsmen, teachers, bricklayers indifferent to automation and technological changes?

• A union which still invokes an image of highly paid workers dressed in top hats, *yet* which at the start of the strike in New York averaged a mere $140 a week on newspapers (and less in commercial shops).

Not the worst wage in the country, nor the best. If the typographers suffer the sin of false pride in relation to other trades which were longer in getting organized than theirs, and re-

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quired less skill, what shall we say of those liberals who have decided that the printers are paid enough? Why, there are assistant professors, still busy collecting footnotes for their desiccated dissertations who get paid more. With the twelve-and-a-half dollar package, over two years, that settled the strike, the newspaper printers will be making about $150-a-week on the average? Does that strike Kempton and Reston as exorbitant?

• A union which has led the movement for unification with the Newspaper Guild and all the printing unions, *yet* provoked the wildest antagonism in the Guild.

It is to the credit of the Guild leadership that it held the line against the panicky in the Guild ranks who wanted to break the strike. What a spectacle that was! A lot of them were ready to buck the picket line. Not that it would have done them any good if they had—without paper and pressmen and printing skills, what could they have done? It's a good thing for their own future that there are some *men* and *women* around, in the typographers and other allied unions, to save these pipsqueaks from themselves. And it's a better thing that the majority of the Guild, and its leaders, showed that they had a sense of responsibility in what was, of course, a time of great strain.

We get here to a key issue in the strike, even if it seemed like a dodge to the uninformed. The printers maintained that the principal issue was not wages, but a common expiration date for all contracts. In finally winning a common expiration date, the unions had to yield the best time for that—before Christmas. But they did get an agreement on a common date which the Guild and other unions are apparently ready to approve.

Actually, we have been up against this problem for many years. The steelworkers would settle a contract, and that was supposed to become the pattern for auto workers, everyone. By settling with the Guild first, the Publishers imposed terms on the printers and other crafts regardless of separate needs and problems—and the ability to achieve more by negotiation. The printers had had a bellyfull of this. And they stopped it. And their decision will have far-reaching effects in promoting the common welfare of *all* the employees in the industry.

Admittedly, the typographers did not get their argument over well. No one will praise them for having demonstrated any skill in public relations. Not that they had much opportunity to exercise what skills they had. Bert Powers might have been a bit more pedagogic and persuasive in his interviews. But then he was leading a tough strike, not trying to ingratiate himself with James Reston. Should he be voted out of office at the next election (*conducted by referendum in every shop!*) he'll be back at his linotype machine, not sipping martinis on Madison Avenue. (That's something else about the typographers. Every official, in no matter what capacity, has to be a working member of the trade. The printers don't hire labor relations experts—or tough guys. Just themselves.)

Yes, lots of people were hurt. Newsdealers suffered. Guildsmen suffered heavily. The printers took care of themselves. Printers' strike assessments are very high. (Nothing to prevent Murray Kempton proposing at his Guild meeting that assessments be raised to the level of the printers' so

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that benefits can be high in a strike.) Maybe printers' strike benefits are too high, but that's something for the printers to decide. They pay for those benefits. Maybe they should have yielded a week or two earlier when the International officers advised them to; but that's democracy for you, isn't it, Murray Kempton?

There are many realities the printers have to face. Interestingly, little was said, except as a kind of undercurrent, about "bogus" or reproduction. That's a provision in the contract whereby a certain number of ads, and as it happens a smaller and smaller number, are reset in each shop, though the ad that actually runs in the paper has already been set elsewhere. The leadership has been trying to get the members to understand that they will have to yield this point eventually—for a worthwhile gain. The membership of the union is reluctant to yield the reproduction clause—jobs again—but it is no longer the passionate point it was a few years ago. Meanwhile the "experts" fret about this more than the Publishers; except as it's a talking point.

There are other realities, Standards are being cheapened; the demand is for cheap not good typography. Skills are giving ground before various pressures—automation, of course, but also in the respect for skill and what it can do. This is no small point, practically or psychologically. The trade is being automated and massified. Obviously, the printers aren't the only ones who face such problems; They merely fought the battle this year; maybe they'll be in a better position to cope with these problems in the future.

But let's get back to the liberal reaction, and what it signifies. I've heard it said that the strike was "immoral" —that a minority of printers imposed its will on a majority of citizens, depriving them of news and entertainment (but not quite—because weeklies published, radio and TV kept right on going, a daily, the *Standard,* was hastily improvised and produced for almost the duration). *Where, however, were the Publishers denounced for LOCKING OUT the printers?* For that is exactly what happened. The printers struck the *Times,* the *News,* the *Journal-American,* and the *World-Telegram & Sun.* They did not strike the *Post,* the *Herald-Tribune,* the *Mirror,* or the Long Island *Star-Journal.* These closed by the decision of the Publishers. Four papers handling the news are still enough to keep the people informed—let's say inadequately, but well enough in an emergency. Dorothy Schiff, publisher of the *Post,* finally broke ranks with the Publishers and resumed publication after eight weeks. Good for her; but why did she close shop in the first place?

Where is a suppressed column by James Reston protesting this lockout? In his March 30 piece, Kempton remarks that what riled Reston was that the sacrosanct *Times* had been struck. Presumably Reston would not have reacted as intemperately if only the *Trib* had been involved. Could be; some things are clearly too holy to be tampered with. *But why didn't Murray Kempton threaten to—well, threaten to tear up his membership card in the Socialist party if the lockout wasn't ended forthwith!* Were the workers Luddites? Or were the Publishers blackmailers?

I've saved this point for last, and come back to Kempton, because I think this reflects a symptom of the

(continued on page 200)

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Alexander Donat

ARMAGEDDON

Twenty Years After the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising

1. Truth and Interpretation

To Dr. Isaac Schipper, the Polish-Jewish historian who was my closest neighbor in the potato-peeling brigade at the Maidanek concentration camp, I owe an insight which has haunted me ever since my stay there.

"There is no such thing as historical truth," he would say with his sad smile when we dreamed about how after the war the survivors of the camps would tell the world *the whole truth.* "There is just interpretation," he said. "It depends on who writes the history of our time. Should *they* write the story of this war, our destruction will be presented as one of the most glorious exploits in world history. But if *we* write the story we will have the thankless task of proving to a disbelieving world that we really are Abel, the murdered brother."

Not even twenty years have passed since Schipper spoke these words, and reality has already proved darker than his forebodings. Our tragedy has not yet had time to become history, its witnesses and survivors still live, their memories remain vivid; yet a malicious myth about our experience keeps rising before our eyes. The myth is both open and covert; its sources are at best ignorance and misinformation—at worst, vested interest. After the initial shock, the truth proved too horrible to live with. Then, so much the worse for the truth; it must be doctored, and of doctors there is no lack: the Germans, the Poles, the Vatican, the capitals of the world, and, worst, the Jews themselves.

• We are now far from the time when Karl Jaspers could blame every German for "crimes committed in his presence or with his knowledge. If I fail to do whatever I can to prevent them, I too am guilty. If I was present at the murder of others without risking my life to prevent it, I feel guilty."* According to Raul Hilberg,** about two million Germans were connected with the Nazi genocide organization. Other millions profiteered from the loot. Today, it seems that all the

* Karl Jaspers, *The Question of German Guilt.* New York, 1947.
** Raul Hilberg, *The Destruction of the European Jews.* Chicago, 1961.

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crimes were committed by a handful of Nazi criminals; the German people were not present, they "didn't know." Not only were the Germans "ignorant of the crimes," but the measly flicker of German resistance—late in the day (1944) and actually an ultranationalist response to the possibility of Hitler's losing—has now been inflated by some historians into a "soundless rebellion" in which almost the whole German nation ("soundlessly") took part.* Everything becomes simple. The small Nazis carried out the orders of the bigger ones, and the bigger ones the orders of the Führer himself. Since Hitler is dead, the guilt and responsibility are heaped on a small group of Nazi villains—most of them now conveniently dead—so that the German conscience is left free and clear.

Konrad Adenauer is perhaps an enlightened representative of the German conscience—or perhaps he is simply smarter. One thing is sure: he made the better deal with his "Reparations" and "Restitutions" to the victims and to Israel, than the claimants. He is doling out just enough to disarm the victims morally and to buy Germany's respectability in the eyes of the world. At the same time his countrymen—the murderers, their spouses, their families—are comfortably immersed in the prosperity of the *Wirschaftswunder,* pump-primed by U. S. dollars. Such a spectacle could only come about as the result of the shameful American-Soviet race for the favors of their yesterday's enemy. The political wisdom of this race is, for my purpose, irrelevant; the moral aspects are my concern; the depraved spectacle of the *Faust-Volk* periodically selling its soul to the devil, turning into a nation of barbarians, and then being promoted to the role of defender of civilization.

• As for Poland, it now seems there is hardly a man in that country who somehow hadn't "participated" in rescuing Jews from the Nazi murderers. This legend, carefully fomented by the official propaganda, is so well-rooted that the young Polish generation, Jews as well as Gentiles, believe in it entirely.

Each of the political parties participating in the revolt of the Warsaw ghetto and the Jewish resistance has tried its best to appropriate the biggest slice of posthumous glory: the Zionists, the Bund, the Communists. The Communists tend to grossly overstate their part in the Ghetto resistance and in the aid they rendered to the Ghetto.** The Polish non-Communist underground, the Home Army (Armia Krajowa) states through one of its leaders, Andrzej Pomian, that "we Poles are not burdened by the sin of indifference to the Jews' sufferings. In order to alleviate their fate, the leadership of our Underground did everything within the limits of our then very modest means."†

But the historical facts are not exactly thus. The late Dr. Isaac Schwarzbart, deputy in the Polish National Council in London during

* Gunther Weisenborn, *Der lautlose Aufstand.* Hamburg, 1953.
** B. Mark, *Walka i zagłada warszawskiego getta.* Warsaw, 1959.
† Zygmunt Nagórski, Sr. et al, *Dialog polsko-żydowski.* New York, 1958.

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the war, told me more than once, with tears in his eyes, how it really looked—and inside Poland it was even worse. I cite from my yet unpublished memoirs: "In vain did we implore help from our Polish brothers, with whom we had shared good and bad fortune alike for seven centuries. They were utterly unmoved in our hour of need. They did not even express ordinary human compassion at the spectacle of our ordeal—let alone some manifestation of Christian charity. They did not even let political good sense guide them—after all, objectively, we *were* allies in a struggle against a common enemy. While we bled and died, their attitude was at best indifference, and all too often it was 'friendly neutrality' toward the Germans. ('Let the Germans do this dirty job for us.') And there were far too many cases of willing, active, enthusiastic Polish assistance to the Nazi murderers.

"There was a handful of noble Poles, of course, but nobody listened to them. Their voices never carried above the continual screams of hatred. Heroically, they managed to save individuals, but they could not bring about the slightest mitigation of Nazi ferocity."

Two forces only were in a position to influence the Polish masses: the London-led underground, and the pulpit. Neither used its influence to change the climate of indifference toward the martyred Jews.

• The question of the clergy and its role in our tragedy is a very delicate one, but of extreme importance. "A Christian who witnesses inactively a crime becomes its accomplice." In our crucial moment in two nominally Christian nations there were to be found only a handful of true Christians. Of course, it is common knowledge that some Catholic priests, both at the very top and the bottom of the hierarchy, assumed a courageous attitude in a true Christian spirit.* But the over-all picture, it must in candor be said, is most depressing. The Vatican's archives are locked, and the true story of the Church's role in our holocaust has not been revealed to the world. The Vatican and Treblinka, the Vatican and Auschwitz—when will the Vatican archives be opened? When will we obtain the fully documented answer: did the Vatican play the part of Pilate, or did it side with the crucified martyrs?

• Only the great capitals of the world might have stopped the eradication of the Jews: by a simple threat of retaliation. What was done? They followed the letter of the gospel: they were silent. From paper protests, of course, they never shirked. But practically they did nothing to relieve the plight of six million innocent Jews. There is reason to

* The names of the Archbishop of Toulouse, later elevated to Cardinal Monsignor Jules Gerard Saliège; the Bishop of Montauban, Monsignor Pierre-Marie Theas; the Primate of France and Archbishop of Lyons, Cardinal Gerlier; Father Marie-Benoit (Padre Benedetti, "Father of the Jews"); Metropolitan Andreas Szeptycki, Archbishop of Lvov, the head of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic (Uniate) Church in Galicia; and many Superiors of monasteries, convents and Catholic orphanages, will forever remain in the grateful hearts of the persecuted. (Cf. Philip Friedman, *Their Brothers' Keepers*. New York, 1957.)

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• *It is increasingly hard to maintain the notion that capitalism in the U.S. has reached a state of health which leaves little more than marginal problems to solve, and those having to do less with gross exploitation than with intangible psychological difficulties.*

• *Though it remains necessary to keep sharply in mind the distinction between democratic and totalitarian values, recent developments make it less and less useful to enforce a black-and-white division in world politics.*

• *It seems probable that we will not soon plunge into a nuclear war through the deliberate choice of one or both of the major powers. This means that new kinds of problems, not accessible to rigid Cold War politics, keep presenting themselves.*

• *The ideological (or as it sometimes masked itself, the anti-ideological) zealousness that characterized a good part of the intellectual world in the early fifties was bound to exhaust itself. As with the crude Marxism of the thirties, there has followed a period of sobering second thoughts.*

II

Inevitably, in this improved atmosphere, the question must arise as to the role of a magazine like DISSENT. Put at its simplest and therefore (at least in this instance) most useful, the question one hears is this: If one or the other DISSENT article could appear in magazine X or Y, and if even *The New Yorker* is willing to publish James Baldwin's remarkable essay on Negro life in America or Dwight Macdonald's piece on poverty in America (both of which you would have been delighted to print yourselves), what reason is there for continuing a magazine like DISSENT? A decade ago radical writers could appear almost nowhere else; today many of them can publish in a wide range of journals.

We should face such questions with candor and good humor. The people who ask are not motivated by malice; they often appreciate the work DISSENT has done; and they are interested as to the role it can now play. Let me indicate a few ways of considering these questions:

• It was never our goal simply to get this or the other radical article into print. Ten years ago, to be sure, this was hard—though not impossible: *Partisan Review* continued to print some radical pieces. But in relatively normal times—as distinct from the repressive atmosphere generated by McCarthyism—*it should be taken for granted* that there will be an overlap between the democratic socialist left and certain sectors of liberalism, both as to opinion and publication. Far from being a cause for concern, or a reason for either tendency to abdicate, this should be regarded as a desirable state of affairs. If, say, a *Dissent*ish article is lost to us and appears in another magazine, this may cause us a bit of journalistic chagrin; we grind our teeth (mildly) at being unable to compete financially; but such difficulties are of a kind that ought to stimulate us to greater effort, for they are caused by an improvement in the political climate.

• An improvement, yes; but nevertheless there is reason to be a little skeptical as to the uses to which radicalism, or for that matter, any kind of intellectual effort, are put in our society. One wonders as to the *significance* of those radical pieces in some of the larger magazines: do they really have any effect upon political thought and action, or do they tend to become absorbed, sponge-like, in a culture which

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believe that Nazi Germany would have retreated before a strong world-wide reaction to its atrocities, and that they took world passivity as a green light to go ahead with their genocide. The reasons and excuses for this passivity can all be reduced to two: genuine indifference, and fear lest the Western powers be suspected of waging a "Jewish war." A too-resourceful defense of the Jews just "didn't pay," politically and diplomatically.* The sympathies of world Jewry were taken for granted (what alternative did they have?), and there was no need, as in World War I, to win them over with a Balfour declaration.

• And the Jews, last and most painful of all. What did the free Jews in America and Europe do when the abyss of biological destruction opened in front of one-third of their people, the crux and the reservoir of their national existence? Did they stone the parliaments, ministries and embassies? Did they besiege the Congress, and the White House? Did they dynamite the diplomatic outposts of the Nazis? Shmul Zygelboim ("Artur"), representative of the Bund in the Polish National Council in London, committed suicide when his efforts to stir world opinion against the Nazi murders proved futile, in the hope that his sacrifice would arouse the world; but how many Shmul Zygelboims were there, and how many *were* aroused by his act among the millions of Jews spared by the conflagration? Certainly they talked a great deal, and even wept and passed resolutions. But, what did they really *do?*

Thus the litmus test "What did you do *then?*" is amazingly efficient. There are too many participants and onlookers who don't care to remember the details of the spectacle, let alone to be reminded of it.

2. Like Sheep to Slaughter

By a sad irony, all the escapist, revisionistic, and distorting versions of the martyrdom, some arising from guilty consciences, others from shame and still others from "the anti-Semitism of guilt," were helped by some voices coming from Israel. These voices, by no means general, were conceived in a desperate negation of the *galuth,* in a determined dissociation from the tragic yesterday of the ghetto. Helpless hatred of the murderers turned into shame and hatred toward the victims—"Why did they let themselves be murdered?" They forget that Israel owes to the *sherit hapleta,* the survivors, at least what they owe her, that Israel is the bone and flesh of the Jewish people all over the world and that it cannot sever the umbilical cord with two thousand years of Jewish history. They seem to forget that the new Jew-as-warrior was cast in the crucible of a profound moral revolution that the People of the Book went through in the flames of the Warsaw Ghetto revolt. In hating the murderers of their people, in painfully reflecting upon the world gone forever, they were the first to coin the self-flagellating indictment-lamen-

* Cf. G. Reitlinger, *The Final Solution of the Jewish Question.* New York, 1955. See also H. G. Adler, *Der Kampf gegen die "Endlösung der Judenfrage".* Bonn, 1958.

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tation: "The European Jewry left the historical stage without dignity," declared Itzhak Greenbaum, one of the leaders of Polish Jewry in the twenties and early thirties, who emigrated to Palestine before World War II.*

There came also to light a purely pragmatic attitude of "nation-building realism." Out of the blood of the ghettoes and gas chambers came the realization of the 2000-year-old dream, the State of Israel:—and now practically the sole beneficiary of the billion-dollar reparations, and one of the few friends of West Germany! "Let's be realistic." The murdered millions cannot be restored to life anyway, and sound geo-political realism suggests that "our sacred scriptures teach that sons cannot be held responsible for their fathers' sins." So let bygones be bygones! Let's bury the past... And to those of us who cannot so swiftly change our hearts a bitter reproach is thrown: "We *read* memoirs, you still *live* them!"

And then—it was but one more step—the defendants' bench was marked by a new addition: the victims. From all sides obliging pseudo-scientists, historians and psychoanalysts started amassing "learned" proofs that the victims were actually co-guilty. These experts said that not only did the Jews not defend themselves but that by their attitude, due to a centuries-long tradition of passivity and servility, "they went like sheep to the slaughter..." and "collaborated in their own destruction." (Trevor-Roper.)

In this campaign desecrating the memory of our martyrs, the lead belongs to a professor of history at the University of Vermont, Dr. Raul Hilberg. In his 800-page work, *The Destruction of the European Jews,* he concludes with the following verdict: "The reaction pattern of the Jews is characterized by almost complete lack of resistance." "Anticipatory compliance" with the murderers' orders was the only weapon in the Jewish arsenal. Conditioned by 2000 years of submission and passivity they displayed an exceptional capacity for self-delusion. "The Jewish victims, caught in the strait jacket of their history, plunged themselves physically and psychologically into catastrophe." Thus the author condemns the Jews for their "role in their own destruction."

Even more appalling are the pseudo-scientific utterances of the Chicago psychologist Bruno Bettelheim. Because of his work in the Viennese Social Democratic party, he spent a year in 1938 in Dachau and Buchenwald. After his release he went to the USA where he became an "expert" on concentration camps and published several books, the latest of which, *The Informed Heart,*** analyzes the behavior of individuals and groups in concentration camps. From the safety of America, Bettelheim chose to start a war against—Anne Frank. "There is little doubt," he writes, "that the Franks could have provided themselves with a gun

* The very same people from the ghettoes and camps were to become the most devoted soldiers of the Israel underground and Liberation War.

** Bruno Bettelheim, *The Informed Heart.* New York, 1961.

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or two had they wished. They could have sold their lives dearly instead of walking to their deaths." "Millions of the Jews of Europe who did not or could not escape in time or go underground as many thousands did, could at least have marched as free men against the SS, rather than to first grovel, then wait to be rounded up for their own extermination, and finally walk themselves to the gas chambers."*

In 1962, from the comfort of Chicago, Bettelheim presumes to award patents of heroism and/or cowardice to Hitler's martyrs. In 1962, armed with a knowledge which the Jews *and everyone else* lacked in 1942, Bettelheim lectures them on how they should have behaved. The moral level of this advice is best illustrated by the story he admiringly tells of his Hungarian-Jewish relatives who, looking typically "Aryan," *joined the Hungarian SS* and so enabled themselves and some few other Jews to survive. He does not even realize the moral degradation unavoidably involved in such "heroism." Is Bettelheim naive enough to suppose that by serving the SS these Hungarian Jews didn't become participants in and accessories to the crimes of the SS? Survival at any price—is this Bettelheim's notion of heroism?

Bettelheim freely applies his experiences of the "extreme situations" in Dachau and Buchenwald in 1938 to the "extreme situations" in the Warsaw ghetto, Maidanek and Auschwitz in 1943. *He forgets that by comparison to the later camps, the camps in 1938 were like summer resorts.* Bettelheim is fully aware that "One could easily arrive at erroneous opinions if findings made in the psychoanalytic setting were applied outside the context of that particular environment." But the temptation to do just that is too strong for him, and so he commits this gross error.

In his masterly and unfortunately too short article, "Jewish Resistance to the Nazis" (*Commentary*, November 1962) Professor Oscar Handlin disposes of these charges: "It is simply not true that the Jews did not resist; there are ample instances of their capacity for fighting back. Nor is it true that greater, or more persistent, or better organized efforts of resistance would have staved off the catastrophe."

In my already mentioned memoirs I find the following paragraphs about the Warsaw ghetto: "There was a stubborn, unending, continuous battle to survive. In view of the unequal forces, it was a labor of Sisyphus. Jewish resistance was the resistance of a fish caught in a net,

* Amazingly soon Bettelheim found willing disciples and imitators. A particularly coarse example: In their best-selling novel *Fail-Safe,* Eugene Burdick and Harvey Wheeler, without any logical context within the narrative, treat us to the following tirade: "Anne Frank and her family acted like imbeciles. . . . If each Jew in Germany had been prepared to take one SS trooper with him before he was sent to the camps and the gas ovens, precious few Jews would have been arrested. At some point Hitler and the SS would have stopped. . . . If every Jew who was arrested had walked to the door with a pistol in his hand and started shooting at the local heroes, how long would the Nazis have kept it up? But the first Jews who shuffled quietly off to death camps or hid like mice in attics were instruments of destruction of the rest."

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a mouse in a trap, an animal at bay. It is pure myth that the Jews were merely 'passive,' that they did not resist the Nazis who had decided on their destruction. The Jews fought back against their enemies to a degree no other community anywhere in the world would have been capable of doing were it to find itself similarly beleaguered. They fought against hunger and starvation, against epidemic disease, against the deadly Nazi economic blockade. They fought against the German murderers and against the traitors within their own ranks, *and they were utterly alone in their fight.* They were forsaken by God and man, surrounded by the hatred or indifference of the Gentile population.

"Ours was not a romantic war. Although there was much heroism, there was little beauty; much toil and suffering, but no glamor. We fought back on every front where the enemy attacked—the biological front, the economic front, the propaganda front—with every weapon we possessed.

"In the end it was ruse, deception and cunning beyond anything the world has ever seen, which accomplished what hunger and disease could not achieve. What defeated us, ultimately, was Jewry's indestructible optimism, our eternal faith in the goodness of man—or rather, in the limits of his degradation. For generations, the Jews of eastern Europe had looked to Berlin as to the very symbol of lawfulness, enlightenment and culture. We just could not believe that a German, even disguised as a Nazi, would so far renounce his own humanity as to murder women and children—coldly and systematically. We paid a terrible price for our hope, which turned out to be a delusion: the delusion that the nation of Kant, Goethe, Mozart and Beethoven cannot be a nation of murderers. And when, finally, we saw how we had been deceived, and we resorted to the weapons for which we were least well prepared—historically, philosophically, psychologically—when we finally took up arms, we inscribed in the annals of history the unforgettable epic of the Warsaw ghetto uprising."

A few basic facts, and I commend them particularly to Trevor-Roper, Hilberg, Bettelheim and all the other retrospective heroes: at the start of the big "Resettlement" action in Warsaw (July 22, 1942) a clandestine meeting of representatives of all organizations active in the Ghetto (except the Revisionists) was urgently summoned. The majority was against an immediate resistance, arguing that it would serve as an excuse for a total massacre. "Painful as it is," they argued, "it is better to sacrifice 70,000 Jews destined for deportation than to endanger the lives of half a million. Since the Nazis apply the principle of collective responsibility, it will bring disaster." The participants in the meeting did not know at that time that deportation meant death. Dr. Emanuel Ringelblum, the archivist of the Ghetto, testifies: "To normally thinking people it was difficult to accept the idea that a Government pretending to the name of European can be found on the globe which would murder millions of innocent people." Today it is easy to sneer at such pathetic delusions and wax morally superior; but what would our com-

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bative professors and psychoanalysts have done if they had been confronted, day by day, with the agony of such choices?

The more-militant Left-Zionist youth groups disagreed with the majority and decided to act on their own. *Six* days later (July 28, 1942) the nucleus of what was later to become the Jewish Fighters' Organization was born. *In the second half of August one revolver was smuggled into the Ghetto as a gift from the Polish Workers Party.* Note this well, Messrs. Bettelheim and Hilberg, our resistance began with *one* revolver. This revolver was used by the *Shomer* Israel Kanal in his attempt on the chief of the Ghetto police, Szerynski, on August 25, 1942, the date that is considered the beginning of the armed Ghetto resistance. By the end of December 1942 (when the massacre was practically completed) the Home Army turned over to the Jewish fighters in Warsaw *ten* pistols, and then *fifty* grenades and revolvers in February 1943. In Bialystok and Vilna the Jewish fighters received nothing.

Just consider the *quantities* involved: *one, ten, fifty.* This was the help received from the Polish underground. But to Bruno Bettelheim it seems that the Franks (and of course all the remaining million Jewish families in Europe) could "easily" get "one or two" guns—which would have amounted to 1 or 2 million guns! To say things like this is not merely to mock the victims, but to reveal a total failure to imagine what life was like under the Nazis.

Mr. Bettelheim also disapproves of "the Franks' selection [!] of a hiding place that was basically a trap without an outlet." Doesn't the man know that hundreds of thousands of Jews perished because they had *no* place to hide, with or without an outlet? That it wasn't a matter of choice—we could not advertise in the *New York Times*—but of grasping whatever we could? How relevant and realistic Bettelheim's advices are, is best illustrated by my own experience: In our shelter in the Warsaw ghetto there was *one* revolver among the forty persons present. The man with the gun was very anxious to make the Nazis pay dearly for our lives. *He was not even given the chance.* The Germans were careful enough never to approach us within shooting (let alone stabbing) distance. The SS General Stroop, responsible for the destruction of the Warsaw Ghetto, ordered his troops to set fire to *every building* in the ghetto. Special engineer brigades poured gasoline on the ground floors and wooden staircases, then threw grenades and gas bombs into cellar bunkers. Thousands of Jews perished in flames and smoke without a physical chance to fight, even if they *had* had the weapons. For Mr. Bettelheim's comfort: Our shelter *did* have an emergency exit. When flames and smoke reached our shelter, the man with the gun ordered its evacuation. About half of the occupants preferred potassium cyanide to surrender. The others momentarily escaped, only to be captured and killed eventually, one way or another. Balance: only *two* survived (my wife and I). Not because we "did not

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believe in business as usual" and they did. It was just a succession of miracles. Ironically, the man with the gun did not survive.

Bettelheim says: "Anne Frank died because her parents could not get themselves to believe in Auschwitz." But the truth is, Mr. Bettelheim, that nobody could, not you nor I nor anyone else at the time. But what can one expect from a man who could bring himself to write so calloused, so ignorant a sentence as: "Most Jews in Poland who did not believe in business as usual survived the Second World War." Before such a display of bad faith and outrageous stupidity, language is helpless.

Says the Polish journalist Wanda Pelczynska in her review of Hilberg's book:

> Hilberg, educated and living in a free world, doesn't understand how people locked-up in jail, in camp, in the ghetto, people not protected by any law, exposed to enemy violence—save themselves by an illusion of hope. These people are easily told lies and by lies are brought without resistance to the execution trench. Thus the NKVD double-crossed thousands of Polish officers [presumably not contaminated by the Jewish ethos of passivity]; they transported them to Katyn by telling them that this was a change from a worse camp to a better one. And these people, mind you, were brought up on the principle that "violence will be met with violence" and "when our hour to die will come—it will be in combat."

Says Walter Z. Laqueur (*Survey,* October 1962):

> In more than one sense the Russians were unprepared for the German onslaught in June 1941. Sholokhov, in his *The Science of Hatred,* has described the shock experienced by Soviet citizens when they realized that the behavior of the Germans in the occupied territories was very far indeed from their traditional image of the civilized and orderly German; they could not believe the news about mass killings, mass robbery and brutal oppression. They had always held the Germans in special esteem. As Stalin had told Emil Ludwig in a famous interview, "The Germans were a solid, reliable, sober people who could be trusted."

Witnesses Higher SS and Police Chief Erich von dem Bach Zelewsky:

> The mass of the Jewish people were taken completely by surprise. Never before has a people gone so unsuspectingly to its disaster. After the first anti-Jewish actions of the Germans, they thought now the wave was over and so they walked back to their undoing.

Hilberg himself admits that "one of the most giant hoaxes in world history was perpetrated on five million people noted for their intellect."

There is abundant evidence that Jews took at face value German assurances that it was a bona fide resettlement. Resettlements and relocations of one kind or another had been commonplace since the beginning of the war, and no one for a moment imagined that *this one*

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would be different. Hundreds of thousands came to Auschwitz, loaded with food and clothes and their life's savings. Thousands of young people in the Warsaw ghetto with knapsacks and bags volunteered at the *Umschlagplatz* to "join their families previously resettled." Full credit must be given to the Nazi stage-managers that the deceiving appearances, camouflage, psychological warfare and the torture of hope were maintained to the very last moment. Any unbiased person can see the tragedy of the Jews' ignorance. But not Bettelheim and Hilberg: to them the Jews "collaborated in self-destruction."

The tragic truth is, and this is to a great extent our fault as survivors, that twenty years after it occurred, the catastrophe of European Jewry and the epic of the Warsaw ghetto uprising is little known and even less understood. For three years the Warsaw Ghetto had been systematically bled: by savage Nazi repression and discrimination, by famine and disease, by the Gestapo, by traitors among us, by the misgovernment of the Judenrat.* The toll of deaths was 100,000 human beings, 25 per cent of its entire population. It was stripped of its political and intellectual leaders who were abroad as a result of the 1939 exodus. The same applies also to the majority of its young men who were either in USSR or in other countries. For some reasons, the male mortality in the Ghetto was twice that of females. Thus, in 1943, the Ghetto was a famished, broken city of women and children.

And still our record stands the toughest scrutiny when compared to the French Huguenots, to the massacred Armenians, not to mention Andersonville, Eupen-Malmedy, or Soviet prisoners-of-war. And what about Czechoslovakia in 1938? And France in 1940?

Let us remember too the anything but heroic performance of the American people, including the intellectuals, in the McCarthy era. Try to imagine McCarthy in war time, endowed with total power, with limitless facilities for terror and destruction, with no legal opposition and with full control of press, radio and television. Imagine McCarthy with his cohorts determined to physically exterminate and plunder a minority segment of the nation, all "for the glory of America." I am by no means sure about the conduct under such circumstances of the majority of Americans nor of the reaction of our vociferous "heroes," had they had the misfortune to belong to that doomed minority.

Lord Moran, who spent three years as army physician in Flanders during World War I, and a year with the RAF in World War II, observes how soldiers' morale cracks under the strain of tension, shock, and monotony in the trenches, and how their resistance to fear is lowered by sickness, fatigue, loss of sleep and other hardships. "Courage is will-power, whereof no man has an unlimited stock; and when in war it is used up, he is finished."** Has it ever occurred to our retrospective

* Judenrats in most cases began with subjectively honest intentions only to end as tragically helpless collaborators and, in some instances, traitors. This problem warrants a special research work in itself.

** Lord Moran, *The Anatomy of Courage*. London, 1945.

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heroes who now assault the victims of Nazism that after years in the ghetto and camps, after endless "conditioning," after the loss of their dearest ones, a point comes when it no longer matters whether one dies with a piece of iron in his hand—the so-called "hero's death"—or dies passively in a gas chamber? Bettelheim has written about "extreme situations," but he does not know—and perhaps no one can who did not live through it—what an extreme situation really is.

I purposely leave aside the wide range of problems that border on psychology, philosophy, and ethics: where does the natural self-preservative instinct stop and fear and anxiety begin? Where is the line between controlled fear and cowardice? Is discipline cowardice or courage, collaboration or responsibility? And, on the other side of the spectrum: how long can responsibility (individual and collective) be stretched before it becomes courage, and at what point does an idea greater than fear transform courage into heroism? Heroism carried one step too far can be irresponsibility. Was the Warsaw uprising in 1944 an act of heroism or suicidal folly? Was Czechoslovakia's surrender after Munich an act of cowardice or tragic realism? And, in purely practical terms and not just for the glorious record, did Poland with her romantic adventurism fare better than Czechoslovakia with her pragmatism?

The heroism of the handful of Warsaw youths shook the imagination of our generation, though we have become *blasé* toward acts of daring. But that heroism at the same time concealed the much more profound and shattering sacrifice of 50,000 defenseless men, women and children, who in a magnificent gesture of unarmed resistance defeated the Nazi bestial violence. As never before in mankind's history, heroism and martyrdom flashed in the lightning of doom. It takes a Tolstoy or a Gandhi to appreciate the grandeur of the spectacle. In the climax of our history martyrdom reached its most sublime expression, and in the unprecedented revolutionary tension there appeared a heroism that was the turning point of Jewish history and created a new type of Jew. Martyrdom was the mainstream of Jewish history for millennia. In our catastrophe martyrdom and heroism became inseparable ingredients. No one can tell whether and when the two ingredients will cross again. They are both equally tragic and equally sublime.

We are blessed and burdened with the memory of both; neither can be taken from us; and neither could save us.

3. Hatred and Soap

There is a widespread belief that the Jewish tragedy is a result of Hitler's psychopathic hatred of the Jews, that it was conceived in the obsession of a maniac. William Shirer defines our catastrophe as "the shattering cost of [Hitler's] aberration." Handlin thinks that "Hitler . . . was determined, for reasons which were totally irrational, expensive, and contrary to the interests of the state, to liquidate the Jews."

To reduce the origins of genocide to Hitler's psychopathic hatred

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is both historically and politically naive. The anti-Jewish policy of the Nazis was a worked-out calculation. Hermann Rauschning (*Gespräche mit Hitler,* Zurich 1940) quotes Hitler that anti-Semitism is "die wichtigste Waffe in unserem Propaganda-Arsenal."* And Robert Ley, the leader of the Deutsche Arbeitsfront, stated in May 1944: "Anti-Semitism is our second secret weapon."

Irrational hatred sometimes results in murder, but a passionate murderer does not manufacture soap out of the fat of his victim. The anti-Jewish war was a coldly premeditated political action carried out with the most monstrous precision. Says Professor Golo Mann, the son of Thomas Mann: "The German nation in its overwhelming majority was not at all passionately anti-Semitic, no more so than other peoples are . . . Maybe this makes it even more appalling. That they have murdered without belief, without hatred, without conviction, without any sense; only upon order." (*Der Antisemitismus.* Frankfort, 1961). Of course, the war on the Jews eventually became a gathering point for the wicked and the sadistic, a mobilization of scum and degeneration, a university of cruelty and crime. Many a murderer became a captive of the ideology, and intoxicated by hatred. Perhaps the calculation did turn out to be erroneous and, as Handlin wrote, "contrary to the interests of the [German] state," but nobody can deny that for years it was a powerful weapon. Torture of Jews not only sowed demoralization among the vanquished nations; anti-Semitism was the link uniting the scum of the world with the Nazi masterminds. The stages of extermination were precisely calculated, with proverbial German thoroughness.

"Soapmaking," the cold-blooded machinery to exploit all the advantages of the murder—financial, economic, political, propagandistic—was by no means a by-product of the extermination of the Jews, but a basic ingredient of this action. Plundering Jewish property, exploitation of the Jewish labor force, filling all the Jewish economic and cultural positions with Germans, bribing the native mob with shreds of Jewish "wealth," and, finally, the bestial machinery of destruction and exploitation even of human fat and hair—all these stages of soapmaking were by no means accidental.

That anti-Semitism was a powerful weapon in the Nazi aggression is shown by a host of shameful instances. Even Roosevelt and Churchill did not dare to wage an open war on this front. Stalin didn't even try to resist.

Viewed in this light the Jewish resistance against the Nazis must be thoroughly reappraised. To begin with, we have to expose the fallacy which equates the Jewish resistance with the general resistance movements in Europe. The difference consists not only in the two-front situation of the Jews, so penetratingly pointed out by Handlin: Jews fought as members of the general resistance of a given nation, not as

* The most important weapon in our propaganda arsenal.

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Jews but as nationals, but in addition they fought as a branded community pushed to a uniquely "extreme situation."* It is clear that from the moment the decision for their extermination was taken, their destiny was sealed and the diapason of Jewish resistance could not influence the result. European Jewry was an object and not a subject in this struggle, and as the death sentence came from the outside so too could salvation come only from the outside, through the counter-action of the Great Powers, and the Gentile population. The resistance and partisan movements of other nations had the support of their governments (whether in exile or at home), commanding centers, supplies of arms and funds, not to mention a base among the majority of the populace. The situation of the Jews was different in every respect.

Under these circumstances it would not have been surprising had the Jews really given up all resistance. It is a miracle that in spite of these appalling conditions the Jews often did fight, and heroically.

4. The Central Issue

Abundant factual material proves beyond a doubt that allegations of the Bettelheim-Hilberg kind are false. True, history did not make us into a trigger-happy nation, but we are by no means exceptions in this respect. We did not believe that the enlightened Germans could be transformed into a nation of soapmakers, but in 1942 neither Mr. Bettelheim nor Mr. Hilberg knew about it. We dearly paid for this delusion about the nature of Germans, and we should not feel ashamed of it. One never knows: perhaps twenty years from now a future Bettelheim will blame the present one for not fleeing to Patagonia but conducting his "business as usual" instead, and going to his atomic holocaust "like a sheep to slaughter" when it was unmistakably obvious from all the signs on earth and heaven that a catastrophe was inevitable . . .

With each passing day the tragedy of European Jewry, the greatest crime in the annals of mankind, recedes into the storehouse of history. A new generation arises that "knew not Joseph." Less and less is it a political, financial, demographic problem. But it will never cease to be a moral problem.

And as a moral problem, paradoxical as this may sound, it is less and less a Jewish problem, and more and more a universal one. Auschwitz is modern civilization's declaration of bankruptcy. It is a disaster of humanity. It explodes as the anti-Semitism of guilty conscience: one hates the innocent victim whom one wronged. It makes the East European governments dismally surrender to Hitler's heritage, helpless to cope with the scourge of anti-Semitism. And, finally, the worst loser of all is Christianity itself, whose two thousand years turned out to be an historical mirage.

* And in this last capacity they were in most cases left to their own fate. "Where a government and a people fought Nazi encroachments," states Philip Friedman *(Their Brothers' Keepers)*, "many Jews were saved from extermination. Such were the experiences in Denmark, Finland, Bulgaria, and Italy."

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I do not believe in metaphysical historical justice. But we have daily evidence that crime has in it the seeds of forthcoming punishment, and that unpunished crime boomerangs on the criminals.

Item: When the fighting Warsaw ghetto begged for arms from the alert and combat-ready "Aryan" Warsaw, icy silence was the answer. What moral right of protest had this very same Warsaw less than a year and a half later when it begged for help from the Red Army across the river, obtaining in answer a similarly "political" silence?

Item: What moral right of protest do the Germans have against the Berlin wall, they who invented this disgrace? Germany from wall to wall—this certainly has its irony.

Item: How can Christianity regain its face? What does it have to offer post-war man, horrified by the specter of atomic war? How can an honest man believe, after Auschwitz?

Item: What moral right of protest do we all have against atomic holocaust? In the name of what principle? If one can with impunity murder six millions, why not six hundred million? Will tomorrow's genocide be stopped by the technicality that the next victim will not be Jewish any more but German, Russian, or American? Morals know neither arithmetic nor geography.

There is a sense in which nothing anyone writes or does can redeem the tragedy of our century. But the one thing that those of us who have survived can do, is to keep clean the memory of the victims.

Meanwhile, a few concluding remarks may be useful. Whether the Jews resisted or were able to resist, whether they should or could have behaved other than they did—such questions reveal, as a rule, an incapacity even to imagine the extremity of our situation under Nazi totalitarianism. The shame and horror of our century have to do with the conduct of the European powers, the Gentile world. Even if not one Jew had resisted, there would be no justification either to condemn the victims or to divert attention from the crimes of the murderers. The central issue must not be forgotten: it is a moral issue, the issue of what the world has done and permitted to be done. To insist upon making the world uncomfortable with the memory of its guilt, is a necessity for that moral reconstruction which may alone prevent a repetition of our holocaust.

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Jean Bloch-Michel

GAULLISM AND THE "MACHIEVELLIAN LEFT"

PARIS

On February 15, 1963 the arrest of several army officers and their accomplices aborted a new attempt on the life of General de Gaulle; the eighth such attempt since he took power on May 14, 1958.

Go back to the remotest period of French history; you will find no statesman whose existence has been the object of such precise and repeated threats. Nor has there ever been in France a regime so threatened in the person of its leader, yet enjoying so much continuity and staying-power. And what is more, this situation, apparently so precarious, has little bearing on the general state of mind in the country.

We have had governments in the past that were repeatedly assaulted by popular forces which did not, however, threaten the ruler himself. Today the situation is exactly the opposite. No one can be sure that the head of the state will not be the object of an attempt tomorrow, and this time a successful one. But it is certain that there will be no popular uprising. To the extent that in 1958 the nation at least implicitly repudiated the Fourth Republic, de Gaulle's famous declaration of May 13, 1958 met with widespread political approval. By contrast, whatever declaration de Gaulle's possible assassins are preparing would win the support of only a minute group of rebellious officers and nostalgic fascists. Their declaration would thus have a Latin American flavor, and their action would at most be a putsch.

For their objective would not be to sweep into political activity a portion of the people, but simply to remove the men now in power and replace them with others, on the assumption that the country would soon fall into line, as it did after de Gaulle's coup. Whether this calculation is accurate, only time can tell. What is certain is that de Gaulle's regime has brought to France an unprecedented duality: a calm and contented people, by and large uninterested in political affairs, and several hundred conspirators ready to take any risk and determined to destroy the man who rules the country.

"Miserable Though We Are"

These conspirators are not even supported by the nearly 850,000 "blackfeet" (the name given to French and Europeans born in Algeria). We were told often enough that if Algeria were let go, the "blackfeet" would come and offer us an on-the-spot demonstration of what a fascist population is like, transplanting with them to metropolitan France the customs of the OAS. There were, of course, in the beginning OAS "blackfeet" in France who showed in sufficiently violent ways the nasty habits they had picked up.

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But they attacked service stations and cashiers a good deal more often than police stations and gendarmes. All in all, these 850,000 Algerian French thrust back on the metropolis, these men and women whose despair not even the French, let alone foreigners, can gauge, are extraordinarily discreet. Some of us have friends among them who, coming from Algiers, Oran or Constantine, look for any kind of work in France, any sort of housing and with courage accept whatever is offered them.

For a few months the refugees congregated on the outskirts of Marseille because it was warm there and they could drink anisette at sidewalk cafes. Now they are scattered. In a few years a word of "pataouete" overheard on some street corner, suddenly revealing that the speaker was born on the other side of the Mediterranean, will surprise us. In any case, they no longer attract attention. Every evening those living in Paris occupy a few rows of seats in a tiny Montmartre theatre to hear several "chansonniers" from their country in a revue called *"purée de nous zôtres,"* roughly translatable as "miserable though we are." They come to hear the old familiar jokes of their country served with the proper accent, and to weep.

With the OAS threat thus transformed from a political problem into a police matter, the attitude of the left in France is necessarily modified. While even a year ago it was possible to take seriously the periodic appeals of certain intellectuals, calling upon the left to unite against the fascist danger, today such an appeal has no resonance. Not a single candidate standing openly for a French Algeria won in the last election. All those compromised by support from the extreme right were swept away. In a sense this was how the voters showed their indifference to the Algerian question. Fascism, at least this brand of fascism, shall "not pass" (to use the old Popular Front slogan) not because its road has been barred but because it simply does not exist! Whatever the secret or avowed tendencies of the present regime and its supporters, whatever aversion leftist intellectuals may have toward the regime, it is obviously not at all a matter of fascism. De Gaulle is neither Hitler nor Mussolini. Salan and Argoud, however, might very well be Franco or Salazar.

Decline of the Left

In such a situation, the role of the French left is extremely difficult. The traditional parties of the left fully realize they have lost the greater part of their influence. Why is this so? First, because they have lost their platforms. From their founding days until just after the Second World War, they lived not off the myth but the real exploitation of man by capitalist forces. But the great working class victories of 1936 and then the sweeping social reforms of 1945 drained the substance out of the greater part of leftist demands. This does not mean that all is for the best in the best of possible worlds. It does mean that in France, as throughout the western world, the lot of the worker is in no way comparable to what it was fifty years ago: collective bargaining, leisure time, social security, retirement benefits and public education have perhaps altered the situation less than full employment and the transformation of production techniques. Workers' action is now limited to demands for salary adjust-

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ments in order to meet higher living costs or to increase the share going to the workers. But, contrary to what went on before 1940, this action never seriously impinges upon the social structure or threatens the forms of property. The unions in particular are careful not to demand co-ownership of the means of production; they don't even ask for co-management.

Strictly on the political level all the parties of the left have compromised themselves with the politics of the right. It was a Socialist-led government and, for several years, a Socialist minister, Robert Lacoste (still a member in good standing of the Socialist party) which led the Algerian war and which initiated or authorized the most revolting practices. And the Communist party repeatedly voted plenary powers to these governments, thus authorizing them to carry out those practices in Algeria that have by now become familiar to us.

While the Communist party has suffered least of all from these events, it has yet to recover from the effects of the 20th Party Congress, and it is one of the few parties to have drawn no lessons from Khrushchev's revelations. As for efforts to establish a new left separate from the Socialist party and independent of the Communist party, the attempt of the PSU (Unified Socialist party) has demonstrated the futility of that. This heterogeneous grouping, one of whose leaders Pierre Mendes-France withdrew almost as soon as he joined, has just been rendered sterile at its last congress by some seven opposing factions, while the only publication it possesses—*France-Observateur*—spends its time each week publicizing the polemics waged between Gilles Martinet and Claude Bourdet, each of whom represents one of the opposing factions within the PSU.

In addition to political and economic reasons, the decline of the French left is due to demographic reasons. The formidable birthrate of the nation since the Second World War is now making itself felt in politics. Children born after the war have become young students, workers and farmers. They know virtually nothing of the great leftist battles through which their parents lived: the Popular Front, the Spanish Civil War, the Resistance movement. They did not undergo the Moscow trials, that great traumatic experience for the left. Hitler, Stalinism, even the Hungarian events are hardly remembered. But the very instability of the political life which they did see unfold before their immature eyes has, so to say, immunized them to every sort of political illusion. For several years they, in their own organizations (French Students' Union, Young Farmers, etc.) have been dragged into political action by the only event they have ever known which touched them directly: the Algerian war. With this ended, they face the same political void their elders do—except that it leaves them unconcerned. Since they put no faith in ideologies, the most serious of these younger people devote themselves to a kind of political and economic "expertise" which they regard as free from traditional labels. The kind of research done by an organization such as the Jean Moulin Club on democratic planification, the influence it tries to exert through its publications or direct pressure by its members on the state administration is characteristic. The same is true for a whole series of quiet yet powerful organizations such as the UNEF (Na-

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tional Union of French Students), the Young Farmers and the Young Business Executives.

What characterizes this new form of political activity is that it takes place not only outside of but against the political parties. Mistrust of the traditional parties, and in particular of the Socialist party, is such that many young voters whose activities and views would ordinarily classify them as of the left, voted "yes" in de Gaulle's last constitutional referendum. I even know of several leaders of the PSU who, while officially fighting for a "no" vote, actually voted "yes." They did so because they were completely unconvinced by the arguments of the classical left against de Gaulle (the dangers of personal power, distrust of rule by force, the defense of traditional democracy). Most of all they believed that a negative vote would be interpreted in the country as a vote of confidence in the traditional parties which had united in a strange "cartel of the no's." Their mistrust of these parties and their disgust with parliamentary democracy as they had seen it operate before 1958, were such that they preferred almost anything to a return of the Fourth Republic.

Policies Without Ideology

This attitude is not without a certain unexpected Machiavellian touch. These young technicians find the present regime to their liking because it is vacuous. Gaullism has no political or intellectual staff. Its leadership came to power because its principal political claim was that it had none. Not one deputy of the Gaullist UNR was elected because of who he was or what he had done, but only because of his party label. If electoral laws had allowed, this label stuck on a sack of meal would have been enough to win. Hence, everything rests upon the person of the general himself. Once he is eliminated, the young Machiavellians of the left (if so they can be called) count upon power falling into their hands. But two conditions are necessary if things are to go as they wish. The old parties which still have, if not militants, at least some active and competent people, must not be allowed to return to the political scene. Their presence at the head of the country would be an insuperable obstacle, blocking the new technicians from access to responsible posts. The second condition is that the present regime must last long enough for the new aspirants to be ready and the old, if not vanished entirely, at least to be forgotten.

This movement of what I call here the "Machiavellian left" is doubtless the liveliest in France today; it has displaced all traditional notions about politics in the sense that it no longer seeked to form an opposition party but a party of succession.

These new modes of political life are ambiguous: both reassuring and disturbing. That politics should rid itself of anachronistic ideologies is all to the good. But politics without any ideology at all—that is, a politics of efficiency for its own sake—can lead to anything, to fascism as easily as to the "new democracy" everyone claims to favor today. In any event, these young political newcomers have placed those traditional leftists who claimed to be the intellectual guides of the new generation in a painful position.

Nothing is more curious in this respect than the solitude a man like Jean-Paul Sartre suddenly finds himself in. He has once more become the target

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of violent attacks on the part of Communist party intellectuals. On the other hand, the stand he took during the Algerian war appears today to have been completely inconsistent. He was an unconditional supporter of the Algerian FLN, but at the same time he hoped for a long time that the FLN, thanks to its war against France, would be a kind of auxiliary revolutionary force, capable of replacing a faltering because satisfied French working class. He relied upon the FLN to bring about the downfall of Gaullism. This is why the Evian agreement bringing peace to Algeria came as a great disappointment to him. Evian ended his hopes of revolution through the FLN. The fact that the FLN for quite understandable reasons is forming closer ties with the present French government (as it would do with any receptive French government), takes on an aspect of betrayal in the eyes of Sartre. The various schemes on which he had built his political action these past years have vanished: between Gaullism and fascism no identity can be established, there is no longer a fascist political danger represented by the OAS, France is at peace, a peace brought about by de Gaulle. The Algerian revolution cannot succeed without French credits and assistance; so for Sartre it is tainted by neo-colonialism. Perhaps Sartre is murmuring to himself these days that phrase of a hero of Tolstoy which Leon Blum used to say never stopped haunting his political life: "Everything was so strange, so different from what he had imagined it would be . . ."

The rout of the Sartrian left, which tried to be radical, is no greater than the rout of the traditional left which had joined with the government. The heavy test which both are undergoing today is no different from that of the entire western world, subjected to the two great revolutions of the 20th century: (1) political decolonization, (2) economic and social modernization. Only to the extent that a new left will know how to draw fresh conclusions from these revolutionary phenomena and to do so without sacrificing either the need for effectiveness to ideology, or principles to efficiency, can it recover the influence it once had in France.

translated by Lisa Guss

A QUIET, STABLE COMMUNITY

"Rev. Ralph Smith: 'The church has ceased to be the center of social activity in this community. I sometimes wonder if we aren't just an island of the past floating into the present. People here don't see the world outside Vandalia (Illinois) as having anything to do with them. This is a very quiet, stable community. The drugstores sell a lot of tranquilizers."—*The Talk in Vandalia* by Joseph P. Lyford, A Report to the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions.

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Roy Finch

THE NEW PEACE MOVEMENT—Part II

As nuclear energy and rockets are again revealing, science itself is intrinsically more revolutionary than any ideology or political or social movement. Merely trying to adjust to new scientific and technological discoveries imposes a perpetual revolution on modern societies. (Consider, for example, what social and economic effects would arise from discoveries—by no means impossible—of ways to synthesize food cheaply, manufacture gold in the laboratory or change human skin pigmentation.)

Nowhere is the revolutionary character of science more evident than with regard to war. War has proved one of the most resilient of all human behaviors, adaptable to an endless variety of conditions and times. It has been able to incorporate new discoveries and still continue to be what it has always been—the final word, the extreme limit of communication, the ultimate "decision process." War has spelled human affairs in two words, "victory" or "defeat," but in this language it seldom failed to give an answer. Few human institutions or traditions have been so reliable.

Now, one is tempted to say, science is spoiling all that.[1] For science is too literal, in a way too childish. It overdoes everything; it gives us more than we bargained for. War has a ritual character. It depends upon a fundamental rule of combat: that force will be sufficiently limited so that superior force may be rewarded. Force, in other words, must be kept within the limits which permit meaningful superiority if it is to serve military purposes. Overkill—that is, the ability to kill each person on the other side several times over—is not meaningful superiority. When the general "ground level" of force rises so high that superiority only appears in this region, then force no longer meets the conditions of combat.[2]

Theoretically, victory in war might be determined by how many times over each side could exterminate the other, but actually people can only be killed once, and this sets a kind of "force ceiling." The military find themselves squeezed between the rising "floor" and this

1 Or in the (probably mythical) words of Gen. Leslie Groves at Los Alamos after the first bomb had successfully gone off: "The long hairs have done it at last."

2 "We already have enough nuclear explosives to overkill the Soviet Union at least 25 times." Ralph E. Lapp in *Kill and Overkill.* N. Y. 1962, p. 146.

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"ceiling" with less and less room to maneuver in. The enormous ingenuity spent on trying to make war still feasible within this shrunken space—(that is, on exploiting other possible determinants of superiority)—is an eloquent testimony to how reluctant we are to recognize the scientifically-created dilemma of a world too small and a force too great for successful all-out wars. (The forces of modern science are actually sized for "space wars"—wars in outer space—and this may be a possibility. The orbiting of nuclear weapons would be the first step in that direction).

The Spectrum of Pacifism

The development of nuclear weapons has created a new spectrum in the peace movement. This spectrum now stretches from "nuclear pacifists" at one end to "unilateralists" at the other. Nuclear pacifists are primarily opposed to nuclear weapons, rather than war in general, while unilateralists (comprising most traditional pacifists) favor varying degrees of American-initiated disarmament, regardless of what the other side does. Within these two groups and between them are a whole range of different positions. There is also a considerable overlap, since many unilateralists (borrowing a leaf from left-wing "front" methods, but without any subterfuge about it) are also active in nuclear pacifist groups and sometimes have even helped to form them.

Nuclear pacifists merge with, and share much of the general orientation of, the liberal-labor left. These are the "cause" people, those for whom a "moral" stance and a somehow "progressive" outlook are the essence of politics. Some, a declining number, are survivors of the "causes" of the twenties and thirties, harking back to what now look like more idealistic times. Some are remnants of the old Henry Wallace party, but joined by young people who have never heard of Henry Wallace. A considerable number are high school and college students, taught to be "socially responsible" and searching for some way to be it.

The principal organization of the nuclear pacifists is the Committee for a SANE Nuclear Policy, a sprawling amorphous collection of individuals and local groups largely existing to bring pressure to bear on the government to negotiate an end to nuclear tests and the abolition of nuclear weapons. Recently SANE has broadened its program to include "unilateral initiatives"—advocacy of steps to reduce tension, irrespective of the actions of the Soviets. SANE has had a rocky career because of its handling of the problem of Communists or former Communists in its own ranks. Confronted in May, 1960, with the accusation by the Senate Internal Security Committee that Communists or Communist sympathizers were active in the organization (presumably for ulterior motives), SANE, reiterating its position of not working with Communists, chose to cooperate with the Committee. Though it denied that any names were actually turned over to the Committee, or by the Committee to it, this action brought down on it a rash of resignations.

The most phenomenal occurrence among nuclear pacifists has been

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the emergence of Women Strike for Peace, which almost overnight enlisted the support of some 50,000 women (and some estimates put the figure even higher), many of whom are now active in holding demonstrations and meetings throughout the country. What is here intriguing is that it is the first time in many years (perhaps since the suffragettes) that women have been moved to act *as women*. This is a revolt which has a conscious feminist orientation; the women see themselves and their children as a "minority" threatened by what men are doing. While in the past men traditionally killed men in war, in a nuclear war women and children would equally be victims, and this fact is slowly sinking into the consciousness of some women. They are moved to act in protest against masculine presumption. As one woman peace leader puts it, "We want to protect our young against the evils of masculinity." (An analysis of the half-conscious ideas of a large number of women about the "patriarchal" character of technology, war and even "civilization" itself would be an important part of any historical study of the present moment. The real "revolt of women" has not occurred yet.)

While there are many divergences among the supporters of Women Strike for Peace, there is also a widely shared common set of ideas, some of which run something like this: "People are everywhere the same. They all desire peace and the opportunity to live in friendship. Differences of social system and ideology are unimportant by comparison. The issues between the United States and the Soviet Union are exaggerated and in the course of time mean less and less. The two sides are becoming more and more alike. It is inevitable that the United States will become more socialistic and the Soviet Union more liberal. Instead of apportioning blame or judging between the two sides, people should start trusting each other now. As peace advocates we are willing to join with anybody who wants peace, regardless of their political ideas, and we will support any candidate who takes the peace position, irrespective of where he or she stands on other questions." (Not all supporters of the Women's Strike would accept all of this, but the general complex is probably fairly typical.)

Delegations of leaders of the Women's Strike have visited Geneva, Washington and Moscow and have declared that they were not "taken in" by either Russian or American positions. They refuse to be drawn into political arguments, but stick to their own unanswerable argument that they are acting to protect their homes and children. Their demands are addressed equally to the men on both sides and (although they might deny it) in a certain respect put the men as men on the defensive. Confronted by the *ewig weibliche,* what political arguments do not begin to sound hollow?

One of the chief problems of the Women's Strike, as of the entire peace movement, has been the difficulty of locating its opposite number in the Soviet Union. If peace has an international appeal, there should be an independent non-governmental peace cause in the Soviet world. But where is the above-the-battle peace group in Russia? The American

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peace movement has rejected the alternative of working with government-controlled Soviet "peace" groups, correctly pointing out that the Soviet government is no more "peaceful" than other governments. That peace itself is not a weapon is precisely what has to be demonstrated. In the current sociological jargon the "peace game," if it is to be successful, has to be *completely* disentangled from the "war game."[3]

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At the other end of the spectrum from the nuclear pacifists are the unilateralists, including both those who favor unilateral nuclear disarmament and those who want general unilateral disarmament. This position is taken in varying degrees by most of the members of the older pacifist organizations, such as the Fellowship of Reconciliation and the War Resisters League, as well as members of such newer groups as Peacemakers and the Committee for Non-Violent Action.

The unilateralist point of view might be summed up somewhat in this way: In the release of nuclear energy science has made a technological breakthrough which must be matched by an equivalent breakthrough in human affairs. As even the military themselves recognize,[4] nuclear weapons are a *reductio ad absurdum* of war. But because of the inertia of old ways and the failure to grasp just how new the situation is, unless some absolutely new step is taken, these weapons are bound to be used eventually with immeasurable destruction and no "victory" for either side. Time is running out, and in the meantime the arms race continues. The only way to stop the doomsday trend, is for one side or the other to take drastic action by announcing that it will start to cut back its weapons and actually taking the first step. The risk that the other side would take advantage of this would be great, but no greater than the risks of nuclear war, and the side which could really do this would gain an incalculable psychological and moral advantage. In fact, by giving up the Cold War it might actually "win" the Cold War.

Most unilateralists tend to agree that such unilateral action should be "phased"—that is, it should be done by the kind of steps which at each point would provide the maximum opportunity and bring the maximum pressure to bear on the other side to follow suit. The aim is not to tempt the other side all at once into aggressive action, but to provide the context within which it would be easiest for both sides to proceed in the same direction together. The *sine qua non,* however, is that the initial actions should be genuine, clear enough and decisive enough not to be mistaken for additional gambits in the Cold War. To the argument that if the United States acted this way, the Soviet

3 Women Strike for Peace made contact with private women's groups in Moscow, which, however, were not peace groups.

4 Gen. Douglas MacArthur visiting the Philippine Islands in 1961 declared: "Global war has become a Frankenstein to destroy both sides. No longer is it a weapon of adventure—the short cut to international power. If you lose, you are annihilated. If you win, you stand only to lose. No longer does it possess even the chance of the winner of a duel. It contains now only the germs of double suicide." Lapp, *op. cit.*, p. 7f.

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armies at the first opportune moment would overrun Europe, there are two kinds of replies: the "reversible" unilateralist says that at some point it might be necessary to rearm, but at least the gamble for peace would have been tried, while the "irreversible" unilateralist maintains that we will have to learn to practice the only feasible method of conflict today—mass non-violent underground resistance.

If all this is described as impractical and utopian, the unilateralist answer is that it is just what is "practical" that has failed and is leading us to destruction, and it is time now to try the "impractical." In an age when science has done the unprecedented, humanity will not survive unless it is prepared to do the unprecedented in other respects too. The absolute pacifist prescribes a dose of "impossiblism." He sees the issue of war, as the abolitionists saw the issue of slavery, primarily in human and moral terms. He refuses to forget the fact, obscured by strategy, gamesmanship, the Rand Corporation and social scientists, that war is first and last an evil, bringing with it every human suffering. He reacts to this as a human being, rather than as a computing machine calculating "acceptable casualty levels." The pivotal evil today, the place where all other evils focus, he declares to be war, and whatever must be done to get rid of war must be done.

Action as a Policy

Absolute pacifists have concentrated, not on political activity, but on direct action. Dramatic protests have been carried out, such as the voyage of the ship *Golden Rule* into the bomb test area in the Pacific, a walk from San Francisco to Moscow and a series of on-the-spot actions against Polaris submarine launchings. These actions are "gestures of conscience," signals in another language, crackpot only as all prophetic actions are. They make up for the smallness of the numbers involved by the extremity of the action. The absolute pacifist is more interested, in these times, in being "prophetic" than in being "progressive."

A number of different kinds of group direct actions have been developed, which may be roughly classified as follows: (1) picketing—the standard protest, carried out in crises or on annual occasions, usually under conditions rigidly prescribed by police departments; (2) walks—a Gandhian method which has involved thousands, particularly in five Easter Aldermaston Marches in England and an equivalent number of Easter UN Marches in the United States; (3) vigils and fasts—a version of picketing, usually carried out by smaller numbers, sometimes in remoter places or over longer periods of time; (4) sit downs—inside or outside of buildings, at entrances to atomic plants or rocket sites or, occasionally, in public squares, and sometimes coupled with (5) trespassings—on military installations, submarines, or government projects; (6) refusal to take cover in air-raid drills—carried out in several cities with growing numbers for many years now; (7) refusal to pay income taxes for war—another growing form of protest which often, however, leads

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only to the government attaching bank accounts or personal property.[5]

The important dividing line in these protests is between "legal" and "illegal" or civil obedience and civil disobedience. Confusion sometimes develops because of lack of understanding ahead of time as to just which is involved, though the same project may be planned to have both aspects; some participants cooperating with the law (for example, desisting when told to desist) and others refusing to cooperate (for example, "going limp").[6]

Since few people are converted by these actions and the public is likely to be either antagonized or indifferent, what purpose do they serve? The pacifist view is that they are a preparation for a time when peace sentiment will be widespread enough to make mass action possible and effective. In the civil rights field of the Negro struggle, he points out, similar actions were carried on for many years (often by some of the same people), and they are only now producing results. In the peace field eventually the same thing will happen, with even more revolutionary implications. "Do this for long enough, and eventually it will catch on," one pacifist observes. "When CORE first started working in the South many years ago, who would have guessed that it would spark so much? Eventually people will wake up and see that they can do something about war. We just hope this happens before the next war instead of after."

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Many peace workers feel that, despite all this activity, the peace movement is only "talking to itself," convincing only those who are already convinced, and has not succeeded in relating itself to any wider peace sentiment or having any real impact upon events. Preventing the next war should take priority over any question of methods or theoretical purity. With the idea of doing something about this, an over-all grouping named Turn Towards Peace was organized four or five years ago. In addition many peace workers began to put more emphasis on electing peace candidates to Congress.

Turn Towards Peace brought together thirty-eight organizations, not on a radical pacifist program, but on the basis of a general concern for peace, operating both on the local and national levels. It has succeeded in broadening the peace front—for example, by bringing in the leaders of six industrial labor unions (perhaps the first sizable dent in labor's support for the Cold War). Like its West Coast predecessor Acts

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5 This list does not include refusing to serve in the army or to make or transport arms, which are, of course, the *sine qua non* for the individual pacifist. To the list could be added a few more uncommon actions such as the boat trips to the bomb test areas and to Russia, hunger strikes, burning of draft cards (after World War II), etc.

6 Pacifists often make a point of "working with" the police. After charges that peace demonstrators were manhandled in Times Square a representative of the New York Police Department sat in on a pacifist conference discussing best ways to carry on demonstrations.

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for Peace (begun by the same person, Robert Pickus), Turn Towards Peace is extremely catholic, willing to make room for every variety of peace activity from sit-downs to letter-writing. And this has been done while avoiding the organizational rivalries and disputes which usually plague such attempts.

Turn Towards Peace supporters have also tried to concern themselves with some of the economic problems of disarmament, to offer economic alternatives to labor which would make disarmament more acceptable.[7] There is a realization that to advocate disarmament without at the same time dispelling the idea that this would mean the collapse of the economy and tens of millions of unemployed is not sufficient. The possibility of "disarmament without misery" has to be spelled out in logical arguments which can be translated into simple terms and circulated on a mass basis in pamphlets and leaflets.[8]

Another important broadening development of the past few years has been the growth of the Student Peace Union, which was begun by ten students at the University of Chicago and now has more than 125 local chapters. This group brings together student support for peace on the widest possible front and engages in an impressive variety of projects. More than 11,000 students in 70 areas participated in its Students Speak for Peace Day.

Political Intervention

While some pacifists oppose political action on the grounds that nothing should be done to support the state since the nation-state itself is one of the chief causes of war, if it is not, in fact, synonomous with war, a much larger number have poured an increasing amount of energy into political campaigns. The most successful year was 1958 with the elections of Byron Johnson of Colorado, Robert W. Kastenmeier of Wisconsin and William H. Meyer of Vermont. These men, however, were defeated in 1960 after only one term.

In the election of 1962 the outcome was again disappointing. Out of ten or twelve who might be described as peace candidates for Congress, only three were elected, and in many cases the defeats were overwhelming. In the New York area, for example, Harry Hale Purvis, running as an Independent on a Voters for Peace platform on Long Island, polled only one and a half per cent of the votes. The most widely followed campaign was in Massachusetts where an especially competent candidate, H. Stuart Hughes, polled only 2.5 per cent of the votes. Out of more than two million votes Hughes succeeded in gathering only 50,000, far fewer than most of his supporters had anticipated.

Why this poor showing, not only for Hughes, but for other peace candidates? One factor is undoubtedly that many were handicapped by

7 In this connection the ideas of Seymour Melman are especially important.

8 The level of intellectual discussion in the peace movement has gone up considerably since the formation in the Spring of 1961 of the Committee of Correspondence (now called the Council of Correspondence), which brought together such men as Lewis Mumford, David Riesman and Jerome Frank with radical pacifists.

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running as Independents, challenging deeply entrenched two-party voting habits. But certainly much more important was the reaction to Cuba. It seems to be an axiom that the more threatened people feel the less likely are they to be interested in disarmament or any other major change. And Khrushchev's sending of rockets to Cuba was a threatening episode, however "triumphant" the outcome. The 50,000 votes which Hughes polled is probably the rock-bottom minimum peace vote in Massachusetts.

There is a more deep-seated factor, however, which comes closer to the real dilemma of the peace movement. That is that people do not trust peace candidates. They suspect them of being defeatist or of being willing to sell out to totalitarianism. The public image of the peace advocate or pacifist is likely to be of a well-meaning idealist who can easily be taken advantage of by less scrupulous enemies of freedom. Pacifism is equated with weakness and with less, rather than more, attachment to human freedom. (And it must be admitted that the behavior of pacifists themselves sometimes contributes to these stereotypes.) The basic problem is that military force is still the most convincing symbol and measure of a people's commitment to its tradition and ways (that is, the means by which people show how much they believe in what they do believe in), and pacifists have not succeeded in projecting some other symbol and measure.[9]

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The most striking fact about the peace movement (even in its political manifestations) is that it is apolitical. This embraces everything from the sentimentalism which finds a positive virtue in not caring about politics (believing that good intentions ought to be enough for everything) to a conscious and intelligent rejection of politics on the grounds that abolishing war requires revolutionary change. In between are all those who make no special effort to bridge the gap between ideas which seem self-evident to them and the kinds of objections which are raised by ordinary Americans. The peace movement is not only politically immature; it has a "know nothing" quality which, besides limiting its effectiveness, would also make it fair game for political exploitation if the right combination of circumstances came along. A large number of people ready to support any program if only it is for peace—this almost invites political manipulation.

Many peace supporters, and especially young people, are apolitical for the reason that they are fed up with ideologies and ideological squabbling. They would like to forget all that. They feel that the fundamental human necessities ought to be simpler than that, and in one sense they are right. But the idea (implicit in so much peace activity) that all that is needed is to "get out and demonstrate" and experience an emotional togetherness, a folk-songy oneness, is a delusion. This is the atmosphere

[9] The space race—for all its extravagance and military overtones—is perhaps desirable to the extent that it provides a non-military focus for competition.

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of cultism, of substituting automatic action and emotion for thought and communication. Action has its place, but not as an unconscious reaction. And, instead of longing for the short cut of mass emotions, the peace movement should devote itself to working out plans which make sense and a program which can be translated into the consciousness of ordinary people.

The Castro Episode

Peace as such is not a program; it can be coupled with many different views, or none at all. And the word "revolution" by itself is not a program. And adding the two words "peace" and "revolution" together does not make a program. Pacifists who talk about revolutionary change may be forgiven for some vagueness, but theirs is a vagueness which extends even to fundamental principles. The enthusiasm of many leading pacifists for Castro, even after it was apparent that Castro had embarked on a one-party system and a dictatorship, showed that pacifists are not immune to the lure of the mass leader. But it also showed a fundamental confusion about pacifism and democratic principles. (Some of these pacifists had stated repeatedly in the past that they were opposed to *all* dictators, but this did not stop them from adjusting their principles to make an exception for Castro.) It wasn't until Castro went over openly to the Soviet camp—thus becoming an out-and-out participant in the Cold War—that some of them withdrew their support. On paper these pacifists had preached a Gandhian revolution of non-violence, decentralism, and anti-statism. In the showdown, however, it appeared that this Gandhian revolution was for the future, while in the present, in some situations, they would support revolutions of violence, centralism and statism.

The revolutionary enthusiasm and unanimity of Castroism satisfied many radical pacifists who could not look beyond this enthusiasm to the totalitarian implications of the course which Castro took. They refused to see that a political structure which *makes possible continuing opposition* is the only thing that matters in the long run, since revolutionary unanimity cannot be sustained, and after it dies nothing remains in the one-party state but the enforced unanimity of the police. (There is an inevitable line where spontaneous support turns into coerced obedience, but this line is never visible in the totalitarian state. "You're happy and joyous, or into prison you go!") The revolution which fails to understand the nature of freedom, (which is *always* freedom for opposition), cannot help but turn into tyranny. In this respect Castro has betrayed freedom, and no supposed benefits or necessities (or contrasts with the horrors of the previous regime) can excuse or compensate for this. What began as a revolution for freedom abandoned that goal and turned into a reaction against freedom.[10]

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10 The root of the difficulty is a fatal confusion between politics and religion. Politics over-reaches itself when it attempts to do what only a church can do—combine in some inward sense unanimity and freedom, so that there is no need

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The Castro episode also revealed that the Communist question still has the power to cause serious dissensions in the peace movement—not over the question of working with American Communists,[11] but over the question of the basic nature of Communism. Like others, pacifists tend to divide into "soft" and "hard." In the one group are those who basically do not regard Communism as a threat. (They would put the word "threat" in quotation marks.) They believe in the good intentions of Communists, are optimistic about the future development of Communism and are not concerned about the possibility of world domination. On the other hand are those who are pessimistic about Communism. They regard it as a threat to human freedom (but one which cannot be stopped by military means). Pacifism for them is part of the answer, the way to resist totalitarianism effectively by seizing a psychological and moral advantage.

The Cold War

Many pacifists, as this shows, continue to accept the assumption that the Cold War itself makes sense, and that in some way it *could* be won by one side or the other, even if not by a nuclear war. Too few appear to have thought their way through to a clear realization that the Cold War can lead to neither victory nor defeat in any terms and that there is not the slightest possibility of either side being able to win it. Any decisive outcome is precluded by the nature of the situation, in which the very existences of two great peoples stand surety for each other. Neither side will accept the system of the other (after a while if only because the other holds it), and each would choose mutual annihilation before defeat. It makes no sense to talk about the defeat of Communism or the victory of Communism. Before either happened there would be—disaster. (What might happen in a disarmed world would be of an entirely different character.) Peace thinking requires the clear understanding that the Cold War can lead nowhere, while its very nature increases the possibility of unintentional disaster. As long as there is some *arrière pensée* which anticipates any other outcome there remains some reason for continuing it. (The argument that the Cold War provides the possibility of the mutual annihilation which guarantees the stalemate ignores the fact that the Cold War has gone far beyond

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to make room for opposition because no one wants to oppose. The inner identity of ruler and ruled leaves no possible grounds for opposition. (To *believe*—and one *believes in* a totalitarian ruler, whereas one only votes for or supports a democratic one—is to accept this identity.) There is only one thing wrong—these are relations between human beings and another human being and not between human beings and a god. The fusion of a whole people into oneness can only be a temporary occurrence in mundane terms. Then comes the mocking simulacrum—the unity achieved by the secret police.

11 The Communist's view of peace is that "Soviet bombs are for peace; American bombs are for war." There is as little room for American Communists or Communist sympathizers in the peace movement as there is for American Legionnaires, and for the same reason. Each can easily be identified by his refusal to condemn militarism as such, impartially, on both sides.

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this and is a *race,* a struggle for advantage, or illusory maximum security, which becomes more likely to explode into a nuclear war the longer it continues.)

What is the future of the peace movement? It depends on whether peace supporters can remain true to their principle of rejecting both American and Russian militarism equally to work for a dynamic third alternative. Any attempt to apologize for the military moves of either side weakens the peace cause. Pacifists cannot support a Castro who lines up in the Cold War (for whatever reasons), any more than they can support those who would use military means against him, and then expect to be believed when they say they are against *all* militarism. The revolution that is needed now is the revolution against war and militarism and both power blocs. It is imperative that somewhere in the world there be those who see beyond the present world conflict to forms and ways of life that will be superior to both alternatives in the Cold War and who, without compromise, will stand for this vision of the future. Anything less than this, any temporizing for the sake of expediency or of immediate gains, is a betrayal of the peace tradition and of the most urgent need of humanity.

The peace movement's task is to demonstrate that disarmament and ending the Cold War must take priority over every other issue and to show what possible ways there are to reach these goals. It is not only a question of persistently (and ineffectively) appealing for public support, but of working out the ideas which will be convincing. Peace has to be projected as a genuine alternative and not left as an unknown quantity which may seem more uncertain (and more fearful) than the military patterns so long familiar. Pacifists often give the impression of being more attached to their own ideas about *how* peace is to be brought about than they are to peace itself. They forget that the main question is reversing the trend towards war and that it is much more important that this be done than that some particular pacifist thesis be vindicated.

We are in a limbo now between a bankrupt and suicidal militarism which refuses to die and the beginnings of the possibility of world peace. The peculiar numbness which has hung over things since the advent of nuclear weapons is a testimony to how much is at stake and the fearful possibility that war will go out in one last overwhelming paroxysm. It is as if we have been holding our breaths against the moment of the turning point which we know will be the most decisive mankind has ever taken. In the meantime a last frantic pyramiding of fear goes on, the attempt to get rid of fear by more fear. This pyramid like some monstrous inner growth stretches to the breaking point. There remains only a short time. For the first generation in human history peace alone spells survival.

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Edgar Z. Friedenberg

THE IMAGE OF THE ADOLESCENT MINORITY

In our society there are two kinds of minority status. One of these I will call the "hot-blooded" minorities, whose archetypical image is that of the Negro or Latin. *In the United States, "Teen-agers" are treated as a "hot-blooded" minority.* Then, there are the "long-suffering minorities," whose archetype is the Jew, but which also, I should say, includes women. Try, for a second, to picture a Jewish "teen-ager," and you may sense a tendency for the image to grate. "Teen-agers" err on the hot side; they talk jive, drive hot-rods and become juvenile delinquents. Young Jews talk volubly, play the violin, and go to medical school, though never on Saturday.

The minority group is a special American institution, created by the interaction between a history and an ideology which are not to be duplicated elsewhere. Minority status has little to do with size or proportion. In a democracy, a dominant social group is called a majority and a part of its dominance consists in the power to arrange appropriate manifestations of public support; while a subordinate group is, by the logic of political morality, a minority. The minority stereotype, though affected by the actual characteristics of the minority group, develops to fit the purposes and expresses the anxieties of the dominant social group. It serves as a slimy coating over the sharp realities of cultural difference, protecting the social organism until the irritant can be absorbed.

Now, when one is dealing with a group that actually is genetically or culturally different from the dominant social group, this is perhaps to be expected. It is neither desirable nor inevitable, for xenophobia is neither desirable nor inevitable; but it is not surprising.

What is surprising is that the sons and daughters of the *dominant* adult group should be treated as a minority group merely because of their age. Their papers are in order and they speak the language adequately. In any society, to be sure, the young occupy a subordinate or probationary status while under tutelage for adult life. But a minority group is not merely subordinate; it is not under tutelage. It is in the process of being denatured; of becoming, under social stress, something more acceptable to the dominant society, but essentially different from what its own growth and experience would lead to. Most beasts recognize their own kind. Primitive peoples may initiate their youth; we insist that ours be naturalized, though it is what is most natural about them that disturbs adults almost.

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The court of naturalization is the public school. A high school diploma is a certificate of legitimacy, not of competence. A youth needs one today in order to hold a job that will permit even minimal participation in the dominant society. Yet our laws governing school attendance do not deal with education. They are not *licensing* laws, requiring attendance until a certain defined minimum competence, presumed essential for adult life, has been demonstrated. They are not *contractual,* they offer no remedy for failure of the school to provide services of a minimum quality. A juvenile may not legally withdraw from school even if he can establish that it is substandard or that he is being ill-treated there. If he does, as many do, for just these reasons, he becomes *prima facie* an offender; for, in cold fact, the compulsory attendance law guarantees him nothing, not even the services of qualified teachers. It merely defines, in terms of age alone, a particular group as subject to legal restrictions not applicable to other persons.

Second-Class Citizen

Legally, the adolescent comes pretty close to having no basic rights at all. The state generally retains the final right even to strip him of his minority status. He has no right to *demand* the particular protection of *either* due process or the juvenile administrative procedure—the state decides. We have had several cases in the past few years of boys sixteen and under being sentenced to death by the full apparatus of formal criminal law, who would not have been permitted to claim its protection had they been accused of theft or disorderly conduct. Each of these executions has so far been forestalled by various legal procedures, but none in such a way as to establish the right of a juvenile to be tried as a juvenile; though he long ago lost his claim to be treated as an adult.

In the most formal sense, then, the adolescent is one of our second class citizens. But the informal aspects of minority status are also imputed to him. The "teen-ager," like the Latin or Negro, is seen as joyous, playful, lazy, and irresponsible, with brutality lurking just below the surface and ready to break out into violence.* All these groups are seen as childish and excitable, imprudent and improvident, sexually aggressive, and dangerous, but possessed of superb and sustained power to satisfy sexual demands. *West Side Story* is not much like *Romeo and Juliet;* but it is a great deal like *Porgy and Bess.*

* A very bad—indeed, vicious—but remarkably ambivalent reenactment of the entire fantasy on which the minority-status of the teen-ager is based can be seen in the recent movie *13 West St.* Here, the legal impotence of the "teen-ager" is taken absolutely for granted, and sadistic hostility of adults against him, though deplored, is condoned and accepted as natural. Occasional efforts are made to counterbalance the, in my judgment, pornographic picture of a brutal teen-age gang by presenting "good" teen-agers unjustly suspected, and decent police trying to resist sadistic pressure from the gang's victim, who drives one of its members to suicide. But despite this, the picture ends with a scene of the gang's victim—a virile-type rocket scientist —beating the leader of the gang with his cane and attempting to drown the boy in a swimming pool—which the police dismiss as excusable under the circumstances. A Honolulu paper, at least, described this scene of attempted murder as "an old-fashioned caning that had the audience cheering in its seats."

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The fantasy underlying this stereotype, then, is erotic; and its subject is male. The "hot-blooded" minorities are always represented by a masculine stereotype; nobody asks "Would you want your *son* to marry a Negro?" In each case, also, little counter-stereotypes, repulsively pallid in contrast to the alluring violence and conflict of the central scene, are held out enticingly by the dominant culture; the conscientious "teener" sold by Pat Boone to soothe adults while the kids themselves buy *Mad* and *Catcher*; the boy whose Italian immigrant mother sees to it that he wears a clean shirt to school every day on his way to the Governor's mansion; *Uncle Tom*. In the rectilinear planning of Jonesville these are set aside conspicuously as Public Squares, but at dusk they are little frequented.

One need hardly labor the point that what the dominant society seeks to control by imposing "hot-blooded" minority status is not the actual aggressiveness and sexuality of the Negro, the Latin, or the JD, but its own wish for what the British working classes used to call "a nice game of slap and tickle," on the unimpeachable assumption that a little of what you fancy does you good. This, the well-lighted Public Squares cannot afford; the community is proud of them, but they are such stuff as only the driest dreams are made of. These are not the dreams that are wanted. In my experience, it is just not possible to discuss adolescence with a group of American adults without being forced onto the topic of juvenile delinquency. Partly this is an expression of legitimate concern, but partly it is because only the JD has any emotional vividness for them.

I would ascribe the success of *West Side Story* to the functional equivalence in the minds of adults between adolescence, delinquency, and aggressive sexuality. Many who saw the show must have wondered, as I did, why there were no Negroes in it—one of the best things about Juvenile Delinquency is that, at least, it is integrated. Hollywood, doubtless, was as usual reluctant to show a member of an enfranchised minority group in an unfavorable light. But there was also a rather sound artistic reason. Putting a real Negro boy in *West Side Story* would have been like scoring the second movement of the *Pastorale* for an eagle rather than flute. The provocative, surly, sexy dancing kids who come to a bad end are not meant realistically. Efforts to use real street-adolescents in *West Side Story* had to be abandoned; they didn't know how to act. What was depicted here was neither Negro nor white nor really delinquent, but a comfortably vulgar middle-class dream of a "hot-blooded" minority. In dreams a single symbolic boy can represent them all; let the symbol turn real and the dreamer wakes up screaming.

Adolescents are treated as a "hot-blooded" minority, then, because they seem so good at slap-and-tickle. But a number of interesting implications flow from this. Slap-and-tickle implies sexual vigor and attractiveness, warmth and aggression, salted with enough conventional perversity to lend spice to a long dull existence. Such perversity is a kind of exuberant overflow from the mainstream of sexuality, not a di-

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version of it. It is joyous excess and bounty; extravagant foreplay in the well-worn marriage-bed; the generosity of impulse that leads the champion lover of the high school to prance around the shower-room snapping a towel on the buttocks of his team-mates three hours before a hot date, just to remind them that life can be beautiful.

Experience Repressed

When a society sees impulsiveness and sexual exuberance as minority characteristics which unsuit the individual for membership until he is successfully naturalized, it is in pretty bad shape. Adolescents, loved, respected, taught to accept, enjoy, and discipline their feelings, grow up. "Teen-agers" don't; they pass. Then, in middle-age, they have the same trouble with their former self that many ethnics do. They hate and fear the kinds of spontaneity that remind them of what they have abandoned, and they hate themselves for having joined forces with and having come to resemble their oppressors.* This is the vicious spiral by which "hot-blooded" minority status maintains itself. I am convinced that it is also the source of the specific hostility—and sometimes sentimentality—that adolescents arouse in adults. The processes involved have been dealt with in detail by Daniel Boorstin, Leslie Fiedler, Paul Goodman, and especially Ernest Schachtel.** Their effect is to starve out, through silence and misrepresentation, the capacity to have genuine and strongly felt experience, and to replace it by the conventional symbols that serve as the common currency of daily life.

Experience repressed in adolescence does not, of course, result in amnesia, as does the repression of childhood experience; it leaves no temporal gaps in the memory. This makes it more dangerous, because the adult is then quite unaware that his memory is incomplete, that the most significant components of feeling have been lost or driven out. We at least know that we no longer know what we felt as children. But an adolescent boy who asks his father how he felt on the first night he spent in barracks or with a woman will be told what the father now thinks he felt because he ought to have; and this is very dangerous nonsense indeed.

Whether in childhood or in adolescence, the same quality of experience is starved out or repressed. It is still the spontaneous, vivid and immediate that is most feared, and feared the more because so much is desired. But there is a difference in focus and emphasis because in adolescence spontaneity can lead to much more serious consequences.

This, perhaps, is the crux of the matter; since it begins to explain why our kind of society should be so easily plunged into conflict by

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* Cf. Abraham Kardiner and Lionel Ovesey's classic, *The Mark of Oppression* (New York: Norton, 1951), for a fascinating study of these dynamics among American Negroes.

** Daniel Boorstin, *The Image*. New York: Atheneum, 1962; Leslie Fiedler, "The Fear of the Impulsive Life." *WFMT Perspective,* October, 1961, pp. 4–9; Paul Goodman, *Growing Up Absurd*. New York: Random House, 1960, p. 38; Ernest Schachtel, "On Memory and Childhood Amnesia." Widely anthologized, cf. the author's *Metamorphosis*. New York: Basic Books, 1959, pp. 279–322.

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"hot-blooded" minorities in general and adolescent boys in particular. We are consequence-oriented and future-oriented. Among us, to prefer present delights is a sign of either low or high status, and both are feared. Schachtel makes it clear how we go about building this kind of character in the child—by making it difficult for him to notice his delights when he has them, and obliterating the language in which he might recall them joyfully later. This prepares the ground against the subsequent assault of adolescence. But it is a strong assault, and if adolescence wins, the future hangs in the balance.

The Adolescent Girl

In this assault, adolescent boys play a very different role from adolescent girls; and are dealt with unconsciously by totally different dynamics. Adolescent girls are not seen as members of a "hot-blooded" minority, and to this fact may be traced some interesting paradoxes in our perception of the total phenomenon of adolescence.

Many critics of the current literature on adolescence—Bruno Bettelheim* perhaps most cogently—have pointed out that most contemporary writing about adolescents ignores the adolescent girl almost completely. Bettelheim specifically mentions Goodman and myself; the best novels about adolescents of the past decade or so have been, I think there would be fair agreement, Salinger's *The Catcher in the Rye,* John Knowles' *A Separate Peace,* and Colin MacInnes' less well known but superb *Absolute Beginners.* All these have adolescent boys as heroes. Yet, as Bettelheim points out, the adolescent girl is as important as the adolescent boy, and her actual plight in society is just as severe; her opportunities are even more limited and her growth into a mature woman as effectively discouraged. Why has she not aroused more interest?

There are demonstrable reasons for the prominence of the adolescent boy in our culture. Conventionally, it is he who threatens the virtue of our daughters and the integrity of our automobiles. There are so many more ways to get hung up on a boy. "Teen-agers," too, may be all right; but would you want your daughter to marry one? When she doesn't know anything about him except how she feels—and what does that matter when they are both too young to know what they are doing; when he may never have the makings of an executive, or she of an executive's wife?

For this last consideration, paradoxically, also makes the *boy,* rather than the girl, the focus of anxiety. He alone bears the terrible burden of parental aspirations; it is his capacity for spontaneous commitment that endangers the opportunity of adults to live vicariously the life they never managed to live personally.

Holden, Finny, and the unnamed narrator of *Absolute Beginners,* are adolescent boys who do not pass; who retain their minority status, their spontaneous feelings, their power to act out and act up. They go prancing to their destinies. But what destiny can we imagine for them?

* In "Adolescence and the Conflict of Generations," *Daedalus,* Winter, 1962, p. 68.

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We leave Holden in a mental hospital, being adjusted to reality; and Finny dead of the horror of learning that his best friend, Gene, had unconsciously contrived the accident that broke up his beautifully articulated body. The Absolute Beginner, a happier boy in a less tense society, fares better; he has had more real contact with other human beings, including a very satisfactory father, and by his time there is such a thing as a "teen-ager," little as it is, for him to be. On this basis the Beginner can identify himself; the marvelous book ends as he rushes out onto the tarmac at London Airport, bursting through the customs barrier, to stand at the foot of the gangway and greet a planeload of astonished immigrants by crying, "Here I am! Meet your first teen-ager."

Political Disinterest

There are still enough Finnys and Holdens running around free to give me much joy and some hope, and they are flexible enough to come to their own terms with reality. But the system is against them, and they know it well. Why then, do they not try to change it? Why are none of these novels of adolescence political novels? Why have their heroes no political interests at all? In this respect, fiction is true to American life; American adolescents are notably free from political interests. I must maintain this despite the recent advances of SANE kids and Freedom Riders; for, though I love and honor them for their courage and devotion, the causes they fight for are not what I would call political. No controversy over basic policy is involved, because nobody advocates atomic disaster or racial persecution. The kids' opponents are merely in favor of the kind of American society that these evils flourish in, and the youngsters do not challenge the system itself, though they are appalled by its consequences.

Yet could they, as adolescents, be political? I don't think so; and I don't know that I would be pleased if they were. American politics is a cold-blooded business indeed. Personal clarity and commitment are not wanted in it and not furthered by it. I do not think this is necessarily true of all politics; but it becomes true when the basic economic and social assumptions are as irrational as ours.

Political effectiveness in our time requires just the kind of caginess, pseudo-realism, and stereotyping of thought and feeling; the same submergence of spontaneity to the exigencies of collective action, that mark the ruin of adolescence. Adolescents are, inherently, anti-mass; they take things personally. Sexuality, itself, has this power to resolve relationships into the immediate and interpersonal. As a symbol the cocky adolescent boy stands, a little like Luther, an obstacle to compromise and accommodation. Such symbols stick in the mind, though the reality can usually be handled. With occasional spectacular failures we do manage to assimilate the "teen-age" minority; the kids learn not to get fresh; they get smart, they dry up. We are left then, like the Macbeths, with the memory of an earlier fidelity. But Lady Macbeth was less resource-

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ful than ourselves; she knew next to nothing about industrial solvents. Where she had only perfume we have oil.

The Girl as Woman

This is how we use the boy, but what about the girl? I have already asserted that, since she is not perceived as a member of the "hot-blooded" minority she cannot take his place in the unconscious, which is apt to turn very nasty if it is fobbed off with the wrong sex. Is she then simply not much involved by our psychodynamics, or is she actively repressed? Is she omitted from our fantasies or excluded from them?

It may seem very strange that I should find her so inconspicuous. Her image gets so much publicity. Drum-majorettes and cheerleaders are ubiquitous; *Playboy* provides businessmen with a new *playmate* each month. Nymphets are a public institution.

Exactly, and they serve a useful public function. American males are certainly anxious to project a heterosexual public image, and even more anxious to believe in it themselves. None of us, surely, wishes to feel obligated to hang himself out of respect for the United States Senate; it is, as Yum-Yum remarked to Nanki-Poo, such a stuffy death. I am not questioning our sincerity; the essence of my point is that in what we call maturity we feel what we are supposed to feel, and nothing else. But I am questioning the depth and significance of our interest in the cover or pin-up girl. Her patrons are concerned to experience their own masculinity; they are not much interested in her: I reject the celebration of "babes" in song and story as evidence that we have adolescent girls much on our minds; if we did we wouldn't think of them as "babes." I think, indeed, that in contrast to the boy, of whom we are hyperaware, we repress our awareness of the girl. She is not just omitted, she is excluded.

The adolescent heroine in current fiction is not interpreted in the same way as the adolescent hero, even when the parallel is quite close. Her adolescence is treated as less crucial; she is off-handedly accepted as a woman already. This is true even when the author struggles against it. *Lolita,* for example, is every bit as much a tragic heroine of adolescence as Holden is a hero—she isn't as nice a girl as he is a boy, but they are both victims of the same kind of corruption in adult society and the same absence of any real opportunity to grow up to be themselves. Lolita's failure is the classic failure of identity in adolescence; and Humbert knows this and accepts responsibility for it; this is the crime he expiates. But this is not the way Lolita—the character, not the book—is generally received. Unlike Holden, she has no cult and is not vouchsafed any dignity. It is thought to be comical that, at fourteen, she is already a whore.

A parallel example is to be found in Rumer Godden's *The Greengage Summer.* Here the story is explicitly about Joss's growing up. The author's emphasis is on the way her angry betrayal of her lover marks the end of her childhood; her feelings are now too strong and confused, and

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too serious in their consequences, to be handled with childish irresponsibility; she can no longer claim the exemptions of childhood. But what the movie presented, it seemed to me, was almost entirely an account of her rise to sexual power; Joss had become a Babe at last.

One reason that we do not take adolescent growth seriously in girls is that we do not much care what happens to people unless it has economic consequences: what would Holden ever be, since he never even graduates from high school; who would hire him? He has a problem; Lolita could always be a waitress or something, what more could she expect? Since we define adulthood almost exclusively in economic terms, we obviously cannot concern ourselves as much about the growth of those members of society who are subject from birth to restricted economic opportunity. But so, of course, are the members of the "hot-blooded" minorities; though we find their hot-bloodedness so exciting that we remain aware of them anyway.

But girls, like Jews, are not supposed to fight back; we expect them, instead, to insinuate themselves coyly into the roles available. In our society, there are such lovely things for them to be. They can take care of other people and clean up after them. Women can become wives and mothers; Jews can become kindly old Rabbis and philosophers and even psychoanalysts and lovable comic essayists. They can become powers behind the power; a fine old law firm runs on the brains of its anonymous young Jews just as a husband's best asset is his loyal and unobtrusive wife. A Jewish girl can become a Jewish Mother, and this is a role which even Plato would have called essential.

Effects of Discrimination

Clearly, this kind of discrimination is quite different from that experienced by the "hot-blooded" minorities; and must be based on a very different image in the minds of those who practice it and must have a different impact upon them. Particularly, in the case of the adolescent, the effect on the adult of practicing these two kinds of discrimination will be different. The adolescent boy must be altered to fit middle-class adult roles, and when he has been he becomes a much less vital creature. But the girl is merely squandered, and this wastage will continue all her life. Since adolescence is, for boy and girl alike, the time of life in which the self must be established, the girl suffers as much from being wasted as the boy does from being cut down; there has recently been, for example, a number of tragic suicides reported among adolescent girls, though suicide generally is far less common among females. But from the point of view of the dominant society nothing special is done to the female in adolescence—the same squeeze continues throughout life, even though this is when it hurts most.

The guilts we retain for our treatments of "hot-blooded" and "long-suffering" minorities therefore affect us in contrasting ways. For the boy we suffer angry, paranoid remorse, as if he were Billy the Kid, or Budd. We had to do our duty, but how can we ever forget him? But we do

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not attack the girl; we only neglect her and leave her to wither gradually through an unfulfilled life; and the best defense against this sort of guilt is selective inattention. We just don't see her; instead, we see a caricature, not brutalized as in the case of the boy, to justify our own brutality; but sentimentalized, roseate, to reassure us that we have done her no harm, and that she is well contented. Look: she even has her own telephone, with what is left of the boy dangling from the other end of the line.

A Lonely Ride

This is the fantasy; the reality is very different, but it is bad enough to be a "Teen-ager." The adolescent is now the only totally disfranchised minority group in the country. In America, no minority has ever gotten any respect or consistently decent treatment until it began to acquire political power. The vote comes before anything else. This is obviously true of the Negro at the present time; his recent advances have all been made under—sometimes reluctant—Federal auspices because, nationally, Negroes vote, and Northern Negroes are able to cast a ballot on which their buffeted Southern rural fellows may be pulled to firmer political ground. This is what makes it impossible to stop Freedom Rides; just as the comparative militance of the Catholic Church in proceeding toward integration in Louisiana may have less to do with Louisiana than Nigeria, which is in grave danger of falling into the hands of Black Muslims. People generally sympathetic with adolescents sometimes say, "Well, it really isn't fair; if they're old enough to be drafted, they're old enough to vote," which is about as naive as it is possible to get.

Can the status of the "teen-ager" be improved? Only, presumably, through increased political effectiveness. Yet, it is precisely here that a crucial dilemma arises. For the aspirations of the adolescent minority are completely different from those of other minorities. All the others are struggling to obtain what the adolescent is struggling to avoid. They seek and welcome the conventional American middle-class status that has been partially or totally barred to them. But this is what the adolescent is left with if he gives in and goes along.

In the recent and very moving CORE film, *Freedom Ride,* one of the heroic group who suffered beatings and imprisonment for their efforts to end segregation says, as nearly as I can recall, "If the road to freedom leads through the jails of the South, then that's the road I'll take." It may be the road to freedom; but it is the road to suburbia too. You can't tell which the people are headed for until they are nearly there; but all our past ethnic groups have settled for suburbia, and the people who live there bear witness that freedom is somewhere else.

I am not sure there *is* a road to freedom in America. Not enough people want to go there; the last I can recall was H. D. Thoreau, and he went on foot, through the woods, alone. This still may be the only way to get there. For those with plenty of guts, compassion, and dedi-

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cation to social justice, who nevertheless dislike walking alone through the woods, or feel it to be a Quixotic extravagance, a freedom ride is a noble enterprise. Compared to them, the individual boy or girl on a solitary journey must seem an anachronism. Such a youngster has very little place in our way of life. And of all the criticisms that might be directed against that way of life, this is the harshest.

A SPECIAL TYPE OF CAPITALISM

In Latin America, there is a "type of capitalism and free enterprise which abhors competition and the restraint of monopolies, possesses vast tracts of land —and the best—and controls agricultural and industrial credit, the raw material and manufacturing industries, mining, real estate in urban areas, and, in general, government and money, from the central banks.

"That capitalism hardly pays taxes, for it either blocks taxation enactments or circumvents them, and there is no law or power in the state that stands in the way of its monolithic advance.

"That is the sort of capitalism which understands by freedom of enterprise its own efforts to prevent the regulation of its expansion, and which, in the name of enterprise, withstands all obligations to serve and any attempt to convert it into an instrument of progress rather than of speculation.

"It is the capitalism which, when the power of its opposition is thwarted, flees abroad to sneak into the sanctuary of some foreign bank under the disguise of a code number."—Dr. Alberto Lleras Camargo, former president of Colombia, secretary-general of the OAS, speaking at Wellesley College Symposium on Latin America—quoted in *The Christian Science Monitor,* February 15, 1963.

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NOTEBOOK

George Lichtheim

Does Public Ownership Still Matter?

The article which follows, by a long-standing contributor to DISSENT *and one of the keenest commentators on current political issues, refers primarily to the situation in England but has an obvious general relevance. It is reprinted, with one or two minor deletions, from the* New Statesman, *with permission.—Ed.*

Anthony Crosland is the ablest and most persuasive spokesman of the British Labor party's "New Right," notably that section of it which is also pro-European and skeptical of what Mr. Gaitskell on a recent occasion described as "an independent foreign policy." His major work, *The Future of Socialism,* brought the Fabian doctrine up to date and supplied the rationale for the post-1955 attempt to define the Labor party's aims in terms of the mixed economy and the welfare state. His new essay collection [*The Conservative Enemy*. Cape. 30s.] carries the operation a stage further: in applying the "revisionist" doctrine to a variety of topical issues he has suggested the practical steps to be taken by a Labor government in the present decade to make Britain more democratic and (if possible) more socialist. In his own words, "It outlines a program of radical social-democratic reform for the middle 1960s."

The emphasis being on radicalism, the enemy quite naturally is defined as "conservatism." Here one encounters an equivocation: although conservatism "is naturally most visible in the shape of the Conservative party," its true source is "a certain *national* mood of stagnation and dislike of change." This mood, one gathers, is also to be encountered on the Left and among the unions.

> The traditional "Left" is conservative in a different and more pernicious way, clinging to an outdated semi-Marxist analysis of society in terms of ownership.

The New Left is essentially anti-political, The unions are stodgy. "Generally, the Labor party has so far failed to generate the 'new frontiers' enthusiasm which President Kennedy once inspired." Like the country itself, it is parochial and inward-looking. It is suspicious of foreigners and indifferent to Europe. Leaving aside the quarrel over Europe, this book can be said to formulate the "revisionist" credo with greater clarity and consistency than the other writings of the school. Wide-

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ranging, gracefully phrased, and agreeably literate and anti-philistine in tone, these essays make excellent reading, even though half the time one catches oneself wondering where exactly this pragmatic reformism differs from the new radicalism of Mr. Grimond's Liberal party.

The difficulty with Mr. Crosland's position indeed is not that he is "revisionist" with respect to Marxism—after all the Labor party has never been Marxist—but that his reformist zeal is not easy to tell apart from the more advanced notions held by radical Liberals. Keynes, Galbraith, the New Frontier—all these are now among the pillars of the New Liberalism. Mr. Crosland lists here 11 topical proposals ranging from a capital gains tax and expansion of town planning and social welfare, via educational reform, to "racial equality and an effective program of foreign aid." None of these demands are specifically socialist, and Point Nine ("An abatement of national sovereignty, in the long run in favor of world government, in the short run in favor of Europe—even at the cost of loosening Commonwealth links") would have gone down better at the last Liberal conference than it seems to have done at the last Labor conference.

Many of these points in fact are acceptable to Conservatives of the Heath-Macleod kind, though doubtless the Tory party is not ideally constituted as an instrument of radical reform. Still, it has already swallowed the principle of national planning. We may awake one day to find that Toryism has transmuted itself into something like a Christian-Democratic party with a trade-union wing. Indeed, if Britain does eventually "join Europe," the Conservatives will have no choice in the matter. What will then become of respectable radicalism?

Mr. Crosland, it must be stressed, is convinced that his list of desiderata adds up to something that "a radical, progressive, revisionist Labor party" could and should put forward as an alternative to traditional "Clause Four" socialism.

> No Tory could accept either its implications for taxation policy, the level of government spending, and the extent of public control, or its challenge to traditional mystiques about the rights of inheritance, the importance of élites, orthodox "morality," national sovereignty, and the British Commonwealth—generally, indeed, to the whole ossified, middle-class, stagnant, complacent, class-conscious conservatism of British society.

He is almost certainly mistaken: the Conservative party could in principle accept practically all his demands and still retain control of the country. What would really undermine its hold—a major shift in the ownership of property—is precisely the thing he regards as unnecessary. The residual demand for it is, he thinks, a vestige of Marxism. In that case the Tories must be regarded as full-blooded Marxists, for the one thing they seem determined to prevent is a drastic change in the social balance which would transfer the power of decision-making from private firms to public authorities.

The need to labor this rather obvious theme arises paradoxically from Mr. Crosland's wholehearted commitment to the Galbraithian proposition that what is required is a major shift from private to public expenditure. He is an enthusiastic admirer of Galbraith, to the point of accepting rather uncritically the notion that American so-

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ciety—and at a remove Western European society—has become, or is becoming, "affluent" in the sense that real poverty has almost disappeared and basic inequalities are diminishing. This is far too optimistic a picture even for the United States (since *The Affluent Society* was published, the Kennedy Administration has been embarrassed by persistent structural unemployment and virtual economic stagnation). Moreover it does not lead to the conclusion that public ownership is irrelevant. The current growth of quasi-socialist tendencies on the left wing of American liberalism (an interesting parallel to the corresponding British phenomenon before 1914) is directly related to the discovery that national planning demands a much higher degree of governmental regulation.

Admittedly this need not everywhere take the form of public ownership, but on pragmatic grounds it is difficult to see how the balance between "private affluence" (for a minority—and not even a large one!) and "public squalor" can be righted short of effective state control over the economy. It is the opponents, not the supporters, of nationalization who are being doctrinaire on this point. Furthermore we now know, thanks to the studies undertaken by Lampman and Kolko, that the shift towards greater income equality in America came to an end about a decade ago: a date perhaps not unconnected with the subsequent slowdown in economic growth. Creeping socialism has not crept very fast or very far.

Galbraith's rather modest program—a diversion of resources from private to public spending—now turns out to be requisite for economic as well as social reasons: it is not simply a matter of providing more public housing and better amenities, but of coping with massive structural unemployment. Indeed the whole Galbraithian concern with amenities as against necessities begins to seem frivolous against the current menacing backdrop of stagnation. It looks as though the investors' strike will have to be broken. That this can be done by tinkering with the monetary mechanism, without a paral lel expansion of the public sector and a consequent shift in the balance of social forces, is just the kind of antiquated liberal illusion which it is the proper business of socialists—Fabians or Marxians—to correct.

It may be said that all this is more relevant to the United States than to Britain, and that after all it is not Mr. Crosland's fault if the Kennedy Administration has hitherto not applied even the ordinary Keynesian remedies. Doubtless there would be fewer institutional obstacles in England if unemployment became really serious. But this merely underscores the point that a moderately progressive and intelligent Tory government could do most of the things he wants done, without effecting those basic changes to which socialists are traditionally committed.

Oddly enough, exactly the same argument applies if such an operation were performed by a Labor government—as is perhaps more likely. We would then have a "Swedish" situation: doubtless a great improvement on the current state of affairs, but somehow not quite what is meant by socialism. Still, it might be an adequate goal for the remainder of the 1960s, and to be fair, it is all that Mr. Crosland's social-democratic program commits him to. It is by no means clear, though, whether even so modest an aim as the imposi-

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tion of a planned economy guaranteeing full emlpoyment and a more rapid rate of growth can be reached without drastic measures of nationalization designed to shift the balance of the "mixed" economy from the private to the publicly owned sector. On this point M. Mendès-France—a Keynesian liberal-socialist if ever there was one —is more realistic, and more pragmatic, than Mr. Crosland. His recent pronouncements in *La République Moderne* (a work curiously neglected in England) envisage not merely drastic constitutional change and a movement away from traditional parliamentary rule, but an expansion of the public sector such as to give it the dominant role in the economy: thereby enabling the central authorities to plan in real earnest. Yet M. Mendès-France is not a Marxist; indeed he has gone out of his way to affirm that the need for a centrally controlled socialist planned economy can be demonstrated on empirical grounds alone.

In a sense it is unfair to Mr. Crosland to labor this point. Fabianism is indeterminate as between socialism and liberal radicalism, and he can thus claim to be in a respectable tradition. It is, however, regrettable that in his understandable anxiety to supply a rationale for the acceptance of the mixed economy as desirable and progressive, he has blurred the importance of public ownership. Even in a mixed economy it makes a difference whether the public sector is large enough to permit effective planning from the center. What he says on the subject lacks the intellectual rigor of Mr. Henry Smith's observations in *The Economics of Socialism Reconsidered:* a work on which it would be interesting to have Mr. Crosland's opinion, the more so since it supplies some rather depressing pointers to the conclusion that, for the present anyhow, the electorates of highly industrialized countries are unlikely to want more than full employment and the welfare state. If this should turn out to be the case, it would cut the ground from under socialist expectations: at any rate if socialism is identified with substantial social equality and the gradual ending of economic conflict. But even on the bleak assumption that progress towards full socialism so defined is ruled out for the present (notably in a country so heavily dependent on foreign trade as Britain), it remains important to specify who is to run the planned economy which even Conservatives are beginning to admit is the only alternative to chronic stagnation.

Mr. Crosland's essay collection is an interesting contribution to this debate. Its value fortunately does not depend on his uncritical admiration for Galbraith, nor on his involvement with transitory factional alignments within the Labor party. If he fails to make it plain (at any rate to this reviewer) where he sees the dividing line between a "mixed" economy and a "planned" one, he is in all other respects sufficiently clear-cut and consistent to sustain a principled commitment to radical "revisionism."

Yet in the end one is obliged to ask what exactly is being revised. After all, few people have ever seriously supposed that the Labor party—as distinct from its socialist wing—is really committed to anything beyond the social-democratic program. The latter may be summed up in the terms "full employment" and "the welfare state," to which Keynesian economics has added

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the discovery that the market economy left to itself, tends to equilibrate below the optimum level. Outside the United States this is now taken for granted. There is no longer anything specifically socialist about the notion that the state should intervene to maintain a volume of total demand adequate to sustain full employment. The conflict between the parties must be about something else. Setting aside utopian goals of complete equality and total socialization, the current political line-up has to do with how much planning there should be, and who should be in charge of the machinery. Whatever may be said about the growth of managerialism, this is ultimately a political issue: in other words, a question of power. Very likely socialization need not everywhere take the form of nationalization—in the traditional sense. But it must take *some* form that is recognizably different from either private entrepreneurship or corporate management. It would be straining the evidence to say that Mr. Crosland has told us what to look for.

T. D. C. Kuch

Managers and Machines

Survival of the Fittest?

"We are still only in the beginning of the office-machine age. Only when the machinery and the social organization of the office are fully integrated in terms of maximum efficiency per dollar spent will that age be full blown."

C. Wright Mills, *White Collar* (1951)

The threat of cybernetics to jobs has been apparent for some time; not only factory-workers and clerks are affected, but also the "middle managers" (*cf.* Irving Howe's "Cybernation: the Trauma that Awaits Us,'" DISSENT, Spring, 1962). Computers do indeed make business decisions faster, and in many cases better, than salaried functionaries.

It has not, however, been openly admitted that cybernation can replace, and in fact *is* replacing those who refer to themselves as "top-level management." Many a $50,000-a-year man is simply not needed around the office any more. Computers make the decisions in many firms, and the executive's function is to initial those decisions, and take credit for them. Several factors lead to the current hidden or not-so-hidden anxieties of managers.

1) A firm's decision as to whether or not to buy or rent a computer is in the hands, typically, of a "Feasibility Committee," composed of executives who know almost nothing about com-

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puters. They receive reports from, and interview, people who *do* know something about computers. It is these people, who, by more or less overt suasion, actually determine the decision.

The Committee is soothed by computer-manufacturers' representatives, who vie with each other in describing the advantages to top-level management of having their particular computer. Immense savings in dollars are sometimes mentioned. This was for years the primary selling argument of computer-manufacturers, but as it is realized that this is mostly an illusory hope, other rationalizations have been brought up. Primary among these is the pitch which typically goes "The 315 provides the power and speed necessary to furnish facts and figures to management in time to be used in effecting sound decisions."*

2) Top-level management's contact with the business is to a great extent through statistical reports. The executive's decisions are based on these reports, and the more reports the better. "Up-to-the-minute" reports are also considered invaluable. A computer is the best possible device for obtaining a multitude of reports in the morning telling how many hundred automobiles were sold yesterday, to whom, for how much, and what should be done about it. Top-level management, then, while ostensibly buying or renting a computer for reasons of greater efficiency and economy, is, perhaps unconsciously, motivated by considerations of strengthening their own positions, and having more control over what goes on (we shall see that this does not happen). Some of them get the feeling that the decisions themselves might be made more effectively by a computer. They feel threatened. It is these executives who are to be placated:

> Using Project Control Methods, it is possible to realize the following important advantages: 1. It will aid management in the planning and scheduling of the project. 2. It will allow management to simulate the effect of alternate decisions under consideration. . . . 4. It will provide management with a continuous timely progress report . . .*

3) Thus the Committee is cajoled into getting a computer. But the implication of "allowing management to simulate the effect of alternate decisions" is clearly that the decision itself will be made by the computer; the role of the executive is only that of formulating possible solutions to be tested. And even in this area the executive rightly feels danger; his technicians can formulate problems for the computer, but he can't, not knowing the language.

The solution of this problem lies in constructing a problem-oriented language that "looks like" English. The executive can then read the list of computer-instructions and, more or less, understand them, or, what is more important, feel that it is not entirely a foreign tongue. "COBOL [COmmon Business-Oriented Language] gives the business executive the ability to obtain first-hand knowledge of business programs processed by the G-20 computer."**

This ability, as has been pointed out in one of the professional journals of electronic data processing, is quite useless; the COBOL statements are of necessity so particularized that no top-level manager has any business reading

* From a National Cash Register Corp. publication.

* From a Service Bureau Corp. publication.

** From a Bendix Corp. publication.

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them. Also, as the language is problem-oriented and not machine-oriented, the resultant computer-program will be slower, less efficient, and more costly. It *is* reassuring, though.

Evidence that executives are becoming aware of all this is found in a new, five-color, illustrated brochure published by IBM which attempts to combat the idea of the obsolescence of executives by emphasizing their irreplaceability. The brochure makes its point so emphatically, however, that it is apparent IBM is running scared; you don't sell a machine to a man whose functions it will usurp. (Not that obsoleted executives will be discharged, of course; that privilege is reserved for workers and clerks, preferably of minority groups; the executive will merely lose control of the decision-process, almost as appalling a prospect to the corporate mentality.)

The pamphlet is titled "IBM Management Operating System for the Process Industries." In one giveaway passage the anonymous writer states ". . . the system can automatically determine and implement *routine* control measure for all phases of the manufacturing cycle. At the start of the cycle, for instance, the system combines current and historical sales trends with forecast formulas to produce a finished products plan. From this plan, the system automatically determines requirements and checks them against inventory. . . ."

The emphasis on "routine" is IBM's. The executive still has a place, somewhere; but where is that?

"Any change entered into the system . . . is immediately reflected in all other control data. This compensation for change is made automatically, according to prearranged plan—your plan."

But "your plan," to be optimal, is one that has been dictated by a computer. And even if it weren't, what kind of function is the manager left with, anyway? IBM's description of this function sounds like nothing so much as the Deist conception of God; surely not an appetizing prospect for any executive who wants to be Immanent, rather than Transcendent.

"Only with MOS—can *you* so accurately gauge, in advance, the effect of a given course of action." The emphasis on "you" is mine; it is plain that this word is not the proper one here; it should read "it."

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A technical writer for IBM (presumably not the author of the MOS brochure) commented on seeing a draft of this article, "I must admit that I do not agree with your article, but then I rarely agree with anything DISSENT has to say. I feel that your view of what top-level executives do is too narrow. They have many jobs to do other than what you claim the machines are supplanting them for, even if it is only to decide to convince the American people that 'halitosis' should be in the dictionary and is a real social problem."*

To this objection we might reply by citing two other writers on the subject. In "Executives Who Can't Manage"** Ernest Dale points out that top managers have lost their ability to think in terms of the consumer, and instead rely on experts (who may or may not be human beings): "The Edsel and its potential market were studied by every conceivable type of expert, and yet the new car fell flat on its chassis."

So the manager's idea that halitosis is saleable, in some form or other,

* Letter to the author, 7th August, 1962.
** *Atlantic*, July, 1962.

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seems to be, if not one that a computer could come up with, at least one that has no guarantee of success if arrived at by a manager and his coterie of experts.

In addition to this, we have the fairly reasonable assurance that computers will continue to be improved at the fantastic rate they are being improved today, so that we might well come to the time when a computer could, on its own hook, decide that halitosis should be profitably combatted by its owner's corporation:

> At present the output of a computer is, all too often, a great indigestible mass of data. I foresee computers which will reduce this to comprehensible generalisations, or even better, to action-instructions.... [The computer] must have a source of randomness and a sensing system which enables it to check the validity of its hypothetical prediction systems.... This type of computer is in its infancy, but I predict that the next 15 years will see tremendous developments in this field.*

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C. Wright Mills wrote, in another context:

> Going from problem to problem and always deciding, like Tolstoy's generals, when there really is no basis for decision but only the machine's need for command, the need for no subordinate even to dream the chief is in doubt—that is different from working out some problem alone to its completion.**

The "trauma that awaits us," then, awaits the people on top as well as the people on the bottom; the only gainers will be some of those in the middle: the technicians who build and repair the machine. And this trauma will only be questioned by those on top on that unlikely day when they begin selling artichoke-hearts on the street corners; and then they will no longer be at the top.

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* Victor Serebriakoff in *Chiaroscuro*, Summer, 1962.
** *White Collar*, p. 82.

Race Mathews

Letter From Australia

In Australia no less than in other Western nations, radicalism took a beating from the apathy of the fifties. The rot set in after the fall of Prime Minister Chifley's Labor Government in 1949. It was stayed briefly by the wave of protest which ultimately overwhelmed the new Menzies Government's attempts to outlaw the Communist party, then spread throughout the middle years of the decade. The average age of Labor party members climbed rapidly, while their numbers declined. In the universities, the radical and socialist societies saw their influence shrink to a shadow of what it had been during the war years and in the immediate post-war period. Un-

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der Menzies, the Security Service insinuated its agents into every area of society. Public enterprises were dismantled or handed back to the private sector, and the direction of foreign policy was reversed. Labor was everywhere forced into a defensive stance, which periodically became a rout.

The party itself was sick. The courts had blocked its chosen road to socialism by declaring the attempt to nationalize the banks unconstitutional; the revered leader, Chifley, was worn out, soon to die; and a secret organization, headed by a brilliant young Catholic lawyer named Santamaria and fired by his vision of an Australian corporate state, had begun to move its supporters into key positions at all levels of the party apparatus and the trade unions.

The clash between the authoritarian values of the new corporate state ideologues and the liberal, egalitarian Labor tradition came to a head late in 1954. The leaders of the Santamaria faction were defeated in the party councils and expelled, taking with them a number of supporters mesmerized by their anti-communist rhetoric. They formed Australia's fourth significant political party, the Democratic Labor Party (DLP—as opposed to ALP, for the Australian Labor Party).

The Australian political spectrum thus includes three parties of the Right —Prime Minister Menzies' Liberal Party (conservative, representing industrial and commercial interests), the Country Party (farm interests, junior partner in the coalition government) and the DLP, which has no seats in Parliament, but whose second preference votes at the elections last December gave Menzies his majority. There is also one party of the Left, the ALP, which forms Her Majesty's Opposition. It is the strategy of the DLP to keep hold of a segment of the Labor vote large enough to permanently deny the ALP office, and to use this vote as a lever to force the re-admission of its leaders to the ALP and the restoration of their influence there. Much of the interest in Australian political maneuver derives from the efforts of the ALP to by-pass this obstacle without coming to terms, efforts which nearly succeeded last December, when the party came within a single seat of victory (the candidates who scraped home to give the Government its majority was a notorious Birch-type right-winger, elected, by a quirk of the preferential voting system, on a bare hundred second preferences from voters who made the Communist candidate their first choice).

Election Factors

The return of Labor to a point within striking distance of power was in part the result of a series of spectacular economic blunders on the part of the Liberal Government, but in part also the result of a new welling-up of restlessness and radical thought in the community as a whole. This is nowhere more evident than in the universities, where radical and socialist ideas have regained much of the influence they enjoyed in the middle forties.

The real feature of the election campaign was not the activities of the parties, but the sustained attempt on the part of university students to raise the issue of the White Australia Policy, on whose retention both Government and Opposition agree. Students staged mass demonstrations outside the meetings of the party leaders, pursued cabinet ministers around their elec-

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tioneering circuits with systematic and searching questions, and invented a variety of means to bring the issue of official racialism to the public's attention as never before.

Since the election, student interest in immigration has continued at a high level, and has probably been a factor in restraining the Federal Government from carrying on its policy of deporting illegal Chinese immigrants to mainland China; but the focus of student activity has shifted to capital punishment, and in particular to a campaign to dissuade the Liberal Premier of the state of Victoria from terminating a run of eleven hanging-free years with the execution of Robert Tait, perpetrator of a particularly nauseating and pointless killing. In this campaign, the students have the support not only of articulate public opinion and the Labor Party, but also of the normally pro-Liberal press. Visiting Melbourne University recently, Victorian Premier Bolte, who claims to have the "silent majority" of the citizenry behind him in the Tait case, found himself the object of an onslaught of anti-hanging demonstrators better than two thousand strong.

However much success the students may achieve as a freebooting liberal lobby,—and there are strong indications that their intervention in the Tait case will prove decisive—their strong native empiricism orientates them to the Labor party, rather than to the decimated and senescent ruin of the Communist party, and probably only the bitter disagreement over maintenance of the White Australia Policy stands between Labor and their full support. Even so, in an individual capacity students and academics are playing a much greater part in the affairs of the party than ever before.

Labor's Policy

Labor's own empiricism—a quality not always favorably regarded by social democrats elsewhere—is in the ascendant, and, although the party retains the traditional objective, "socialization of the means of production, distribution and exchange to the extent necessary to eliminate exploitation and other anti-social features in these fields," its leader was doing no more than acknowledge the facts of political life under the Australian Constitution when he pledged during the last election campaign that, should Labor be elected, there would be no nationalization during its three-year term of office. Moreover, it is probably true that, even if nationalization were not ruled out by the Constitution, younger Labor parliamentarians of the stamp of the Deputy Federal Leader Whitlam, would prefer the more flexible—and amply precedented—alternative of creating government corporations to compete with private enterprise.

In foreign policy, Labor rejects the mindless subservience of the Liberals to American wishes in favor of judging issues on their merits (had Labor been in office, Australia might not have been the first country to endorse the Cuban blockade). The party backs the United Nations as the natural defender of small nations, calls for negotiations of a nuclear-free zone in the Southern Hemisphere and seeks to restore the friendly relations with neighboring Asian powers fostered in its previous term of office and forfeit by the Liberals through their unswerving support of colonialist—and most notably South African — interests. These, together with emphasis on education, aid for underdeveloped countries and domestic social justice, are policies which draw the young radical to the party.

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Stanley Diamond

MODERN AFRICA: THE PAINS OF BIRTH

Colonialism in its classic form is dead, but the spirit lingers on in the policies and presuppositions of the ex-colonial powers, and infects, also, the American consciousness. Lupine journalists, catching the scent of our malaise, and pets of the liberal-conservative establishment, from *Time* to *The Reporter,* are remarkably quick to condemn what they do not understand; they laugh at the wrong times at the paroxysms of nations in birth, and assume an insufferable and unjustified air which can easily be interpreted as "white" superiority. Too often, even radical Americans, innocent of specific knowledge of events in the ex-colonial territories, think in cliches, and join the chorus of disapproval. They turn abstract principles, which are always double-edged, to the analysis of the "emerging" peoples. But what these people need, and deserve, from us are humane insight, fraternal sympathy, and concrete historical perceptions. We neglect such understanding at our peril.

The situation is, of course, very complicated. The era of so-called unlimited national sovereignty is rapidly coming to a close. Global organizations and regional blocs not merely of a military, but of a political, economic, and social character, have multiplied since the Second World War, not so much out of sentiment as out of need. These embryonic structures appear at the very time that political and economic factors are literally forcing new boundaries into existence. There is, of course, a contradiction between the many states arising in the wake of colonialism and the larger trend toward the limitation of national sovereignty. This paradox is one that both we and the new revolutionary nationalisms must face, for reasons that will become evident below.

But to return to the demise of classic colonialism: there are at least three reasons why it is no longer viable. First, it is no longer profitable; indeed, the minimal cost of maintaining a modern colony in accord with what has wrongly been called the "revolution of rising expectations" (actually, at this stage, a revolution for sheer survival), makes formal independence a cheaper alternative for the metropole. Second, colonialism is no longer prestigious for the metropolitan countries. And finally, the idea of political independence has irreversibly seized the underdeveloped peoples.

But this is not to deny that classic colonialism has left a massive

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heritage in the form of weakly industrialized or completely agrarian economies shaped to the needs of the mother country. In the British West African areas, for example, the early growth and later ramifications of the metropolitan trading companies recapitulate the form and substance of colonial and post-colonial subordination. Detailed evidence for this is available in a recent 1957 U.S. Department of Commerce survey on investment in Nigeria. It is worth quoting at length:

> *Mining, foreign trade, shipping, wholesaling, industry, and banking are dominated by the large expatriate companies, and, outside of the purely agricultural production field, local African capital is significantly represented in only a few scattered activities.* [Italics added.] This situation has prompted some Africans to complain against foreign-financed companies on grounds of economic domination, "monopoly position," and limitation on opportunities open to Nigerians. (A typical view is that of G. Udegbunem Meniru, a Nigerian student in the United States, who, in his treatise African-American Cooperation, 1954, Libertarian Press, Glen Gardner, N. J., stated: "The impact of large European combines in the internal trade with their monopolistic tendencies have restrained independent African traders from large-scale undertakings especially in the fields of exporting and importing. Having been squeezed out of trade, as it were, Africans have concentrated on retail and petty trade . . . These big European companies are the machinery with which imperial Britain exploits Nigeria.")
>
> . . . the large foreign-financed companies started principally as trading concerns but have increasingly diversified their operations to include processing of primary produce and a wide variety of industrial activities. Some of the activities, such as the sawmilling and plywood plant at Sapele of African Timber and Plywood (Nigeria), Ltd., a subsidiary of United Africa Company of Nigeria, Ltd., represent large-scale modern industrial ventures. Several of these companies have a century or more of trading experience in West Africa behind them and in this period through successive mergers and amalgamations have attained a far-flung and diverse establishment reaching, insofar as trading activities are concerned, into every section and virtually every village in the country. Representative of this group are the United Africa Company of Nigeria, Ltd.; John Hold & Co. (Nigeria), Ltd.; Cie Francaise de L'Afrique Occidentale; Paterson, Zochonis & Co., Ltd.; and Societe Commerciale de l'Ouest Africain. British banks, such as Bank of British West Africa, Ltd., and Barclay's (D. C. & O.) also have long association with Nigeria and are well established throughout the principal towns.
>
> The United Africa Company of Nigeria, Ltd., popularly referred to as UAC, is responsible for much of the total import and export trade of Nigeria. Aside from its widespread activities directly or through subsidiaries in wholesaling and retailing, UAC has interests in sawmilling and plywood manufacture, bulking plants for palm oil and other export processing activities, breweries and fruit juice plants, cold storage, engineering and shipping. It also owns 36,550 acres of plantation estates, of

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which 20,250 are in Nigeria (around Sapele and Calabar) and 16,200 in the British Cameroons. Of the total, some 30,000 acres are planted principally to rubber, bananas, and oil palm.

The history of UAC in Nigeria goes back to the original chartered company so intimately associated with the economic and political history of the country. [Italics added.]

By 1879, four British trading companies had established themselves in trade along the lower Niger as far up as Onitsha. In that year, through the efforts of Sir George Goldie, these companies were amalgamated to form the United African Company. Goldie, *a keen diplomat, businessman, and empire builder described not incorrectly as the founder of Nigeria,* proceeded to enlarge the company by amalgamation with competing French trading companies and 2 years later the company's name was changed to National African Company. [Italics added.] *The company continued vigorously to "open up" the upper reaches of the Niger River in Nigeria, and in 1886 it was granted a royal charter giving it sweeping power to administer the territories it had acquired by treaty or concession as well as exclusive rights to all mineral resources and royalties in these territories.* [Italics added.] Upon receiving the charter, the company took the name of Royal Niger Company.

At the end of 1899, its charter was revoked by the United Kingdom, but apart from capital compensation it was allowed to retain the right of one-half share in Government royalties from mining. At the turn of the century it had achieved a virtual commercial monopoly in the lower Niger Basin, but in 1919, a new syndicate of several competitors had emerged—the African and Eastern Trade Corp., Ltd. With an issued capital of 6 million pounds, compared with the Royal Niger Company's capital of 10 million pounds, the syndicate was sufficiently big to seriously threaten the Royal Niger Company. In the ensuing competition, both companies, as one writer put it, "almost competed themselves broke."

The British soap firm, Lever Bros., purchased the assets of the Royal Niger Company in 1920 for 8,500,000 pounds and made one unsuccessful attempt at that time to purchase the shares of the African and Eastern Trade Corp., Ltd., as well. In 1929, the two companies joined forces, and a new company was launched—the United Africa Company, Ltd., with a capital of 13 million pounds. Subsequent financial transactions resulted in Lever Bros. acquisition in the early thirties of the outstanding African and Eastern Trade Corp. shares and a full ownership of the United Africa Company, Ltd. With the formation of the Lever Bros.—Unilever consortium in 1937, the United Africa Company, Ltd., continued as a direct subsidiary of Lever Bros. and Unilever Ltd., of England.

Although the United Africa Company group trades throughout West Africa, it does most of its business in Nigeria and Ghana; separate local companies have been set up to handle its operations in the respective countries. In Nigeria, the local company is called the United Africa Company of Nigeria, Ltd.

As an indication of its importance in the economic development of

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Nigeria, statistics issued by the company show that between 1936–37 and 1951–52 capital expenditures of 15,781,000 pounds were undertaken in all 4 British West African areas, of which two-thirds, or 10,011,000 pounds, was expended within Nigeria.

The United Africa group, as of December 1956, employed 43,228 persons in Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Gambia; of this total, 25,234 were employed in Nigeria in the following fields: Trading, 15,442; transport, 5,380; timber, 3,191; motors (service, etc.), 1,221. Of the total number in Nigeria, 695 were Europeans in technical or nontechnical management jobs; all others were Africans.

In 1955–56 the UAC group in Nigeria alone sold merchandise (mostly imported) to a value of 62,030,000 pounds (at selling prices) and purchased raw material for export totaling 595,000 tons, valued at 27,654,000 pounds. (Most of this was purchased on behalf of the Government marketing boards, the UAC acting as the boards' agent.)

Another factor affecting the development of the ex-colonial areas is an unbalanced transportation and communications grid, developed in the economic and military interests of the mother country. Typically, motor roads branch out from railroads in pursuit of the major export crops, and serve also as channels for the distribution of European imports. Communications outside of this predictable colonial pattern hardly exist.

Moreover, the ruling elites and supportive bureaucracies of the former colonies have been trained for the most part either in the cultural expectations, intellectual attitudes, and psychological set of the dominant power, or are reared in such symbiosis with that power that freedom only reveals the rootlessness of the elite structure. The exceptions here are, of course, those leaders who ignited the independence movements by reaching the people through agencies that lay beyond the control of colonial rule. In the British areas, in particular, independence is being achieved, not through the fancied evolution of the usual instruments of indirect rule, but by their obliteration and replacement. And the leaders, although men of what may broadly be called "Western education," learned lessons and suffered experiences that their teachers did not perhaps intend.

In short, the whole shifting socio-economic structure, including the degree and type of urbanization which is developing in most underdeveloped areas, is a function, direct or indirect, of prior colonial occupation. When a metropolitan power disengages itself politically from a former colony, when "independence" is conferred upon the new nation, what is laid bare is neither a viable and modern political economy nor a series of self-sufficient primitive cultures, nor an archaic culture, but an awkward and random blend of all these elements. Properly to grasp the attitudes of the more dedicated African leaders—Azikiwe, Nkrumah, Toure, Mboya, Nyerere, Banda—demands our comprehension of their struggle against this massive heritage of colonialism, of their quest for what Nkrumah is fond of calling "the African personality." This widely,

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often deliberately misunderstood phrase can be taken to refer not only to the laughter and rhythm that continues to flow through everyday African life, but also to the intangible communalistic consciousness that survives among millions of ordinary Africans in spite of modern commercialism and the gross defections of colonially manipulated chiefs. It is this ancient sense of community which Nkrumah and others seek to rescue, and transform into contemporary cultural forms, while maintaining the spirit of the past. The so-called opportunism of these leaders, in search of a united people and effective political agencies, opportunism which European politicians are so eager to emphasize, undoubtedly exists; but it is no more than that which has always been the gamey aspect of politics itself. It certainly need not blind us to the legitimate historical roles that these leaders have assumed.

The Instance of Ghana

It would be, for example, politically disastrous and analytically naive to interpret Nkrumah's behavior in Ghana as solely motivated by a desire for personal power or as pro-Soviet in a cultural or political sense.

Nkrumah, that is the Government and Party which he represents, is confronted at home with a single crop economy (technically a luxury crop), geared to the interests of the prior colonial power; indeed, there is good reason to believe that cocoa was a major factor in keeping the British on the Gold Coast, after the abolition of slavery and the evident limitations of gold, rubber, and palm oil. Moreover, especially among the Ashanti, the dominant native State of the old Gold Coast, the Centre has been faced, on the one hand, with Chiefly groups whose interests had been cultivated, while their traditions had been transformed, by the British as a means of political and economic control. On the other hand, the Central Government is confronted by the more prosperous cocoa growers, often in fact identified with the chiefs, who desire the continued expansion and protection of the cocoa economy and thereby pursue political and economic autonomy to a degree and in a manner that would threaten the integrity and growth of the nation at large.

For example, the Ashanti-dominated Opposition in Ghana agitated against the Volta River scheme which will destroy the sovereignty of cocoa and help unite the country in economic and social units that cut across present ethnic boundaries, although divisions are bound to appear in the new national class and occupational structure. It is here that the dilemma of African socialism becomes evident. For the struggle for national unity is not only territorial and ethnic, it is social and economic also; the distance between classes in the emerging polity must be kept from widening to the point at which national growth would be crippled and unnecessary revolutions precipitated. This will demand enormous poise and intelligence from an informed leadership, along with the wisest possible planning and economic and technical aid without prejudice from the richer nations. Thus, the attitude of the Opposition to the Volta River project—that it be delayed until the country

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was better prepared, is only superficially plausible. Given continued dependence on cocoa, Ghana is bound to get poorer, not richer, as time goes on, and the possibilities of self-determination must also diminish. Moreover, the best way to develop techniques is not to delay their introduction but to sharpen them on concrete projects. The Volta undertaking is the basis for a new economy, and this must be begun at once, even at some sacrifice of more specialized internal interests, and of what may seem to be quicker, more tangible profits.

This antagonism to Volta is a good example of how "traditional" economic, regional and cultural interests coalesce in opposing the central government, and, thus, converge to a classic position held in metropolitan quarters that underdeveloped areas maintain their role as primary producers, and that decentralization of political power and economic means be pursued along regional and "ethnic" lines.

The principle of radical decentralization, which many social democrats in industrialized countries understandably support, simply does not apply to ex-colonial territories, where the people at large must grope towards union across a great many artificially erected, and a few authentic, barriers, while attempting the most difficult feats of national development. It is the projective fear of our own totalitarian tendency, emerging out of the whole structure of the modern industrial state, that makes us so sensitive to "centralizing" trends in the ex-colonial areas; but in these areas the base of state and nation is weak and amorphous, and a polity first of all must be created to transcend the makeshift colonial structure. Furthermore, centralization and decentralization cannot, in such a context, be conceived as abstract, inflexible principles, but as strategies associated with specific ends, namely, political freedom and economic survival. The governments of the new nations may alternate in their policies in this matter, and may even adopt centralization in one sector and decentralization in another. We must be prepared to understand the context in which either course is pursued.

Ghana, then, has been undergoing a revolution against both colonialism and its after-effects, including the pseudotraditionalism of the Chiefly groups. Among the latter is the old Gold Coast, middle class business and professional elite formed at a time and under circumstances that made solidarity with the mass of people almost impossible. Under Nkrumah's leadership, the attempt is being made to lay the basis for a popular democracy, to shift from specialized, primary agricultural production to a more balanced industrial-agricultural economy, which would include the growing and processing of food crops for consumption at home.

It would also be naive and disastrous to misconstrue Ghana's Pan-West African or even Pan-African policy as merely one man's or one party's ambition in a regional or continental struggle for power. It is most unlikely that Ghana alone, with its arbitrary, colonially defined boundaries, can become, even with the shrewdest political planning and use of resources, a viable modern polity. And this is true despite its

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relative prosperity at this time, based on judicious use of money made in what has been from 1947 until recently an unusually favorable cocoa market. To one degree or another the same thing holds for every so-called independent nation in Africa, indeed for nation states everywhere. In Europe there are the European Economic Community, the European Free Trade Association, Benelux, the European Coal and Steel Community, etc. In these cases, one rarely hears a reference to the ulterior motives of a Monnet or Spaak. On the contrary, we tend to eulogize their capacity to respond to the need for boundaries reflecting political and economic reality. Still, let us bear in mind that European economic union, especially with the involvement of Great Britain, can easily serve a neo-colonialist function. That is, underbidding for raw materials, high tariffs, and preferential planning, pricing and support of commodities produced in Western Europe can drive the ex-colonies into an even more subservient because less protected and more competitive position than was the case during the heyday of frank colonialism. *Buying cheap and selling dear* is, after all, if not the expressed intention of the Common Market, at least its likely effect, vis-a-vis the rest of the world; it is, by no means, the dead slogan of a perishing arrangement between the politically strong and weak. One possible remedy for this would seem to be the economic union of the primary producers, the new nations; it may be the only way that they can protect themselves and accumulate sufficient capital to break out of the endless circle of primary production into more balanced industrial-agricultural structures.

Should England join the Common Market and, in effect, abandon the Commonwealth both as an independent union dedicated to the strengthening of all its constituent economies, and as a potential, political third force, the rationale for West African Federation would grow even more impressive. The idea of a non-colonialist Commonwealth would have proven unrealistic; and, incidentally, English preferential use of colony-earned dollars to help rescue her economy after the Second World War would remain, along with other, more imponderable obligations, an undischarged debt. It is just such considerations that lead sociological economists of Gunnar Myrdal's persuasion to counsel an enlightened self-protection as one essential policy of the emergent nations. Yet the desire for politico-economic union and the more rational use of human and natural resources first projected in the Ghana-Guinea-Mali accord is widely suspected in the West.

But the fact is that the new nations of Africa enjoy little or no communication among themselves. It is still necessary, as both symbol and fact, for a telephone call from Lagos to be routed through London on its way to Accra. Part of the heritage of colonialism has been the strategic overdevelopment of connections between metropolitan power and ex-colony, and the underdevelopment of political, economic, and social relations among the colonies themselves, even when the latter were territorially contiguous. Rational and historical connections between colonial areas associated with the various nation states of Europe were not

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only ignored but actively discouraged. Moreover, connections between colonies of the same metropolitan power were almost equally undeveloped, since isolation of a dependent territory has the effect of securing political control. Both enforced isolation and overprotection have on the political level results analogous to psychodynamic processes; they choke off growth and make the subject more dependent. It is only in such a context that we can properly understand the complaint of Nkrumah and others concerning the postcolonial "balkanization" of the continent; political independence revealed the fragmentation that had taken place under the pseudo-unity of Empire.

In Ghana the sentiment for African union and the critical internal position of Nkrumah, which are of course related phenomena, do not represent antidemocratic or totalitarian tendencies in any philosophic or programmatic sense of those terms; rather they are the imperatives of a movement that we in these federated and United States should be able to understand in the light of our own history—a movement away from a colonial economy and toward a more rational, independent, and sturdy union conceived to be in the best interests of ordinary Africans. Within Ghana, such a movement implies a strong and flexible central government which can weigh provincial needs in the interests of the people as a whole. Gunnar Myrdal's principle is pertinent: ". . . central planning will constantly have to aim at breaking the rigidities, which are the mark of under-development, and to seek to establish greater flexibility in the entire economic and social fabric." That, I submit, is the key to both domestic and foreign Ghanian policy.

An Unfinished Revolution

So long as this revolution remains unfinished, as Julius Nyerere has pointed out, it can hardly tolerate an opposition which would subordinate the interests of the people at large to those of traditionally or newly privileged groups. We should view developments in Ghana as telescoping aspects of our own Revolution and Civil War; indeed, the analogy holds for almost any African or underdeveloped area. Moreover, these explosive events are occurring in a world society in a century that has developed new sources of energy along with alternative technical and social means of organizing industry and agriculture; and, it might be added, Africa has her own ancient sense, and systems, of communal ownership. Thus, one may conclude that the surprising thing is not that there has been so little tolerance in Ghana for an opposition that sought to fragment the country before the revolution had gotten off the ground, but rather so much tolerance when compared with similar situations elsewhere. This is not to deny the danger inherent in the bureaucratic entrenchment of new, revolutionary elites, particularly in the underdeveloped areas, where very striking gaps between the few and the many are easily opened. But it should be borne in mind that a bureaucracy settling in after a revolution *can* be cleansed by the vigilance of the people and their executive representatives; it is also, despite itself, a

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structured part of a movement toward freedom, and should not serve as an excuse for us to belittle the efforts of emerging nations. Nor must we exaggerate, or misinterpret *their* "corruption" as against *our* purity. The dynamic cultural context should always be considered; what is acceptable in one tradition may be intolerable in another that succeeds it. For example, bribery, and related practices, in our society tend to be outright commercial transactions, betrayals of principle. But in many developing nations, wherein the impersonal principles of statehood have not yet crystalized, nepotism seems natural and even bribery has emotional, kin-saturated overtones; it can be considered a civil transformation of the customary practice of gift-giving. In any event, corruption in all modern bureaucracies is universal and multiform; ocassionally it is subtle. Who would dare measure us against them—and where is the evidence? Moreover, to evaluate by standards of behavior that we ourselves hardly ever achieve, as in the instance of our "disappointment" with India over Goa, is a species of what may be called *moral colonialism,* a curious piece of psycho-political business which gives us the chance to evade our own history by adopting fantastic expectations of carefully chosen others; and we, then, become justified in their failure.

Summing up my second premise, then: Colonialism is dead, but its heritage remains. Properly to understand events in ex-colonial areas, such as Ghana, demands recognition of the unfinished revolution against this heritage, and the no less difficult attempt to replace it with an independent and viable structure.

International Inequality

My final premise is implicit in the socio-economic analyses of Gunnar Myrdal, Ragnar Nurkse, and like-minded Scandinavian scholars. It is Myrdal's hardly debatable contention that classic equilibrium theory, most evident in economics with its free trade and laissez faire components, but ramifying throughout the social sciences, has led to a false and dangerous expectation concerning the self-adjusting and harmonious relationship of the "have" and "have not" nations. Accordingly, Myrdal and others, including the authors of a basic United Nations report on economic development in underdeveloped areas, point out that the richer nations of the West are accumulating capital at a rate so far in advance of the underdeveloped areas that an international class system, comprising all nations, has already come into being. Colonialism alone was merely a phase in this process, the origins of which must be looked for in, among other factors, the global dynamics of the mercantilist and later the industrial market. Indeed, several of the lower class nations are not only relatively, but absolutely, poorer in terms of real per capita income than they were before the Second World War. Moreover, the richer nations themselves strive increasingly toward integration, that is, the bringing up of relatively depressed areas within their borders to the national level by means of typical, and costly, welfare state measures. In all western nations this internal interference with economic forces

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has become a routine matter. But the disparity between richer and poorer classes and areas within underdeveloped nations, who cannot afford such measures and are ill-equipped to implement them, grows cumulatively through a spiraling process similar to the one widening the social and economic distance between groups of nations. One reason for this internal dynamic of the lower class nations is clear enough: In large parts of the underdeveloped world, archaic, "oppressor," pre-industrial state structures, to use Myrdal's terms, are absorbing the wealth that is being produced and using it to buttress the ruling regime and to benefit its members. Even where foreign aid seems fairly extensive, it is quickly blotted up in showcase projects or by bureaucratic waste, and the "take-off into sustained growth" cannot be achieved.

The traditional "oppressor" state (Myrdal believes that all pre-industrial states are "oppressive" and I am inclined to agree with him) should not, I think, be confused with a strong and flexible state apparatus. On the contrary, the "oppressor" state is usually weak in its own hinterland, substantially unconcerned with welfare measures, economically feeble and incapable of conceiving or effectuating large-scale socio-economic reorganization. It survives because it is either not directly challenged, that is, accepts, under native conditions, a high degree of local autonomy in exchange for tribute, or because it is supported by colonial or foreign authorities. The idea of the absolutistic, pre-industrial state is a modern political myth, a sort of historical projection of present fears into the past. That is, past "despotisms" were less capable of cultural regimentation than any contemporary state, totalitarian or otherwise. They simply lacked the complicated ideological, technological, social, and economic means, not to mention the refined psychological techniques, which are at hand today and are incorporated into all modern political structures.

This cumulative development of international inequality which Myrdal sketches as the present trend is not only perilous politically, inviting the most ugly forms of behavior, but an anthropologist is obliged to add —it is thoroughly destructive of culture. For the shattering of subsistence or near-subsistence economies, as a heritage of colonial or quasi-colonial penetration everywhere in the underdeveloped areas, means the destruction of the relative cultural autonomy, style, and vigor previously associated with these societies. Millions of people, radically disengaged from their own traditions, are being rapidly proletarianized in both rural and urban areas, and are being forced to substitute a mere strategy of poverty and survival for authentic cultural expression. Put another way, they are being rapidly converted into marginal producers and marginal consumers on the remotest fringes of contemporary industrial society. This is a development on a scale unprecedented in history; even the most far-flung empires prior to modern times were essentially tributary; considerable local economic and cultural autonomy were maintained under the surface of external rule, and there was far more sense and continuity, even of participation, in the changes that did occur. To put the matter

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aphoristically, in the past a genuine *culture of poverty* was possible but in the present the familiar, mutually reinforcing factors of overpopulation, economic stagnation, political impotence and the loss of tradition threaten us with a vast *poverty of culture* among the lower class nations in the international class structure. This looming cultural poverty is complementary to the cultural deficiency of our phase of industrial civilization; to their chaotic diaspora, we are a problematical Jerusalem.

The further widening of the socio-economic, and cultural, gap depends upon the free play of national and international markets, either unregulated and thus working "naturally" to the disadvantage of the poorer nations or actively regulated in favor of the rich. Myrdal's critical point is that free trade will only increase the wealth of the community of richer nations, although I should note that capital has migrated, and will continue to migrate, from one area among them to another. But free trade will increasingly impoverish the poor. In some cases, indeed, a flight of capital from the now unprotected ex-colonial areas is under way as a predictable result of the "free play" of the market forces. Thus active, planned interference with these forces by sophisticated, welfare oriented, and politically sturdy governments is the *sine qua non* of future development in the underdeveloped areas. The internal purpose of these governments, moreover, must be to develop balanced economies; thus to break down archaic oligarchies of wealth and privilege which impede the distribution and slow the formation of capital. In Myrdal's words, "In many of the poorer countries the natural drift towards inequalities has been supported and magnified by built-in feudal and other inegalitarian institutions and power structures which aid the rich in exploiting the poor." Moreover, "No society has ever substantially reformed itself by a movement from above or by a simple voluntary decision of an upper class . . ."

As for ourselves, let us not forget that colonialism has been the old, persistent contradiction that unfolded at the heart of the West and remains, in its accumulated ramifications, unresolved; it is the concrete denial of our conception of freedom, justice, truth and mercy; indeed it is the force that drives them into mere abstraction. A modest acquaintance with history confirms that these abstractions starve the spirit; civilizations die of them.

For us, the colonial contradiction began with the Greeks, generated in the disparity between their view of Man and their uses of men. It was chronically evident in their employment of strangers as slaves, and in their pride of Empire, but it reached its climax in that terrible dialogue between Athens and Melos recorded, or invented, by Thucydides. In the end the Melians are, as a matter of policy, exterminated and enslaved, having been denied the right to stay neutral in the war against the Lacedaemonians, and having refused the honor of becoming an Athenian colony. That act of Athens epitomizes the self-betrayal of classic Greek civilization. The rest is epitaph.

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COMMUNICATIONS

Prospects for the New Nations

H. Brand

I take issue with Lewis Coser on the following major grounds:

1) He discusses the political evolution of the developing countries in isolation from their ties, past and present, with the West. Yet, their prospects cannot be assayed without examining those ties.

2) His approach is limited to locating the groups or strata which initiate economic development in the new nations. He attributes to them the ability to choose among political modes; but I question that a choice exists.

The political evolution of the developing countries hinges upon how well and rapidly they solve such problems as capital and skill shortages, and overpopulation; how they deal with the disarray of their social order arising from, say, new technologies and urbanization; how they cope with sharpening class struggles; how they contain their own and others' hostile nationalisms. The methods used to tackle these problems cannot usually be adopted by "choice," or even on the basis of a common consensus.

3) Coser's use of "models" of polity prevents his defining the historical directions in which the new nations are *in fact* evolving. Is it towards some form of state capitalism? Agrarian socialism? Can their traditions be expected to humanize economic development without fatally slowing it? What are the *real* preconditions for despotism? For democracy?

In all three of his models [democratic, authoritarian, totalitarian], social conflict remains in static balance, deadlocked, leading nowhere. The use of these models obscures rather than clarifies the prospects of the new nations. It spawns the illusion that political choices exist which are not determined by a given social environment—choices which are the more narrowly determined, the more intense the antagonisms that rend society.

4) Coser adopts some of Max Weber's concepts in describing the evolution of capitalism in the West, and the requirements for economic development in the new nations. Coser stresses, with Weber, the role of the protestant ethic as a precondition of industrialism in the West. This is a problematical contention. Weber's thesis cannot be used to explain, for example, the phenomenon of primitive accumulation (e.g., the seizure of Catholic Church property by the Tudors), nor even the many speculative ventures which spurred the rise of capitalism.

Coser writes that "We have to recognize that some or all of the new nations

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will present features deeply distasteful to men of a libertarian vision." One might simply endorse this statement as it stands, were it not that it keynotes an article that raises the experience of democracy in the West as Coser sees it to the status of a guiding example. (The adoption of large elements of Coser's "liberal model" by the developing nations is the programmatic point of his article.)

Yet, the evolution of bourgeois society has been characterized by features that men of libertarian vision have struggled against bitterly. And what is more, the developing nations have encountered the West as master and exploiter, not as teacher. Their political and social development has been stamped indelibly by the nature of this encounter. The West remains co-responsible for their future.

I

Coser advances a naive theory of pluralism in the liberal state. Pluralism has ever been the delusion of Social Democrats, unable or unwilling (or even fearful) to come to grips with the question and reality of power in class society. They (Coser included) elevate what dispersion of power does exist in the liberal state to a sort of ideal mechanical equilibrium, a "social statics." But as the action of blind natural forces eventuates in a calculable resultant, so the push and pull of contending social groups works in a definite historical direction.

The liberal state was based on the class rule of the bourgeoisie. This class rule has, in recent decades, been modified, it is true. The role of the state in the life of Western nations has become more pronounced; party, welfare, and many cultural organizations, even large corporations, have been virtually institutionalized. But these modifications have not resulted from the mutual give and take which, Coser implies, rules the liberal state. They have been forced upon the bourgeoisie by crises which shook Western society to its foundations —two devastating wars, violent revolutions, the decline of its world dominance.

Social power in the 19th century was decisively located in the economic realm. The state was able to rely on the discipline imposed by the factory system no less than it could on its own penal institutions to maintain the liberal order.

The advancing juggernaut of industrial capitalism was the central experience of the 19th century; the rise and struggles of the labor and socialist movements its salient political event. The economic setting and class nature of the liberal order, which Coser chooses to ignore, was regarded as a bane on humanity by Owen, Sismondi, Marx, Engels, Proudhon, as well as a number of sensitive poets and novelists. Later, less uncompromisingly oppositionist thinkers like Mill, Hobson and Veblen decried it as well.

Coser's liberal model, then, is a figment. The illusion it conveys of a "democratic" economic development in parts of Europe and America serves to bolster the ideological position of the West; it contributes little to an understanding of the actual course of the West's social evolution.

That illusion is heightened by Coser's discussion of totalitarianism. I question that totalitarianism is a phenomenon *sui generis,* that it represents an identifiable political order like feudalism or the liberal state. But let that be.

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Coser says, "The totalitarian model may be considered the antithesis of the liberal model." Antithesis suggests transformation. The liberal state, in one form or other, harbored the seedlings of such regimes as Nazism in Germany, fascism in Italy, the Vichy regime and the Fifth Republic in France. In the United States, it owes its ever more problematical existence to vast investments in the cold war, economic as well as psychological in nature.

"Totalitarian societies," writes Coser, "destroy traditional social groups, communities, or self-contained classes . . ." But this has been characteristic of the evolution of capitalism. That evolution set the stage for totalitarian regimes, for it severed individuals from their social moorings, at the same time making social antagonisms ever more difficult to bridge. Totalitarianism doesn't do away with these antagonisms, as Coser implies, but merely represses them.

II

Coser has nothing to say about the role of the West insofar as it affects the future of the developing countries. He declares, "It is no longer sufficient to applaud the demise of imperialism," and then goes on to treat the problems facing these countries as if they were theirs alone. Now, one cannot reproach Coser for limiting his subject in the way he sees fit. But to omit any reference to the role of the West is inexplicable to me, since that role vitally affects the "choice" the developing countries have, according to Coser, between democracy and totalitarianism.

The cards are stacked against a "democratic" development in the industrially backward nations. Modern technologies and capitalist modes of production have been mercilessly imposed upon them by the expansion of the Western metropolis. Their native social fabric has often been deliberately torn asunder. Coercion via both juridical and market sanctions has been the major agent of the introduction of "rational" norms of economic behavior, to use Coser's language. Examples abound.

In Java, writes Wilbert E. Moore in *Industrialization and Labor* (Cornell University Press, 1951), "land restrictions have been instrumental in inducing natives to enter employment on plantations or in factories" (p. 53). Land policies in South and East Africa pursued the same objectives. Alienation of native land for more effective utilization by Europeans was common in much of Africa and the Dutch East Indies.

The introduction of cheap manufactured goods, one of the better known agents of economic change, proletarianized large strata of craftsmen and their families in India and China, as it also did in Europe in an earlier period.

Forced labor, ranging from indenture to slavery "has been more common in world economic development than has free contract labor" (Moore, p. 59). ". . . In the spread of modern . . . economic activity to new areas, coercion has commonly gone along" (ibid.). The imposition of head taxes or hut taxes, defrayable in cash only, was used deliberately in British Africa to drive native peasants into the money economy. Such measures have wrought irreversible changes whose effects probably can't be overcome without more coercion. (See also *Report on The World Social Situation,* United Nations, 1961.)

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For the developing countries, problems they have inherited from their earlier encounter with the West are made more burdensome—and the chances of authoritarian solutions are enhanced by—the social and political stagnation of the West. An aspect of this stagnation is that powerful interests can successfully insist on the shoring-up of reactionary and parasitic oligarchies. They can successfully oppose large-scale aid, or can impose their own terms in extending it.

Thus, Coser's positing of "choices" that the developing countries can make is an abstraction, attesting his good intentions, but clouding the issues. The "hands off" policies he advocates to promote democracy have subjected advanced countries like the United States to the grip of immobilism ("The Deadlock of Democracy" is the revealing title of a recent work by James MacGregor Burns). For countries like India, such policies would prove ruinous at the present conjuncture.

A plural state, the widening of the areas of democracy, social equality, an internationalist spirit, greater individual self-determination—all are indispensable to human development. They *should* be the rationale of economic growth. But unless aided liberally by the West, the developing countries are exposed to the ever present danger of smothering in their own contradictions. If they face any "choice," it is less likely to be between totalitarianism and democracy, than between chaos and a regime that safeguards some order and a modicum of economic advance.

Karl de Schweinitz, Jr.

Lewis Coser's analysis of the prospects for political development in the new nations is an extremely lucid treatment of a notably intransigent subject. Indeed so compelling is the analysis that one gets the impression Coser shrinks from its implications as if he had created a Frankenstein's monster. How else explain the last paragraph in which he deprecates rigid determinism and suggests that after all new nations "can, if they so desire, deliberately create or at least permit the growth of a dispersed power structure in their countries. They can, though ruling as authoritarians, lay the foundations for a future democracy." Of course they can, but the purpose of social analysis is not merely to state potentialities or possibilities; it is to assign probabilities to alternative social outcomes. And this Professor Coser really has done; he simply has been unwilling to state explicitly what he in fact has shown—that the probability of non-democratic political systems in the new nations is greater than the probability of democratic systems.

If this is Coser's prediction, I concur. I should, however, like to emphasize somewhat more sharply the underlying forces which grip economically backward societies. He observes that in their search for solutions to the enigma

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of development, westernized intellectuals in the new states have tended to discard the liberal economic model. Aware that the absence of an entrepreneurial middle class and the ideology associated with it has thus far aborted autonomous economic growth and impatient to break the hold of subsistence and tradition, they look to the state to mobilize the latent energies of their societies. Implying, as it does, that the foregone alternative is a possible option, the word "discard," I think, does not properly convey the fact that the liberal economic model *cannot* meet the development needs of the new states. In the western world a unique combination of resource availabilities, geographical and climatic conditions, technological possibilities, and population densities permitted individuals, acting more or less independently of the state, to create the industrial economic order which, as Coser rightly observes, did so much to strengthen the centers of autonomous power in plural societies. But in the non-western world these circumstances are so unfavorable that they offer little scope for the play of individual initiative. In fact, the cultural, religious, and familiar characteristics of traditional societies which inhibit growth, may in part be explained as adaptations to the cruel and capricious demands of an unyielding nature. The monsoon climate of southeast Asia, the deserts of the Middle East and North Africa, and the tropical rain forests of sub-Sahara Africa and Brazil do not provide a congenial habitat for individual enterprise.

The Price of Starting Late

I share Coser's concern that as the state assumes responsibility for economic modernization, the very process it nurtures may weaken those traditional and cultural values which now make it difficult for authoritarian states to become totalitarian. I would add these observations. The price of being a late starter in development is high. Economic growth takes on extraordinary urgency. Not only is the underdeveloped economy galled and piqued by the "demonstration effect" of living standards in the mature economies, but its own living standards may be diluted by a rising tide of population originating in the mortality-reducing technology of the advanced countries. If time is of the essence, it is not easy to be indulgent with those individual foibles and idiosyncrasies that may seem to interfere with the collective needs of society. If, moreover, late starters are inhabited by a population which has acquired aspirations for material goods greater than its capacity to produce them, they may feel compelled to limit the expression of economic and political demands which threaten to draw resources away from growth. The tasks of economic development, whose outcome gleaned from the history of the west promises an end to poverty and present discontents, can thus become a categorical imperative to which all behavior must be subordinated. Further, to the extent that new states are not yet nations, the "economic plan" may seem to have the political advantage of expressing goals that cut across parochial loyalties and values, and provide a focus for nation-building.

What I have said so far explains my doubts about the prospects for democracy in the new states. In conclusion let me say that I am far from being convinced that totalitarian political orders represent the wave of the future. Coser, I believe, is too much impressed by the efficiency of Soviet-type totalitar-

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ian regimes. That the Soviet Union has achieved impressive production records year after year is undeniable. Yet the inflexibility of totalitarian political orders —the insistence on ideological conformity and the consequent suppression of free and open discussion—has also created economic problems. "Great leaps forward," distinguished only for being neither great nor forward, are not a surprising consequence of a system that inhibits the opportunity for criticizing the nostrums of party leaders. And the evidence continues to mount of troubles in the Communist countryside, arising in part from the Communists' paranoiac fear of the peasantry and their unwillingness to give greater play to individual incentives. If, as well may be the case, the key to growth in the underdeveloped economies lies in the agrarian sector, the example of totalitarian Communism may not be so impressive. Furthermore, while the new states may adapt Soviet planning techniques to their special needs, they will be far from anxious to enter into any political relationships which jeopardize the independence so recently won from the Western imperialist nations. This in the long run may be the strongest bar to the extension of Communist regimes in the new states of the world.

Lewis Coser comments

Horst Brand apparently believes that one cannot write about a topic such as this without reaffirming the old verities. So let me reassure him: I believe capitalism to be a Bad Thing, and imperialism an even Worse Thing. And I am firmly opposed to Economic Exploitation. These matters being disposed of, what then are Brand's other complaints?

1. He thinks that I suggest that the leadership of the New Nations have unlimited freedom of choice, as to political and social alternatives of development. In fact the whole burden of my piece was to show that the situation in which they find themselves precludes for the time being various types of "choices," such as parliamentary democracy, the application of the liberal model, or democratic socialism. I tried to show that among the limited options open to them some form of authoritarianism was the most likely for the immediate period ahead, but that in the longer run other alternatives would open up. If Brand wishes to argue however, that no choice exists at all then I can only say that this type of determinism is a metaphysical doctrine of dubious validity. Men choose, I would suggest, within certain limits imposed by the social structure in which they find themselves; they are actors, not puppets. More concretely, economic structures, such as capitalism, do not in and of themselves determine political structures. Capitalism flourished under the British liberal regime, but it also developed under Bismarck and Napoleon III. He who denies the limited autonomy of the political sphere cannot understand the history of modern Europe—or any other history for that matter.

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2. Brand accuses me of adhering to a naive and social democratic theory of pluralism. I stand accused, but fail to understand why in his concluding sentences he states that "a plural state [is] indispensable for human development." He can't very well have it both ways.

3. Brand fails to understand that though everything in the real world is indeed connected, analysis requires concentration on certain factors and the temporary neglect of others. I am not unaware of the fact that the West has a powerful influence on the further development of the New Nations—as has the East. I preferred in the article at hand to concentrate on the internal dynamics within the New Nations. Of course, in some ultimate sense everything is connected with everything, but the logic of exposition requires one to suspend consideration of many of these connections at least for the time being. Brand, being an economist, ought to be fairly familiar with the "all other things being equal" procedure.

4. Where I have advocated a "hands off" policy in this article I don't know. I specifically stated several times that the liberal model is not applicable in the New Nations, and that a large measure of planning is a vital necessity for them.

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Mr. de Schweinitz's comments seem to me to supplement rather than to contradict what I had to say. I agree with him that some form of authoritarian regimes will most probably be the characteristic political feature of the New Nations in the near future. I prefer to think that in later stages other alternatives may open up especially if autonomous centers of power and initiative are allowed to grow during the period of authoritarian rule. Mr. de Schweinitz is more pessimistic in this respect. One can clearly make no dogmatic prognostications here, and I am perfectly willing to concede that for the time being the main drift doesn't seem to be in the direction I think possible and desirable. But then, it is not the first time that history has provided us with surprises.

SOME FRAME OF MIND

Arguing for a Baltimore parent, Mrs. Madalyn E. Murray, Attorney Leonard J. Kerpelman told the court yesterday that a public school cannot have a "somewhat" religious practice or a "shade of religion." He said that Mrs. Murray's son, William, 16, had been spat upon, assaulted and subjected to schoolboy and teacher sanctions because he dared to walk out on religious exercises. The Murrays are avowed atheists.

Francis B. Burch and George W. Baker, Baltimore city solicitors appearing for the city school board, countered by saying that the religious observances were not compulsory and are considered by school authorities mainly to be a good practice for the benefit of the children and to put them in a good frame of mind.

—*Newsday*

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BOOKS

And We Are Frightened

ONE DAY IN THE LIFE OF IVAN DENISOVICH, by Alexander Solzhenitsyn. Translated from the Russian by Ralph Parker. Dutton. 160 pp. $3.95.
ONE DAY IN THE LIFE OF IVAN DENISOVICH, by Alexander Solzhenitsyn. Translated from the Russian by Max Hayward and Ronald Hingley. Praeger. 210 pp. $3.95.

The simultaneous appearance of two translations of Solzhenitsyn's remarkable concentration-camp novel climaxed a rat-race between rival publishers. Dutton touted its entry as the only "authorized" version, while Praeger countered with a "press-release" stating that its version was *NOT* authorized by Moscow and denouncing Ralph Parker as "a fervent apologist for the Soviet regime." "We think," they added, "that Mr. Solzhenitsyn deserves better interpreters." As *The Times Literary Supplement* remarks, "it seems mean and silly to suggest that a man's political opinions are bound to affect his ability to translate." We have had quite enough by now of cold-war hot air; when it is used for commercial motives, it becomes specious indeed. After all, the Tyrant *is* dead although a wag at Harvard has suggested the formation of a Society for the Resuscitation of Stalinism (SRS) for the benefit of those intellectuals who feel that they cannot live without the Enemy. We ought today to look at Soviet life and literature coolly. Once having sobered up, we would no longer regard the Ehrenburgs and Yevtushenkos as either heroic "rebels" or conniving schemers.

Meanwhile, it is a pleasure to report that *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich* is a first rate piece of prose. This is the story of a Russian peasant, Ivan Denisovich Shukhov, who taken prisoner by the Germans in the early years of the war manages to escape and find his way back to the Russian troops only to be unjustly condemned for treason and sentenced to ten years in a concentration camp. "Why am I here?" he asks at one point. "Because they didn't get ready like they should've in forty-one? Was that *my* fault?"

Once in prison he is both resigned and alert; this is the only way to stay alive. The simple pleasures count: a drag on a cigarette butt, a rare extra portion of mush, the tension and relief of successfully smuggling something past the guards, above all, pleasure and pride in work. Ivan Denisovich is a bricklayer. He hides his favorite trowel so that it won't be stolen. "Even after eight years in camps . . . he couldn't stand things being wasted." The account of the building of a wall

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in sub-zero temperatures is one of the best things in the book. For a moment the reader is startled; he thinks he is back in one of those tedious five-year-plan novels but Solzhenitsyn succeeds —where his socialist realist predecessors with their hollow rhetoric ("we're building, comrades") failed—in restoring to work its genuine satisfactions. It is a sign of the art of this book that one is always expecting something frightful to happen but that except for one chilling paragraph on the isolation cells nothing too terrible does take place. The concluding sentences are masterful in their irony:

> Shukhov went to sleep and he was very happy. He'd had a lot of luck today. They hadn't put him in the cooler. The gang hadn't been chased out to work in the Socialist Community Development. He'd finagled an extra bowl of mush at noon. The boss had gotten them good rates for their work. He'd felt good making that wall. They hadn't found that piece of steel in the frisk. Caesar had paid him off in the evening. He'd brought some tobacco. And he'd gotten over that sickness.
>
> Nothing had spoiled the day and it had been almost happy.
>
> There were three thousand six hundred and fifty-three days like this in his sentence, from reveille to lights out.
>
> The three extra ones were because of the leap years. . . .

Ivan Denisovich is a decent, ordinary, uncultured man. Caesar Markovich, the one intellectual ("he smoked to help his mind come up with great ideas") among the prisoners he regards with a combination of respect, incomprehension and good-natured irony. Here he is listening to a discussion between Caesar and another prisoner about Eisenstein's *Ivan the Terrible*:

> Too much art is no art at all. Like candy instead of bread! And the politics of it is utterly vile—vindication of a one-man tyranny. An insult to the memory of three generations of Russian intellectuals!
>
> "But what other treatment of the subject would have been let through. . . ?"
>
> "Ha! *Let through,* you say? Then don't call him a genius! Call him a toady, say he carried out orders like a dog. A genius doesn't adapt his treatment to the task of tyrants!"
>
> "Hm, hm!" Shukhov cleared his throat. He was afraid to butt in on this learned conversation.

Solzhenitsyn himself is an intellectual who is conscious and who makes us conscious of much that Ivan Denisovich cannot grasp. Choosing a simple but shrewd peasant for his hero, he is able to dispense with rhetoric: there is no Russian breast-beating here. Knowing from experience that "there's nothing you can't do to a man," Ivan Denisovich preserves through all his trials a simple code: he doesn't take or give bribes, he doesn't squeal on other prisoners, he keeps up rudimentary table-manners ("He ate the [fish] eyes too when they were still in place, but when they'd come off and were floating around in the bowl on their own, he didn't eat them. The others laughed at him for this"), and he prides himself on the fact that "after eight years of hard labor, he was still no scavenger and the more time went on the more he stuck to his guns." Ivan Denisovich is rewarded for his virtues at the end: "Shukhov'd had such a good day, he didn't even feel like sleeping, he felt so great." That sentence will naturally make us think of Ernest Hemingway and it is surely no accident, as the Soviets are fond of saying, that in the November issue of *Novy Mir* that includes Solzhenitsyn's novel there is a translation of a Hemingway story. For

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the rest, Solzhenitsyn has heeded Chekhov's sage admonition: if you wish to write about harrowing things, keep your descriptions cold. Leo Tolstoy once said of Andreyev's rhetorical stories of the Russo-Japanese War: "Andreyev says 'boo' but I am not frightened." Alexander Solzhenitsyn never says "boo" but we are very frightened indeed. GEORGE SIEGEL

Capital Punishment and Warden Duffy

88 MEN AND 2 WOMEN, by Clinton T. Duffy with Al Hirshberg. Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1962.

"If I could have my last wish,"
Said the prisoner one day
As they led him from the death cell
To the chair not far away,
"Please grant me this request, sir,
Ere you tighten up the strap,
Just tell the Warden I would love
To hold him on my lap."

88 Men and 2 Women is a journalistic chronicle of the execution chambers of the sovereign state of California. Its author—a jailer who has won wide respect and even love—tells of numerous instances of hanging and gassing at San Quentin in the last several decades. The extent to which Warden Duffy was betrayed by his collaborator into merely gossiping about judicial killing is uncertain; the mindlessness of the book must, however, be Duffy's fault. Since he chose —or was persuaded—to avoid writing the brutally honest history of legal slaying which he, better than any other living American, could have written, it is disappointing that he did not present so much as one sustained argument against capital punishment.

A prison guard's son, Duffy was born at San Quentin in 1898; he was raised and educated there; he married a guard's daughter. After holding administrative jobs at the prison, he became Warden in 1940; he finally left San Quentin in 1952, resigning to accept a post with a correctional authority. From all accounts, the compassion and fearlessness Warden Duffy has shown cannot be exaggerated. A man of conventional and even parochial outlook, he is extraordinary for possessing the courage of his humanity. For years he has been California's leading advocate of the abolition of judicial slaying.

Perhaps because of his rearing and character, Warden Duffy has been unwilling to disgorge the violence and depth of his half-century intimacy with the state's use of rope and cyanide. *88 Men and 2 Women*—the persons whose killings Duffy himself administered—often reads like a travesty on Duffy's abiding decency in the

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midst of the institutional hideousness he supervised; there are moments when the burden and suffering are rendered cutely. The joking, pathetic doggerel quoted at the beginning of this review was handed to Duffy by a young convict just before he inhaled the fumes California had allotted him. Those lines are as close to—and as far from—gallows humor as anything in the book.

42 states in the Union legally slay; those whom they slay are especially likely to be poor, young, and male; very often they are Negroes. Those killed by states, the offences for which states kill them, the ways in which they kill them and the time they take about killing them—in every one of these regards, and indeed in every conceivably relevant regard, capital punishment is inequitable. Of course it is consistent with upholding capital punishment to regret sincerely its many inequities and even to work toward eliminating them. Paradoxically, if such an effort were to succeed, the consequence—especially of furnishing equal resources to all defendants and of achieving non-discrimination in verdicts—would be that no one or next to no one would ever be judicially killed.

Warden Duffy's book gives a rough but adequate picture of the inequities involved in capital punishment. Among the arguments against capital punishment itself that he starts but does not develop, there are three on which I want to comment. First, Duffy alleges that statistics have established that capital punishment is not a successful deterrent. Secondly, he approvingly cites a remark of Clarence Darrow's to the effect that no one can ever know what someone else deserves. Thirdly, Duffy rightly stresses the possibility—it is known to have actually occurred a number of times this century—of judicial killing of the wrong man.

In regard to the conclusion from statistics: Thorstein Sellin and many other authorities have testified that statistics have not yet shown either that capital punishment deters or that it fails to deter; at most, statistical studies strongly suggest that capital punishment is not a powerful deterrent.

Darrow's remark—that no human being ever knows what another deserves—is absurd, particularly in view of its utter generality. In any case, Darrow did not realize, nor does Duffy, that even *if it were known in some cases* that individuals deserved to die, institutions of capital punishment would still be far from justified. This would be so even if no inequities whatever attached to them.

Notably missing from the large literature on capital punishment—and no ethical philosopher has begun to cope with the task—is a careful examination of the moral intuitions of civilized, disinterested and humane persons about what people who commit grievous crimes deserve. Suppose, however, that rational certainty that some criminals *deserve to die* could be attained. What is more, imagine that moral clarity was achieved of such a kind that a reasonable basis was provided for concluding that if some crim-

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HOLY OF HOLIES

" 'Taxmanship—The Fine Art of Filing Income Taxes Without Really Cheating' is the title of the sermon on which Rabbi H. Joseph Simckes will preach at Temple Beth Am, Randolph'" — *Boston Globe*, March 14.

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inals received their just deserts, they would not merely die, they would be *put to death*. Even then, capital punishment would not have been justified. To mention only two of several problems that would remain: first, *who* is to do the killing? Warden Duffy's book, and this is probably its chief merit, conveys a sense of the difficulty of answering this question. Could we *require* of anyone that he perform the state's judicial killing? Should we *allow* anyone to do it? Secondly, there is always—always—the possibility of judicial error; in the case of capital punishment, irrevocable error, never to be compensated. Indeed, this consideration alone should be enough to persuade all those who are now sure that some criminals deserve to be *put* to death, that institutions of capital punishment are unjustifiable.

One word more: Science and technology have, at last, made it possible for all men to live in circumstances that are not economically miserable; they have also made it a real possibility that most, if not all, of acquiescent mankind will be killed by its nation-states. In this universal crisis of promise and terror, when finally war is no longer the health of the state, should there be continued, agitated concern for the tiny fraction of human victims of capital punishment? In 1956, in England, during the House of Lords' debate on hanging, Earl Winterton deplored "the intense illogicality of British moral reasoning"; he said that "Intense emotion has been displayed . . . over the fact that each year some twelve or fourteen persons —who, quite frankly, both for their own sake and that of the public, are probably better put out of this world —have been hanged." Among other remarkable aspects of these words, there is the ignorance they reveal of an elementary moral fact: that a question of the life or death of any one person suffices for moral seriousness and urgency.

DAVID SACHS

Essays on the Russian Question

THE BUREAUCRATIC REVOLUTION, by Max Shachtman. New York: Donald Press, 360 pp. $2.95. (paper)

During the 1940s and 1950s the author of this book was the leader of a tiny radical organization, the Independent Socialist League. Originally a fracture from the American Trotskyist movement—it quarrelled with Trotsky over the character of the Russo-Finnish war, insisting that the Russian invasion was an act of imperialism, no more deserving of political support than the Trotskyists were willing to give any of the belligerent powers—the ISL, under Shachtman's intellectual guidance, soon moved

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away from the Leninist tradition and uneasily approached the politics of what might be called left social democracy. The group was, I think, the most intellectually reflective, and therefore the most indecisive and tortured, of the recent American Marxist tendencies; it kept breaking into various fragments, a very few members going back to Trotskyism, another few of its leading figures onto the editorial board of DISSENT when the magazine was started in 1953, and most, under Shachtman's leadership, into the Socialist party several years ago.

Within the terms of the Marxism to which he still adheres, Shachtman was the most gifted political thinker to emerge from the anti-Stalinist left in the United States. But because he seldom tried to reach an audience beyond the hermetic left-wing world, because he clung to an unpopular version of Marxism, and because his gifts showed themselves better in speech—he was a brilliant debater—than in writing, where his weakness for prolixity too often overcame him, he did not gain a reputation in the intellectual world.

Shachtman has now collected the articles he wrote for *The New International,* a Marxist journal, on "the Russian question," the major issue, though after a time not the only one, leading to his divergence from Trotskyism. These articles, reprinted here without change, suffer from a narrowness of frame: too many are polemics against orthodox Trotskyism and therefore stale (though the long attack on Isaac Deutscher remains extremely cogent); they are repetitious and verbose; and they simply assume a number of Marxist premises which many socialists have since been obliged to question. One wishes that Shachtman had troubled to write a book based on his articles, structuring his argument and dropping the references and asides which now merely irritate. But if the book shows evidence of indiscipline, it also shows something quite admirable: a man trying to *think,* struggling to preserve convictions deeply imbedded in his experience yet constrained by the evidence and by his own sense of intellectual obligation to modify some of his ideas and abandon others.

The difference between Shachtman and Trotsky came finally to rest on whether Stalinist Russia could still be designated as a "workers state." In effect Trotsky argued that the continued state ownership of major industries in Russia, occurring as it did in the context of a revolutionary disintegration, warranted calling Russia a "workers state," even if also a degenerated and, apparent paradox, a counterrevolutionary "workers state." Shachtman argued that mere state ownership of basic industries, even if it were the last remnant of a proletarian revolution, did not warrant calling Russia a "workers state," for in regard to a statified economy the decisive criterion was not the property *form,* that is, nationalization of industry, but property *relations,* that is, which class has control of the nationalized property. In an economy that is statified, political and economic power tend to become indistinguishable, and, argued Shachtman, if it is true, as both he and Trotsky recognized, that the workers in Russia had no power under the Stalinist dictatorship, then there was no meaningful sense in which Russia could be called a "workers state." Since he also agreed with Trotsky that the term "state capitalism" was

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too vague and confusing to be applied to the kind of society emerging in Russia, he ventured upon the bold step—bold, certainly, for a Marxist—of calling Russian society "bureaucratic collectivist."

> The name [he writes] is meant to reject the belief that Stalinist society is in any way socialist or is compatible with socialism; and to reject as well the belief that it is capitalist or moving toward capitalism . . . I regard this new society . . . as a unique form of class exploitation and oppression. The vast majority is dominated by a minority which monopolizes all political and economic power and aims at maintaining social relations that are even more alien to socialism than they are to capitalism. The ruling class too is unique, in that it does not own the national property which it rules but does "own" the state. It derives its vast economic power and privilege exclusively from the political power it exercises through its chosen instrument, the Communist party. The roots of its power over society reposing entirely in this political power, the ruling class cannot permit even such measures of popular political control as are possible under capitalism . . . The totalitarian character of the Stalinist regime is thereby determined and—despite the concessions and modifications it may grant under popular pressure—thereby fixed.

Put so briefly and schematically, the issue at stake may seem parochial. But it was not. Much can be said against the anti-Stalinist left of the past few decades, but it needs also to be said to its credit that, in its own special vocabulary and within its constricted range of analysis, it anticipated a number of crucial problems troubling serious political thinkers at the present time. Shachtman's theory, for one thing, in making the existence of political democracy the major criterion for designating a society as a "workers State," undercut the various brands of "vulgar Marxism" which still flourish at the moment, and often in the strangest places. Saying this much, however, Shachtman had to face severe and perhaps insoluble problems: e.g., given the universal trend toward state ownership of major industries, is "bureaucratic collectivism" merely an historical quirk, the product of peculiar conditions created by an effort to

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establish a proletarian regime in a backward nation like Russia, or is it a portent of a world society of tomorrow, replacing traditional capitalism and reducing socialism either to historical obsolescence or to an ethical ideal no longer, as Marxists had supposed it to be, an integral part of the historic process?

In any case, the articles collected in this book should be of value to all those who wish to study Russian society at a level more serious than journalistic speculation and empirical notation. Which makes one regret again that the solid thought and analytic gifts displayed in these essays were not put at the service of an integrated book that would analyze the origins and nature of "bureaucratic collectivism."

IRVING HOWE

The World as a Movie

THE IMAGE: OR WHAT HAPPENED TO THE AMERICAN DREAM, by Daniel J. Boorstin. Atheneum, 1962. 315 pp. $5.00.

In his study of English poetry and its resources, F. W. Bateson quips about "the non-ruling classes who are more planned against than planning." He can afford the quip for he writes with a confidence in the style and possibilities of a managing elite which no reader of a study like Daniel Boorstin's *The Image* will be able to muster. The scene depicted here reminds one, rather, of the scene in the movie *Pimpernel Smith* when the Nazi general brags to his foe, an historian and archeologist who had complained about the instant coffee offered him: "In Germany we have discovered that substitutes are better than the real thing."

Professor Boorstin's subject is the enormous range of substitutes for the real thing which affect the quality of our everyday experience and resources. He writes with urgency about daily bombardments of newscasts and song and celebration which serve mainly to reinforce stale habits of judgment and feeling and to diminish character and sensibility. Not that some conspiracy is afoot to bury the qualities of judgment and feeling—like his predecessors over the last ten years who have written about the fall into spectatorship of publics lonely or organized or waist-high or status-bound or idbound or distracted, Professor Boorstin is quick to observe that "the problem is created by people working industriously at respectable jobs . . . not by demagogues or conspiracy or evil purpose." Something's gone amiss with "the whole machinery of our society." Those involved in oiling the machinery are dedicated, if stupid; well-intentioned, if wrong-headed; respectable, if inert. They are, all in all, "men of good will." It's a nice

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irony, though, that a time which has prided itself on its moral and intellectual superiority to the "innocence" of previous decades should so eagerly avow the awesome innocence of its own failures.

Typically, Professor Boorstin attributes the deceptions he discusses to an innocent mechanical hitch of industrialism which he dubs the Graphic Revolution. He means simply the techniques of printing and photography—techniques whereby any experience or thing under the sun can be turned into a version of itself. In his first, and best, chapters Professor Boorstin notes how a compulsive mass interest in versions of What Happened leads to the rehearsal and production of facsimiles of the eventful manufactured for the market like toys. What Boorstin authoritatively describes here reinforces exactly the same impression of the American character one receives from Riesman, Whyte, *et. al.* That impression is of a character as little "wrapped up in himself" as can be; one whose eye—despite all the to-do about togetherness or the drooling over Salinger's coy hokum—is fixed everywhere but on his own immediate state, and immediate conflicts. He is obsessed with knowing all about What Happened rather than gaining a knowledge of What Is. Such gaping does not make for dispassionateness or a critical objectivity. Instead, it makes for that further compulsion toward a waterfall of "facts" which leads those who provide them to arrange anticipations of "fact" by way of staged interviews, planted "leaks," and other publicist's methods. Boorstin defines such carefully plotted items as "pseudo-events." Most of these, packaged and labelled to suit ingrained opinions and stock responses are, of course, a matter of publicity. *The Image* offers a valuable reminder of just how, and how pervasively, publicity has become the substitute for "news."

We are reminded of how publicity affects celebrity by being equated with it; and travel by turning the experience into a tour of the most publicized places by the most publicized means; and "ideals" by expressing them in the chants of the copywriter (the friendly Attend the Church of Your Choice gambit, with its built-in push —Or Else—exemplifies average copywriting method). In turn, stars of sport, screen, space, or culture are tamed by their publicity into fitting their image-frame.

Boorstin objects to the image-bound experience, as being "little more than interior decoration," a process of "invention rather than discovery." Belabored by what has been pre-judged and pre-digested to suit our anticipations, we are becoming more and more like Hollywood's movies about us.

Occasionally, the strictures on art reproductions or Cook's tours sound like the chant unfailingly recited by reviewers of translated works: ah-but-so-much-has - been - lost - of - the - original! More to the point is how much of the original always gets through—especially when a heavyweight's involved, even a paragon like Flaubert or Vermeer. The "message" and style of a major artist willy-nilly make their way. How they make their way is a process which technology indeed makes different for each generation. Those developments in the present popular romance with art-and-culture which resemble a circus, complete with art-tamers and their breathless audience, bring to mind Samuel Butler's point:

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better to have loved and lost than never to have lost at all.

Although we expect a novelist or poet to be as fascinated by the "frivolous" aspects of a scene as by any other, we expect from a venturesome scholar an instructive definition of issues. The whole question of the morality of mass communications which *The Image* especially evokes, one which Raymond Williams tackles in the concluding sections of his *Culture and Society,* is skimped over. Professor Boorstin's concluding pitch is to advise that each individual find his own shelter, so to say, against the image fall-out. This tip, as inspiring as it may seem, is astonishingly lacking in moral point. *The Image* is not an intellectually exciting work.

One reason is that it concentrates on the managed majority and ignores the managing establishment. A more qualified slant would have enlarged the book's perspective, and strengthened its style. For all the urgency of purpose, the repetitive, simplified, mildly hortatory tone curiously echoes that of the primer. Primer-fashion, tidbits of local history fill out the chapters; we are given—again— the stories of Lindbergh and P. T. Barnum and *The Reader's Digest* and the Star System. This rehashing of oft-told tales leads to a tiresome informativeness ". . . the addition of sound signalized by Al Jolson's *The Jazz Singer* in 1927 . . ." When he shifts gear from information to exhortation, Boorstin sounds the chantable rhythms of the Sunday supplements: "The hero was a big man; the celebrity is a big name." And to say pseudo-events thrive on "our honest desire to be informed" is to be coy. A Burckhardt or Freud would have written instead: "our surly desire to escape into information." The need for escape, of course, is a fact of life—of modern life an increasingly grim fact. The abnormality arises when an act more escapist and trite than taking dope or watching a vintage Tarzan movie is rationalized as stalwart good citizenship or an "honest desire to be informed." Instant information is the opiate of the public.

Nor does Boorstin help the eventfulness of his own book when he writes solemnly that ". . . in the making of pseudo-events . . . newsmen find ample scope for their individuality and creative imagination," for this amoral statement might be found in a brochure plugging the advantages of majoring in journalism, and it helps corrupt further any meaning that may still attach to the words "individual," "creative" or "imagination." More accurately, what newsmen usually express in their "creations" is professional cynicism and expertness in doublethink. Boorstin's patient, cosy manner becomes positively governessy when, in recommending a book on *The Reader's Digest* for its "statistics and anecdotes" (!) he cautions that it is also "critical and often snide." (What else could a book on that monster be?)

These few instances are typical of a mode of address which has become standard in such sociological trots-round-the-scene. In contrast to critical essays which used to be written in a tone suggested by a title like *The Air-Conditioned Nightmare,* essays whose contents are, actually, every bit as chilling, now appear fussy with reassurances and prefaced, or interspersed, with declarations of love, faith, and humility. The stance assumed by their authors is that of the stout fellow, the plain blunt man on the road. But the manner of the Stout Fellow school

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of criticism is so much at odds with the macabre scene it describes as to add a final piquant touch to the all-round grotesqueness of that scene. The Stout Fellow style is not one shaped for a Great Audience. Well, this is the day of anti-heroes in fiction, and anti-heroic styles in sociology.

T. J. Ross

SIQUEIROS

continued from page 106

out telling the truth about his crimes, is to maintain injustice. To speak of Siqueiros as a great painter who through some arbitrariness of the state languishes in jail, is to play a dangerous game of political double-talk. Those who have lived through the 1930s and '40s when the arts were used as instruments of Communist politics and the fascist threats to the liberty of the artist were arguments for support of Stalin's policies—though Stalin had no respect for that liberty at home and exterminated some of the greatest Russian writers—those who remember the petitions and appeals of that time, signed by artists in perfect good faith, will look more skeptically at the gross formulations of the Siqueiros letter.

I urge those who have approved the Siqueiros letter to read the statement issued by a group of French writers, addressed to the committee of artists that sponsored an Exhibit in Homage to Siqueiros. (It is printed in the Bulletin d'Informations of the Commission for the Truth About the Crimes of Stalin, May 1962.) They review the history of his crimes and refuse to ally themselves with those who picture the Communist politico Siqueiros as a pure artist, victimized by a reactionary regime. It is their statement, I hear, that led Picasso to refuse to join the sponsors of the exhibition.

The appeal for Siqueiros has also its comic ambiguities. We are told that Siqueiros, a man for whom painting is his life, is being kept from his easel and that mankind as a result is denied all those masterpieces which we would possess if Siqueiros were free. When this argument was presented in Paris at a meeting of the International Association of Art Critics in order to win their support for the appeal, an inquiry at the Mexican embassy disclosed the fact that Siqueiros was able to paint in prison. We hear now that he paints two or three canvasses a week and sells them for over three thousand dollars apiece. Never has he been so productive, never has he contributed so much to the cultural patrimony of Mexico and the world—assuming, of course, that his paintings are good. During much of his life he has been a Communist militant, more active in leading demonstrations, planning and participating in murders, and carrying out faithfully the instructions of the Moscow dictators, than in painting pictures. In prison perhaps he has at last found himself as an artist.

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A Cuba Meeting

Not the least of the consequences of *fidelismo* has been its effect upon a section of American radical youth. At a meeting organized by DISSENT and held in New York City on February 22, an instructive, if ironic, illustration of this occurred.

The meeting, attended by about 400 people, had been organized as a symposium on the Cuban revolution. The idea was to have a broad discussion on the nature of *fidelismo,* emphasizing Cuba itself rather than reiterating an opposition to the American government's actions toward Cuba which all of the participants presumably shared.

Among the speakers were Daniel M. Friedenberg, a DISSENT Contributing Editor, two anti-Castro Cubans belonging to the revolutionary socialist JURE (totally removed from the reactionary exile groups of Miami), Leo Sauvage of *Figaro* and author of a recent book on Castro, Dave Dellinger of the pacifist magazine *Liberation,* and Samuel Shapiro, well-known writer on Latin American affairs. While strenuous efforts were made, without success, to obtain as a speaker Waldo Frank (honorary chairman of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee), spokesmen of explicit propaganda groups were not invited. The point was to have a *discussion* on the issues, not a series of speakers.

The consensus among DISSENT editors—not of course an "official" line—has often been expressed in the magazine: hostility to any and all attempts by the American government to "solve" the Cuban problem by unilateral action (invasion, bombing, etc.); opposition to the Castro regime as a travesty of socialism and democracy; sympathy and support to the Cuban people in their efforts to free themselves from *all* foreign domination and to establish their own form of democracy. The charge made at the meeting by one of the speakers sympathetic to Fidel Castro that the meeting was "stacked" is both factually absurd and a slur on the chairman of the meeting, Dennis Wrong, who incidentally was not a member of the DISSENT board at the time of the meeting. However, if the "charge" implies a general hostility on the part of DISSENT editors to the Castro regime, then at least I, as organizer of the meeting, acknowledge its accuracy.

My intention here is not to review the entire meeting (it lasted almost three hours), nor to describe the at-times heated exchange that developed. Suffice it to say that apologists and supporters of the Castro police-state, both avowed and tacit, got in their licks freely and at length. By contrast, I have yet to hear of a pro-Castro meeting (those organized by the *Monthly Review* group, for example) which gave equal time to opponents or even invited a lone dissenter.

I do want to comment, however, on the astonishing attitude of a fair part of the audience (at least a quarter, my guess would be), particularly when stirred up by Dave Dellinger, editor of *Liberation.* This section of the audience seemed to consist largely of young people and it supported Mr. Dellinger consistently and emotionally. One asks, why?

Mr. Dellinger, a pacifist of long and honorable standing, is a kind of hit-and run driver who does, however, return to the scene of the accident and apologetically seek to make amends. After raising the cry of "stacked meeting" and the even more outrageous cry of "counter-revolutionary" against those who oppose the Castro regime, he proceeded to withdraw all this his second time round! Which was the real Mr. D?

More important and disturbing than the confused apologetics of Dave Dellinger on behalf of what he, a pacifist!, offhandedly admits to be a "totalitarian police state," is the apparent taste of certain young radicals for this kind of "tough" regime. Many of them have decided to close their minds even to the facts presented by such Cuban socialists as those who spoke at the DISSENT meeting and who blasted to the ground the claims of Castro as having carried through great social reforms. These young people circumvent the need for political analysis of the Castro regime by two entirely contradictory rationalizations: (a) they deny that Castro runs a dictatorship; (b) they claim that dictatorial measures are necessary in Cuba because of U. S. pressure. Emotionally committed to the image of Fidel, they will neither reason nor respond to facts. In this sense, they fulfill only too well the portrait of such "new-left" young radicals presented in DISSENT (cf.

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Socialist Ideals

Editors:

Julian Mayfield's letter rebutting Lewis Coser's assessment of his piece in the "Young Radicals" symposium was printed without comment, I suppose, on grounds that it damns itself. It does. One hates to fall back on labels, but the fact is it takes a powerful self-restraint to stop mumbling "neo-Stalinist" in the reading of it. Coser was right, in the formal sense, to rest his case.

The trouble is, where does this leave us? Most of the bright young left militants who contributed to the symposium are soft on Castro, show more than a passing sympathy for Nasser, see "something wonderfully hopeful" in China, and find little to complain of in the actions of Nkrumah and Touré. Those on the left who say, "Yes, but . . .", and raise questions about the one-party, implicitly totalitarian character of these regimes get a reaction in which they are accused, in substance, of being wise but irrelevant. To have lived through a political war or two . . . casts one in the role of a finger-shaker. To act with confidence on the left, now, it seems necessary to have been born yesterday.

What we are left with is a tearing dilemma. A humanly understandable, if intellectually and morally deplorable response is that of the late C. Wright Mills: deny what you know, affirm what you feel —*act*- If the alternative is simply the reverse, deny what you feel and affirm what you know, the young radicals are going to continue to prefer the brand of myth to the stone of what they characteristically call a sterile intellectualism.

But there is another way, which I think is implicit in Norman Mailer's hope that DISSENT will choose a role for itself in the future that includes "existential exploration" as well as programmatic comment on the performance of the Kennedy Administration. Concretely, in terms of the dilemma I have just noted, this could mean that we should affirm both and deny neither. The inconsistency between what we feel and what we know would than be not so much an embarrassment as a source of insight . . .

I do not suggest that the "Senior Radicals" (Mayfield's term) depoliticize themselves and become philosophers. The category of the political is not limited to the devising of programs and of tactics for realizing them. Somebody has to concern himself with the question of what the programs are for. To argue the reverse is to fall into the error of a historically misplaced, misunderstood, and misapplied Leninism.

In any case, the "Juniors" of the new left will not be taught by the "Seniors." And where they want to go, or think they want to go, the seniors will not and cannot lead them.

Nor will it do to take the position that the Mayfields are honest but misguided. Honest they are, if by that we mean that their political intuitions are real and sincerely felt. (Who has not suffered from "secret sympathy for Nasser"—like Al Capp's character—at times? It must be conceded that the leftist tyrants have a certain appeal.) But how can their "guidance" be improved as long as we do not know what to guide them for or lead them to? The fact is, there is nothing much to be done in the way of high-styled political action in the United States at our moment in history. Nonetheless, the political bent continues: there is the sense of injustice in the world and the will to do something about it. I submit that the role of the veteran radical in relation to the new man should be neither to chastise him (Coser) nor to endorse his mindless militancy (Mills). Instead, we should make a greater effort to take him and his political intuitions seriously, to try to understand him in his own terms. We cannot lead him, since what he wants is a grand, revolutionary goal and we have none to offer. We can continue to try to educate him, but broadly and indirectly, more by asking questions than by supplying him with correct answers to questions he never asked in the first place. Perhaps our role (and of course I

Fall 1961 issue: "New Styles in Fellow-Traveling," pgs. 497–98) by Irving Howe and Lewis Coser. It is hard not to feel a certain dismay and shock, at this late date, at the ease with which they dismiss democratic and socialist values in the name of tough-mindedness. There are times when, remembering the last few decades, one cannot but feel that history does, alas, repeat itself. S. P.

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am thinking of DISSENT, as the acknowledged forum and in some sense the senior spokesman for the independent left) should be something like that of the Zen master: respond to the neophyte's question with another, better question, and thus engage him in a dialogue. The protean richness, the immediacy of the younger man's experience could then be set against the intellectual thoroughness, the quality of organization in the older man political intelligence in fruitful counterpoint.

Julian Mayfield is still stiff-necked as ever, in spite of his metaphorical self-hanging. He is exasperating, but he is *there.* I submit that the content of the existential exploration Mailer hopes will supplement the programmatic criticism of the liberal establishment in the pages of DISSENT should be directed as much at *our* exasperation as at *their* inability to get the lessons of history straight. We are sure of the correctness of our analysis, but not so sure of its relevance; they are confident of their intuitions, but not altogether sure what they mean. Their thoughts are vigorous but not always vigorous. In this functional complementarity of two aspects of the political intelligence there ought to be the basis for a cooperative and mutually respectful inquiry into the content of contemporary political experience. We may hope, though this, to get a better sense of what socialist ideals mean in the modern world, and what socialist political action in the best sense entails.

F. WILLIAM HOWTON

Who Will be Judge?

Editors:

What are artists' crimes as artists? What artists are for murder? Who knows, except artists themselves, especially "action" artists, what artists will not do to sell their paintings, win prizes and commissions, and publicize their art-personalities and careers?

Isn't all that we know about David Alfaro Siqueiros what we read in the publications of the Museum of Modern Art in New York? For an action painter, what is a myth if it's not as good as a pile?

If Siqueiros is not a "persecuted artist and a champion of school teachers and of popular freedom," what is he? What do the protesters against the protest of Siqueiros' imprisonment want "done" to him, if he is what they think he "infamously" is?

Last year at the College Art Association Convention, at a symposium on the "Environment of the Artist," I made a suggestion, in relation to this particular problem, that space be provided in the Museum of Modern Art's New Building Program, for an Artists' Prison, which would take care of all artists who are guilty of being not "mere artists" but "living myths" of one kind or another.

What artists will serve on the Museum's Jury?

AD REINHARDT

PRINTERS

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times. The liberals who cursed the strike as "immoral"—haven't they resolved as well that all strikes are immoral and unforgivable? A year ago a prominent *union official,* who "represents" labor in such public bodies as the Board of Education, called the teachers' strike a disaster. What was disastrous about it? Teachers have struck in France, for example, without retarding the mental development of a notable number of children.

It could well be labor needs other weapons than the strike. Compulsory arbitration? No; most sections of the labor movement have quite properly resisted it. Is the strike, born of independence, passion and need, outdated—or is still a painful last resort? Must the unions become the property of the Jimmy Hoffas, or can they still serve their ends decently and militantly? Beyond that question lies the greater one—are unions necessary? The printers, in their own situation, supplied enough of an answer for themselves and for the present. And some liberals ought to be having sober second thoughts—or first ones.

EMANUEL GELTMAN

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